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This study considers how Serbian border security sector reform illuminates questions of 
force and statecraft in a southern European nation. In 2006, Serbia became a member 
of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a step toward a North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) membership, however, Serbia has indicated no intention to become a full 
NATO member. Also in 2006, Serbia entered into a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA) with the European Union (EU) as part of the process of accession to 
EU membership; however, Serbia must meet EU conditions regarding border security 
reform and must continue to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) for full membership to be realized. 
This thesis evaluates Serbia’s continued efforts to integrate into the EU structures. 
It begins with a historical overview of the leadership, politics and reform of the Serbian 
security sector before the 21st century. It then explores the role of the international 
community, including Russia, in providing assistance to Serbia during the past decade. 
The thesis then focuses on Serbia’s progress in border security development, Integrated 
Border Management (IBM), border guard reform and customs administration reform. 
This thesis argues that, despite the on-going efforts of the international community to 
integrate Serbia into the EU community, due to the unique political and social 
circumstances specific to Serbia regarding comprehensive reform of ethics and power, 
the continuing border security reform efforts in Serbia—and hence, EU membership—
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A. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
1. Introduction 
The Balkans historically have been a gateway and first line of defense for the 
European continent against invaders from the East. Consequently, Balkan stability is 
crucial to the prosperity and regional stability of Europe. Serbia lies astraddle the 
infamous Balkan Route, which has long been the main route for illegal trafficking of 
human beings, weapons, and drugs into Western Europe from the Central Asia and the 
Middle East—and more recently from South America and Africa as well. The Balkan 
Route also has become a highway for terrorists moving between the Middle East and 
Central Asia and Europe. Exemplifying this latest development is the recent arrest on a 
train in Serbia, headed to the Middle East, of the only surviving suspect in the Madrid 
March 2004 bombings.1 
European prosperity is important to U.S. strategic interests. As the Secretary of 
State declared, "the integration, the peace, the prosperity, the common market, the 
advances in Europe are so incredibly impressive and welcome, certainly to us, and the 
opportunities for European leadership in the EU are, as I said, ones that we support. But 
this dangerous world still requires deterrence.”2 Furthermore, Balkan stability is 
considered by NATO to be an integral part of European and U.S. security interests in the 
Euro-Atlantic area. NATO's Strategic Concept 1999 states that NATO's "commitment, 
exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including 
                                                 
1  Branik Bakic and Novak Gajic. Police Reform in Serbia: Five Years Later. (London: Conflict 
Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2006), 24, accessed April 4, 2010, 
http://www.ssrnetwork.net/document_library/detail/4187/police-reform-in-serbia-five-years-later.  
2  Address by Secretary Clinton at the NATO Strategic Concept Seminar: Outlines principles, vision to 
revitalize NATO alliance for 21st century, February 22, 2010, accessed April 4, 2010, 
http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/February/20100223115552eaifas0.4237787.html.  
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through peace support operations: all reflect its determination to shape its security 
environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area."3  
Peace and stability is a fragile triumph of the continual conflict in human nature 
between the rational discipline of civil society and the self-centered anti-social pursuit of 
self interest by any means. The latter is expressed collectively by societies through 
unrestrained nationalistic fervor. European peace and prosperity has historically 
repeatedly been threatened by outbreaks of unrestrained nationalistic fervor. In the 
twentieth century, Europe's peace, and much of its material wealth, was significantly 
damaged by outbreaks of nationalistic fervor in World War I and again in World War II. 
The European collective response to these experiences was to forge international 
institutions of mutually intertwined interests to ensure that the losses due to non-
cooperation to both sides in any dispute would become so painful as to prevent either 
party from escalating conflicts to the point of wholesale war.  
The fledgling European Union of the early 1990s was developing a confidence 
that its new cooperative economic community had put Europe on the road to the level of 
prosperity and international stature that it had enjoyed before the devastation of WWI and 
WWII. The development of the Balkans conflicts of the early 1990s, and the European 
community's inability to contain the escalating violence, societal disintegration and 
crimes against humanity brought back memories and fears of the collective irrationality 
and brutality of the destruction of WWI. Balkans instability and conflict is a particular 
sensitivity for European peace and stability because of the history, recounted in Chapter 
II, of the Balkans as the gateway to Europe for Byzantine and Ottoman invasions. The 
Balkans had historically been contested ground, the frontier of Catholic/Protestant 
enlightenment European civilization, culture, and institutions of government. Serbia, in 
particular, had suffered a chaotic and brutal history of conquest followed by revolution 
and further conquest and subjugation. Serbian culture embodied the tough  
 
                                                 
3  NATO, “The Alliance's Strategic Concept,” (Apr 24, 1999), accessed April 4, 2010, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm.  
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nationalistic independence and rebelliousness required to survive the centuries of conflict 
and national suppression, rather than assimilating into the settled and progressive 
expectations greater Europe sought.  
The 1990s had seen the rise to prominence of the "Clash of Civilizations" theory. 
The term was used by Middle-East expert Professor Bernard Lewis in an article titled 
"The Roots of Muslim Rage"4 in The Atlantic Monthly in September 1990. Lewis 
analyzed the doctrinal and ideological differences between Islam and western 
civilizations. The terms, and some of the concepts, were developed and popularized by 
Samuel P. Huntington in an influential 1993 article in Foreign Affairs titled "The Clash 
of Civilizations" in 1993 in which the Serbian conflict was portrayed as representing a 
clash between the values of Islam and Europe/ the west Huntington’s article claims that 
Islamic civilization is witnessing a massive population explosion, generating social 
instability, and that "the great historic fault lines between civilizations are once more 
aflame. This is particularly true along the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc 
of nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs between 
Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans ... Islam has bloody 
borders."5  
More specifically, Huntington saw the Balkans conflicts as the conflict between 
the two civilizations of Europe. Huntington's theory distinguishes between the 
Catholic/Protestant Christian civilization of western and central-eastern Europe, which he 
terms Western civilization, and the Slavic-Orthodox Christian civilization of most of the 
Balkans, Bulgaria, and Romania, and Greece. Huntington’s article argues that at the time 
of the Balkans wars, western Europeans protested Serbian mistreatment and crimes 
against Bosnian Muslims, but did not protest Croatian attacks on Muslims; moreover, 
western European countries quickly extended diplomatic recognition to Catholic Slovenia 
and Croatia and supplied arms to Croatia. In response, he claims, Russia supplied arms to  
 
                                                 
4  Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic Monthly (September 1990). 
5  Samuel P. Huntington, ”The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, (Summer 1993), 34–35. 
  4
Slavic-Orthodox Serbia, while Iran, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia supplied arms or funding 
to Bosnian Muslims. Huntington claims this pattern represented support for co-
religionists.6  
Huntington characterizes the geographic line between predominantly Catholic / 
Protestant western European civilization and predominantly Slavic-Orthodox civilization 
Russian and Balkan areas as a "Velvet Curtain," emphasizing that it was not simply a 
difference of culture, but a source of potent hostility and latent destructiveness. He states 
the "Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most 
significant dividing line in Europe. As the events in Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line 
of difference; it is also at times a line of bloody conflict."7 Huntington implies this Velvet 
Curtain was not a difference that could be overcome easily, noting: "Conflict along the 
fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years" 
and was based on the accumulated cultural experiences and habits built up over that 
period.8 
While the mixing of references to Slavic-Orthodox and Islamic cultures on one 
side of the Velvet Curtain culture did not detract from the attention the theory received at 
the time; in retrospect, it troubles this study sufficiently that we will not seriously 
examine the theory, but simply note that the theory as presented in Huntington's article, 
and subsequent book of the same title, had a very significant influence on security policy 
makers during the mid- and late-1990s. One consequence was the increased concern of 
European leaders about Europe's initial inability to cope with the Balkans conflicts, 
which prompted a much more serious and fundamental response than might otherwise 
have occurred.  
The European Community response was to develop a set of policies designed to 
create institutions assuring greater stability and security in member countries while 
restraining defense spending to allow increased domestic and social spending, yet 
                                                 
6  Samuel P. Huntington, ”The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, (Summer 1993), 36. 
7  Ibid., 31. 
8  Ibid., 35. 
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complying with political realities. Since the early 1990s, the EU members have reduced 
defense expenditures to an average of 2 percent of GDP, while in comparison the United 
States allocates 4 percent of GDP to defense.9 Initially in 1991, the EU revitalized the 
Western European Union (WEU), originally set up as the common defense organization 
during the Cold War for the nine western European countries. In the late 1990s, the WEU 
was replaced by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which the UK and France agreed to develop as an 
EU, rather than a NATO, framework.10  
These two security sector policies were articulated in two policy documents 
issued in 2003. At the core of these policies was a radical conception of national defense 
and national security not based on power projection and designed to reduce the collective 
EU community cost of these social goods. The concept involved the restructuring of the 
security sector of member countries of the European Union, so as to result in enhanced 
positive feedback loops in member country social institutions. The objective was to have 
these positive feedback loops generate greater dynamic social stability, thereby avoiding 
the possibilities of internal community conflicts and enhancing EU community security 
and stability. In 2005 the ESDP was supplemented with an “EU Concept For ESDP 
Support to Security Sector Reform.”11 This document set the definition, aims and scope 
of security sector reform necessary to ensure local and regional stability in accordance 
with the principles of good government, the rule of law, international standards and with 
respect for human rights.12  
The document defines the core actors in the security sector to include the armed 
forces, police, civilian and military intelligence and security services and border guards. 
                                                 
9  Erdal Tatli, “Turkey Turns Cold to European Defense: Implications for Western Security,” 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch #1376, June 2, 2008, accessed April 4, 2010, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2894.  
10  Ibid. 
11  Council of the European Union Secretariat, “EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector 
Reform (SSR),” Brussels, October 13, 2005, accessed April 4, 2010, 
http://www.eplo.org/documents/SSR_ESDP.pdf. 
12  Ibid., 4. 
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Security management and oversight actors are defined to include the Executive, national 
security advisory councils, legislatures, legislative select committees, the Ministry of 
Defense (MoD), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoI) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MoF). The third aspect of the security sector that the document defines is the justice and 
law enforcement institutions including the judiciary, the justice ministry, prisons and the 
criminal investigation and prosecution service. 
While the threat due to the instability in some of the former Yugoslavian 
republics was overcome relatively quickly, Serbia proved more problematic. Serbia was 
involved in armed conflict from March 1991 until the 1995 Dayton Accord brought peace 
to the region temporarily. Serbia was involved in further armed conflict attributed to the 
Milosevic government’s nationalistic attempts to suppress Albanian Kosovar 
independence, resulting in intensification of hostilities in Kosova in 1998, and 
culminating in the 1999 NATO action in Kosova and Serbia. After the Milosevic 
government failed to prevail in the elections of September 2000, the EU indicated that the 
former Yugoslavian republics could seek to join the EU. 
The post-Milosevic Serbian government indicated interest in gaining access to EU 
markets to build its economy and began the process of reforms to comply with the 
requirements for EU participation. The most important aspect of the requirements of EU 
membership is the security sector requirements; and therefore, the Serbian government 
began a process of security sector reform. Due to Serbia's history, the institutions of 
Serbian government and civil society were such as to require substantial reform to 
comply with EU standards; and many elements in Serbian society did not support the 
government’s reform efforts. During the early years of the decade, Serbia's progress 
toward security sector reform could at best be termed modest. Not until 2005 did the EU 
Commission deem the Serbian government to be prepared to begin to negotiate a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU as the first stage in the 
process of applying for membership. The EU required that Serbia cooperate with the 
UN’s International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a condition 
for maintaining the association process. In 2006, Serbia failed to comply with this 
  7
condition and the EU suspended negotiation on the SAA. Only in May 2007 did the 
Serbian government bring itself into compliance with the requirement to cooperate with 
the ICTY, and the EU restarted the SAA negotiation process.  
In November of 2007, the SAA was initialed. The SAA specifies the security 
sector reforms (SSRs) that Serbia must make in order to meet EU standards for 
membership, and they were significant. Serbian President Boris Tadic has expressed his 
opinion that Serbia may join the EU by 2014,13 while media commentators suggest 2017 
to 2021 as earliest plausible membership dates.14’15  
In addition, in 2003 the Serbian government applied to join the NATO 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. In July 2005, Serbia signed a transit agreement with 
NATO regarding Kosova forces movements. In December 2006, Serbian signed a PfP 
agreement and became a full PfP member in 2007.16 In 2009, Serbia submitted an 
Individual Partnership Program to NATO requesting NATO assistance with major threat 
defense and with maintaining Serbian territorial integrity. However, the Ministry of 
Defense website states that Serbia is not currently interested in applying for NATO 
membership.17 
This thesis will assess Serbia's current status with regard to several aspects of 
border security. In particular, the analysis focuses on police and border guard reform, 
including the functions of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance relating to 
policing and border guarding, to assess the likelihood of Serbia achieving EU standards 
and gaining accession before 2020. Police reform and border guarding reform are key  
 
                                                 
13  B92News, “Tadic, Berlusconi open Serbia-Italy summit,” (November 13, 2009), accessed April 4, 
2010, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?mm=11&dd=13&yyyy=2009.  
14  B92News, “Serbia's speedy EU accession – ‘illusion’,” (February 9, 2010), accessed April 4, 2010, 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=02&dd=09&nav_id=65086. 
15  B92News, “’Serbia will join EU no sooner than 2021’," (July 2, 2008), accessed April 4, 2010, 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=02&nav_id=51587.  
16  NATO, Partnership for Peace Information System, “Serbia admitted into SEDM,” accessed April 
4, 2010, http://www.pims.org/news/2009/10/29/serbia-admitted-into-sedm.  
17  Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Defense, “Minister's authored text in NIN,” (Oct 15, 2009), 
accessed April 12, 2010, http://www.mod.gov.rs/novi_eng.php?action=fullnews&id=1790.  
  8
components of internal and perimeter security respectively, and they are highly visible 
and thus important as symbolic aspects of SSR. For these reasons they are especially 
relevant indicators for the larger themes of this thesis. 
This thesis will find that police reform has made organizational advances in 
training and policing education. Additionally, there has been considerable progress in 
border guarding reforms. Serbia has demonstrated a desire for an initial implementation 
of cross-border cooperation with neighboring countries, and there has been participation 
in an array of programs and initiatives to development and implement Serbia's Integrated 
Border Management Strategy. However, authorities in Serbia struggle with reform issues 
as a result of: 
• lack of national support for the police that will take years to overcome, 
due to the slow rebuilding of trust among the civilian population 
• distinctive historical circumstances that continue to persist despite internal 
and external reform efforts 
• ineffectiveness and lack of coordination of Serbian democratic structures 
and of international community efforts to provide assistance to Serbia 
• domestic political disagreements 
• unsettled borders of Serbia—Kosova distracting political effort from the 
reform effort 
2  Purpose 
This thesis intends to provide a reasoned gauge of the rate of progress Serbia may 
achieve in meeting conditions for EU integration by examining Serbian progress in the 
areas of police reform and border security reform since the replacement of the Milosevic 
government in October 2000. In addition, this thesis will: 
• identify the changes to external factors that would result in Serbia more 
rapidly adopting changes required to fully integrate into the European 
community commercial and defense institutions including becoming a full 
member of the EU and of NATO 
• examine the effectiveness of international community efforts to facilitate 
and support Serbian police reform and border security reform and to 
recommend the focusing of support for international community activities 
on the enhancement of those international community efforts identified as 
most effective 
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• examine Serbia’s border security progress in deterring transnational crime 
with a look at her neighbors and regional cooperation toward prevention 
of illegal trafficking 
• examine the role of Serbia in the evolving development of U.S. interests in 
Europe and Asia minor to illuminate the larger question of force and 
statecraft in one of southern Europe’s nations 
3. Significance 
European prosperity is important to U.S. strategic interests. As Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton declared: "the integration, the peace, the prosperity, the common market, 
the advances in Europe are so incredibly impressive and welcome, certainly to us, and the 
opportunities for European leadership in the EU are, as I said, ones that we support. But 
this dangerous world still requires deterrence.”18 
Furthermore, NATO considers Balkan stability to be an integral part of European 
and U.S. security interests in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO's Strategic Concept 1999 
states that NATO's "commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and 
crisis management, including through peace support operations: all reflect its 
determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the 
Euro-Atlantic area."19  
Serbian stability is crucial to the prosperity and regional stability of Europe. First, 
as noted above Serbia is part of the historical corridor from Asia Minor into Europe and 
thus Serbia can serve as a forward defense base for Europe not only to deter the 
possibility of armed invasion and terrorist infiltration, but also to filter out organized 
crime smuggling activities such as drug and human trafficking. Second, Europe is 
becoming increasingly dependent on energy imports in the form of gas flows from 
Russia. Existing pipelines are vulnerable to delivery disruption by Ukraine and Belarus, 
as occurred in recent years. To increase European energy security, an alternative Russian 
                                                 
18  Address by Secretary Clinton at the NATO Strategic Concept Seminar: Outlines principles, vision 
to revitalize NATO alliance for 21st century, February 22, 2010, accessed April 4, 2010, 
http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/February/20100223115552eaifas0.4237787.html.  
19  NATO, “The Alliance's Strategic Concept,” (24 April 1999), accessed April 3, 2010, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm.  
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sponsored pipeline avoiding these politically unstable areas is slated for construction. 
This new pipeline is being routed through eastern Serbia to deliver Russian gas to the 
central European distribution hub in Baumgarten, Austria.20  
Third, due to cultural and religious commonalities and political ideologies, Serbia 
had historically maintained cordial relations with the Soviet Union, and with its 
dissolution with Russia. Recently, this relationship has involved establishment of a 
Russian airlift emergency response base at the Serbian Nis airfield.21 Serbia's stability 
and inclusion of Serbia in the institutions of the EU and NATO will increase transparency 
regarding the Russian presence and activities in Serbia and help to limit those activities.  
U.S.-based companies are involved in planning and promotion of another gas 
pipeline, the Ambo line, to carry gas from southern Russia through Bulgaria, Macedonia 
and Albania to Italy.22 European companies led by Austria's OMV are promoting a third 
pipeline, Nabucco, to transport Caspian gas through Turkey, Romania Bulgaria and 
Hungary to Austria.23 The proposed Nabucco line would be 3,300 km long and cost 8 
billion Euros and be ready by 2013. The 3,300-kilometer pipeline could begin operating 
in 2013.24 Any disruption in the planned Russian sponsored South Stream pipeline 
through Serbia would be commercially advantageous for these companies. 
B. ARGUMENTS AND MAJOR QUESTIONS 
This thesis argues that, as a result of historical political, economical and social 
circumstances unique to Serbia, combined with the deficiencies of Western institutions 
                                                 
20  Steven Eke, “UK Russia signs gas pipeline deals,” (Friday, 15 May 2009), accessed April 7, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8051921.stm.  
21  Economist, “Base camps: Rumors of a Russian base in Serbia reflect Balkan hysteria, not reality,” 
(Feb 4th 2010), accessed April 2, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15464941.  
22  Ibid. 
23  Eke, “UK Russia signs gas pipeline,” 2009.  
24  Radio Free Europe, “Factbox: Russian Gas Export Pipelines, Projects: The Nord Stream Gas 
Pipeline Project.” (January 6, 2009), accessed April 4, 2010, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Gas_Export_Pipelines_Projects/1366873.htm.  
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contributing to Serbia’s democratic reform, continued border security and police reform 
will take several years to reach EU performance standards. 
Many observers, westerners as well as Balkans commentators25 in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s attributed the dysfunctionality of Serbian external relations and internal 
governance to the policies of Milosevic. The expectation was that with his removal 
Serbia would be released from its restraints and would quickly rebound into 
transformation to a democratic nation able and ready to be integrated into the western 
European international community. This thesis argues the reality is more subtle. 
Pavlakovic notes that the "new leaders of Serbia have failed to pursue policies 
that diverge significantly from the nationalist goals of Milosevic, resulting in failure to 
address responsibility for war crimes, to cooperate with the ICTY, and to build strong 
relations with neighboring countries. Serbia faces many challenges ahead, and it remains 
to be seen whether the new authorities will make a clean break with the Milosevic past, 
or whether they will continue to pursue the kind of politics that have led to so much 
tragedy in the former Yugoslavia."26 However, Pavlakovic fails to note the fact that 
Djindjic did attempt to pursue policy that diverged significantly from the nationalistic 
goals of Milosevic; and the result was that he was removed from policy making, and 
there were no popular demonstrations calling for justice or for the continuation of 
Djindjic's agenda like there were after Milosevic attempted to nullify the election of 
Kostunica. This suggests that there was not widespread popular support of Djindjic's 
policies, and that the will of the populace is predominantly not in favor of rapid 
Europeanization, but instead favors a conservative and nationalistic approach to reform. 
Pavlakovic does note that "many of the forces in Serbian society—the Serbian 
Orthodox Church, the military establishment, intellectuals, and most of the opposition—
generally supported the nationalist policies of the 1990s.”27 While elements of Serbian 
                                                 
25  Vjeran Paklakovic, “Serbia Transformed? Political Dynamics in the Milosevic Era and After,” in 
Serbia Since 1989, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeran Pavlakovic (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2005), 30. 
26  Ibid., 31. 
27  Ibid. 
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society stand ready to accept the fundamental concepts of western liberal rule of law and 
civil rights and freedoms including market-based economy, other major, fundamental 
elements of Serbian society supported much of what Milosevic stood for. In other words, 
he was not primarily a dictator imposing his iconoclastic ideas on a victimized population 
but was primarily a figurehead for the conservative and nationalistic ideals the majority, 
especially of older Serbians, believe in. Consequently, the process of westernization of 
Serbia requires either the changing of the hearts and minds of the majority of the 
population or their marginalization. The former can be to some degree achieved with 
implicit and explicit subsidization to provide benefits to those supporting the 
Europeanization program. As Graham Allison proverbially observed, "Where you sit is 
where you stand.”28 However, the cost of a sufficient degree of subsidization is unclear; 
and cost can be minimized by the passage of time, by waiting for a younger generation 
who do not share the beliefs in Serbian nationalism, to assume the roles of power as the 
elder generation expires. Thus, pessimistically, it could be, as Biddle suggests will be 
necessary to achieve a transition to western democracy in Iraq, a generation until the 
reforms are fully accepted in Serbian society.29 
To provide a background context for the examination of selected aspects of SSR, 
this study reviews Serbia’s history, briefly from the Ottoman Empire, and in more detail 
from WWII to the end of the twentieth century. This will include a description of the 
political climate of the regime of Tito and of the political climate of the regime of 
Milosevic. It will describe the rise and fall of nationalism and the decay of the 
Yugoslavian federalism in the era of the 1970s and 1980s, and indicate how this led to 
the ultimate disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.  
To assess border security reforms, this thesis examines the root causes of Serbia's 
impaired border security sector, and provides a description of the current state of 
                                                 
28  Graham Allison and P. Zelikow, “Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 
(New York: Longman, 1999). 
29  Stephen P. Biddle, “ Strategy and the Iraq War,” University of California, Berkeley, Institute of 
International Studies, Conversations with History, with Harry Kreistler, accessed March 29, 2010, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TO9nyPwUfTQ.  
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development of Serbian border security and border guard reform. To illuminate the 
current status of the Serbian border security reforms, this thesis examines Serbian 
progress with regard to border security reforms since the replacement of Milosevic as 
head of state in October 2000. This analysis includes a description of police and border 
guard reforms undertaken and of the current status of police and border guard reform, 
including Serbia’s Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy. In addition, this thesis 
examines the effectiveness of Serbia’s border security progress in deterring transnational 
crime in comparison to Serbia's neighbors, and Serbia's effectiveness at participating in 
regional cooperation for prevention of illegal trafficking. 
Further, this thesis examines the effectiveness of the many governmental, supra-
governmental, and non-governmental organizations active in facilitating and advising on 
SSR in Serbia. Specifically this study considers the effectiveness of the programs and 
initiatives developed by the international community’s primary organizations (i.e., 
DFAC, OCSE, EU, etc.) in advancing Serbia’s border security reform. 
This study also considers the Serbian government's political will to comply with 
EU conditions for membership and to advance SSR in the face of existing historical 
social reluctance to change and give up old institutional forms. Specifically, the Serbian 
government still has not complied with the EU requirement to cooperate with the ICTY 
by apprehending and transferring to ICTY custody accused war criminals Ratko Mladic 
and Goran Hadzic. The issue of why the Serbian police and intelligence services have not 
been able to apprehend these two men, despite the ICTY seeking Mladic's arrest since 
1995 and Hadzic's arrest since 2004, will be examined. A related issue is whether the 
current government has the political will to expeditiously pursue the remaining border 
security reforms that EU membership will require. This thesis also analyzes the impact of 
current reforms on the ability of the government to build further political support for 
reforms. This provides insight into whether or not the changes brought about by existing 




NATO structures. Finally, this thesis will consider the issues surrounding Kosova and the 
political will of the current Serbian government to resolve those issues in a manner 
satisfactory to the EU and NATO. 
C. OVERVIEW 
Chapter II begins with a brief history of Serbia's role under the Ottoman empire 
and Serbia's responses to Ottoman rule, and a brief overview of the history of the 
Kingdom of Serbia (1804–1919) and of its successor, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1919–
41) up to WWII, focusing on the aspects that have left a legacy influence on Serbian 
institutions and political and business customs. Following is a discussion of the 
institutional reforms put in place by the Tito government during the 1943–80 period 
under the Republic of Yugoslavia, and a more detailed discussion of the reforms and 
difficulties the Yugoslav state experienced under the regime of Slobodan Milosevic from 
1980 through 2000. Finally, the chapter briefly describes Serbia's history through the 
recent years, focusing on police and border security institutional functionality during the 
recent period. This focus includes an examination of reform of the Ministry of Interior, 
the role of Serbia’s state security forces, the existing degree of respect for the rule of law 
and the degree of democratic control and oversight of security forces during those 
periods.  
Chapter III studies the contributions of key international organizations to 
facilitating and supporting Serbia’s border security reform and the resulting extraordinary 
number of programs and initiatives. The chapter also demonstrates the significant role 
Russia has played in Serbia’s recent reforms and considers the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the EU’s objective of regional integration on the Serbian reform process. 
Chapter IV examines Serbia’s border security reform progress. The chapter makes 
an in-depth examination of border security reform, drawing on reports establishing 
expected behavior and outcomes related to the development of border security and border 
guard reforms. It also illuminates the advancements made in border security 
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development, and how Serbia has progressed in the area of Integrated Border 
Management (IBM) since the implementation of Serbia’s IBM strategy.   
Chapter V examines the challenges Serbian SSR has yet to overcome. Chapter V 
also highlights on-going issues, including Serbia’s degree of compliance with ICTY 
requests for the apprehension of the remaining indictees, and also the tensions over the 
administrative issue of the border of Kosova and Serbia.  
The Conclusion, Chapter VI, recapitulates the findings of the main chapters. This 
is followed by an explanation of the way forward for Serbia. While continuing to make 
good progress in some areas of border security reform, such as police training and aspects 
of border security development and border guard reform, this thesis research indicates 
Serbia is still several years away from meeting requirements for EU integration; and has 
several major issues requiring solutions before Serbia can successfully transition to fully 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  17
II.  BACKGROUND OF THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY 
SITUATION IN SERBIA 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Serbia, specifically, and Yugoslavia, generally, have a long history of 
authoritarian government and not particularly effective governmental economic 
management in contrast to, for example, the United States. The United States has had a 
cultural history of breaking from an unbearably authoritarian king to form a new 
government based on rational principles transparently delineated in a constitution, 
providing for rule of law with law making by democratically elected legislative 
representatives and enforcement of law by a judiciary appointed by democratically 
elected representatives. Serbia has experienced a cultural history of giving up democratic 
power to authoritarian leaders, and of leadership transitions by deposition or assassination 
when those same leaders’ authoritarian rule becomes unbearable.30  
The first independent Serbian polity developed in 1037–38 in, what is now, parts 
of Herzegovina and Montenegro. This Serbian area was part of the larger region that had 
been recognized as Slavic possessions in return for submission to Byzantine suzerainty 
by Emperor Heraclitus. By 1169, Stefan Nemanja established the Nemanja dynasty in the 
Serbian area. In 1219, the Serbian Orthodox Church became autocephalus, and by the 
1350s when the Nemaja dynasty ruled over a Serbian empire including Serbia, 
Montenegro, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Albania, and northern Greece with its capital in 
Skopje, a Serbian bishop was made patriarch of all Greeks and Serbs.31 By 1355, the 
empire crumbled and the area gradually fell under the control of Ottoman Turk forces. 
B.  BATTLE OF KOSOVA AND THE KOSOVA EPIC 
According to Serbian historiography in June 1389 (June 15 by the Orthodox 
calendar, or June 28 by the Western calendar), an alliance of Serbian and other Christian 
                                                 
30  New York Times, 13 March 2003, A10. 
31  Elizabeth Pond, Endgame in the Balkans: Regimen change, European style. (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 234. 
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Orthodox forces were vanquished by Ottoman Turk armies. The cultural mythology 
about this battle, termed the Kosova epic, has Serbian leader Prince Lazar choosing a 
heavenly kingdom over an earthly one, resulting in defeat of the Serbian forces in the 
battle, but securing a moral superiority and a place in heaven. The epic also has Vuk 
Brankovic defecting to the Ottomans, which has been interpreted in Serb culture via the 
common proverb "samo sloga spasava Srbe" (only unity can save the Serbs) and has 
resulted in a strong cultural stigma for any betrayal of what is seen to be the national 
interest.32 Further, the Kosova epic emphasizes heroism and betrayal, which became, and 
have remained, two recurring themes in Serbian history.33 Consequently, from later 
resistance against Ottoman rule, to resistance against German aggression in World War I 
and World War II, Serbian culture has perceived political leadership and military strength 
as intimately interwoven.  
Also according to the Kosova epic, the loss of the Battle of Kosova resulted in 
migration of Serbs northward, with consequent conflicts with neighboring ethnic groups 
in areas that were to become the other republics of Yugoslavia.34 Further, the loss of the 
Battle of Kosova was interpreted as the loss of the Serbian medieval kingdom, blocking 
the development of Serbian culture and identity, which could only be regained through 
the recovery of the territory lost in the Battle of Kosova. According to the cultural myths, 
only when this recovery occurred in the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries was the 
rebuilding of an independent Serbian state able to proceed.35 
After the Battle of Kosova, Ottoman Turk armies conquered all Serbian speaking 
areas by 1392. The Ottoman system provided autonomy for the Serbian Orthodox Church 
and there was little persecution or conversion of Serb Christians; however, there was 
some migration of Serbs out of Kosova northwestward into Croatia and Hungary over the 
                                                 
32  Vieran Pavlakovic, “Serbia Transformed? Political Dynamics in the Milosevic Era and After,” in 
Serbia Since 1989, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeran Pavlakovic (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2005), 18. 
33  Ibid., 17. 
34  Ibid., 18. 
35  Ibid., 17. 
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next four centuries of Turkish rule. However, after more severe Turkish repression in 
1455, Serbian poetry and religious art cultivated a "spirit of resistance and hopes of 
ultimate deliverance by depicting the Serbs as 'the chosen people of the New 
Testament'—the new Israel.”36 In the eighteenth century the Serbian Orthodox Church 
lost influence in Serbian society due partially to the enlightenment ideas propagating and 
partly due to corruption, which led the Constantinople patriarch to replace the senior 
Serbian church leaders with Greek appointees. This was strongly disliked by the Serbian 
public.37 The consequence, that the Serbian Orthodox Church was to suffer the rejection 
of the Serbian public until the beginning of the twentieth century, may have attuned 
Church leaders sensibilities more closely to public opinion. 
By 1804, when Ottoman officials in the Belgrade region grew more predatory, 
Serbian peasant resistance organized. Under an outlaw pig dealer, Karadjorje Petrovic, a 
Serbian Assembly met in 1805 to endorse his proposals for autonomy, which were sent to 
the Sultan in Constantinople, who rejected them. The Sultan sent Muslim mercenaries 
from Bosnia to suppress the uprising, and Karadjorje solicited Russian support. It was not 
until 1813 while Napoleon's attacks diverted Russian efforts that the Turkish forces 
eliminated the uprising, and Karadjorje escaped into exile. Turkish repression was severe, 
and in 1815 Milos Obrenovic led a renewed uprising against the Ottomans.  
Exemplifying a continuing Serbian governmental tendency, when Karadjorje 
returned to assist the fight for freedom against the Turks, Obrenovic dealt with his rival 
by having him killed. Obrenovic then made a deal with the Ottomans gaining local 
autonomy in exchange for monetary tribute payments, and used his enhanced power to 
dominate the local economy, which was dependent on pig exports to Austria, and to 
prevent the rise of rival large landowners.38 
                                                 
36  Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, The Balkans: A post-communist history, (New York: Routledge, 
2007), 234–235. 
37  Elizabeth Pond, “Endgame in the Balkans,” 224. 
38  Bideleux and Jeffries, “The Balkans,” 235. 
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In a development toward democracy comparable to the Magna Carta in Britain of 
1215 but approximately six centuries later, in the 1830s a broad political movement in 
Serbia developed calling for limiting Obrenovic's power and sharing of power with a 
seventeen-member council. By 1839, Obrenovic grew irritated by the Council and 
abdicated in favor of his son. Obrenovic's son was deposed by the Council in 1842, which 
appointed the son of Karadjorje as ruler. He lost the approval of the Russian supporting 
Serbian populace by not supporting Russia in the Crimean War of 1853–56 and was 
deposed by the Council in 1859. The Council reappointed Milos Obrenovic, who died a 
year later, and then reappointed the Obrenovic son, who it had deposed in 1842. 
Obrenovic was one of the few Serbian leaders with a concern for institution building and 
developed a regular army, a judiciary and a civil service bureaucracy. He also negotiated 
the removal of the remaining Ottoman bases in Serbia by 1867. However, exemplifying a 
continuing tendency in Serbian leadership transition, in 1868 Obrenovic was 
assassinated.  
The assassinated leader was succeeded by his 14-year-old cousin, Milan 
Obrenovic.39 Eight years into his reign in 1876, Milan declared war on the Ottoman 
Empire in support of a Bosnian peasant revolt. He quickly had to call on Russia to be 
rescued; and the Russians with Serb, Montenegrin and Bulgarian support defeated the 
Ottomans by 1878, with Serbia occupying large areas of Albanian territory.  
Serbians, having initiated the removal of the Ottomans from Europe, probably 
expected favorable treatment from Europe; however, Europeans perhaps fearing further 
Serbian expansion chose to diminish Serbia, initiating a continuing Serbian distrust of 
European policy intentions. The war ending Berlin conference of 1878 recognized Serbia 
as an independent state and required Serbia to abandon occupied Albanian areas, and 
allowed Austria to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina including its Serbian dominated areas. 
Milan negotiated Serbian subservience to Austria in 1881 in exchange for Austrian 
support for his plan to declare Serbia a kingdom and himself, king. 
                                                 
39  Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, The Balkans: A post-communist history, (New York: Routledge, 
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Foreshadowing recent Serbian responses to increased European dominance, 
Serbian nationalists forced Milan to abdicate in 1889; and when his successor proved 
similarly inclined, the successor was assassinated by nationalist members of the Serbian 
army in 1903. Nationalists established a constitutional monarchy in 1904 with Petar 
Karadjorje as king. The government strengthened the economy and expanded the 
educational system, ended Serbian subservience to Austria, and developed power 
balancing alliances with France and Russia.40 
In 1906, Austria began a trade war imposing prohibitive duties on Serbian pig 
exports to Austria, the main Serbian foreign exchange earner. In 1908, Austria formally 
annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. Foreshadowing the late 1990s, in 1912–13 Serbia took 
possession of Kosova, parts of Albania and some Albanian inhabited parts of Macedonia 
in campaigns that "involved wholesale carnage, rape, pillage, arson and ethnic cleansing 
against hundreds of thousands of 'ethnic Albanians'."41 When Austrian Archduke 
Ferdinand visited Sarajevo on the anniversary of the Battle of Kosova, he was 
assassinated by a Bosnian Serb, resulting in the outbreak of the 1914–18 War. By late 
1915, German, Austria-Hungarian, and Bulgarian armies had forced the Serbian 
government, royal family and army to retreat through Kosova, and Albania to be sea-
lifted by the French navy to Corfu. Over 150,000 army casualties were sustained in the 
retreat, and during the period 1912–18, approximately 15 percent of the Serbian 
population died.42 
In 1918, a Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created under the 
Karadjorjevic dynasty and the Serbian Radical Party led by Nikola Pasic with its capital 
in Belgrade. Croats grew to resent the domination of the government and military by 
Serbs and for Serb interests. In 1919, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was formed, 
and by 1921 it was banned, although highly popular. In response to Croat opposition, 
during a parliamentary session June 20, 1928, a member of the governing Radical Party 
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41  Ibid, 236. 
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shot five Croat opposition members. The King responded to the following parliamentary 
crisis by outlawing all ethnic and sectarian political parties and declaring a royal 
dictatorship. The King appointed a military general who had played a key role in the 
1903 coup to be Prime Minister responsible only to the King. The Kingdom was renamed 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and initiated an ethnic-tolerance strategy subsequently 
followed by the post 1945 Yugoslavian government and by the current international 
boundaries in the Western Balkans. That strategy was to redraw the Kingdoms provincial 
boundaries to intentionally not correspond to historic ethnic or territorial allegiances.  
In a further reversal of democratic progress in 1931, a constitution instituted a 
two-chamber parliament and non-anonymous balloting with two-thirds the lower house 
assembly seats going to the party with the plurality of votes; and the remaining third 
divided between parties on the basis of percentage of total votes received. The King 
appointed half the upper house seats and the other half were elected indirectly by 
electoral colleges of the provinces. Many Serbs protested the lack of representativeness 
of the electoral system. The world-wide economic depression of 1929–33 dramatically 
reduced export earnings, government revenues and peoples incomes and boosted 
unemployment.43 
In 1929, the Croatian Catholic Ustasa was formed and funded by the Italian and 
Hungarian governments; and along with the Bulgarian based Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), began terrorist bombings and assassinations in 
Serbia. In October 1934, the Serbian King was assassinated by Ustasa and IMRO agents. 
The new regent appointed Serbian nationalist Milan Stojadinovic as Prime Minister and 
Stojadinovic increased agricultural exports to Germany and set up government programs 
to boost the depressed economy. However, Stojadinovic was popularly perceived as 
increasingly authoritarian and as making Serbia increasingly dependent on German and 
Italian government support, especially by the Croatian opposition, with the result that he 
was removed in early 1939.  
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By summer 1939, the government had been forced to grant significant regional 
autonomy to Croatia, over protests of Serbs and Slovenes. On March 25, 1941, the 
government signed the anti-Comintern pact of the Axis countries. On March 27, 1941, a 
nationalist coup overthrew the government and installed a nationalist prime minister. The 
German government retaliated by coordinating an invasion with the help of Italy, 
Hungary and Bulgaria. Four days later, the Axis governments proclaimed the NDH 
(Independent State of Croatia) with control over the territories of Slovenia, Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina to be governed by Croatian Ustasa selected Catholic clergy and 
selected Bosniak Muslims. In further foreshadowing of the 1990s Balkans conflicts from 
1941 to 1944, the NDH regime put to death several hundred thousand non-Catholic 
Yugoslavs living in the NDH area, including approximately 240,000 ethnic Serbs.44 
C. THE RISE AND DEMISE OF TITO AND HIS YUGOSLAVIA 
While the King and former Serbian government had taken refuge in London after 
the German/Austrian/Italian invasion, two resistance groups coalesced in Serbia. One, the 
Cetniki, were Serbian royalist nationalists, while the other, the Partisans, were led by the 
Communist Josip Broz aka Tito. The Cetniki were discreetly supported by the Serbian 
Orthodox Church and in turn were sympathetic to the church leader’s doctrine of St. 
Savaism, which "equat[ed] Serbdom, Orthodoxy and Christ."45 The Partisans were able 
to win support from a broad mass of Yugoslav society and grew to a force of 300,000 by 
1943. With the help of captured Italian weapons, the Partisans were able to liberate 
southern and central Yugoslavia in 1944 and the rest of Yugoslavia in 1945. The 
Partisans put each liberated area under a Communist people's liberation committee; and 
by mid-1945, this government controlled the public transportation, banking and 80 
percent of the industrial sectors. In August 1945, a constituent assembly abolished the 
monarchy and established the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 
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Born and raised in Croatia, Broz sought to avoid a Yugoslavian government that 
would be dominated by Serbs. The Federal Republic was set up to consist of the six 
constituent republics of Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Serbia, with the two Serbian provinces of Kosova and Vojvodina given significant 
autonomy within Serbia. In addition, the republic borders were drawn to include 
substantial predominantly Serbian areas in the republics of Croatia (the Krajina region) 
and Bosnia, without giving these areas any of the provincial autonomy given to Kosova 
and Vojvodina.46 Additionally, the federal government encouraged Macedonian 
language, literature and church to develop a stronger Macedonian identity and discourage 
Serbian claims that Macedonia was part of greater Serbia.47 Perhaps to reassure Serbs, 
Tito appointed Serbian Aleksandr Rankovic as his security chief and second in 
command.48 
A major aspect of Tito's economic policy was worker self management, which 
gave workers the right to elect the management of the enterprise for which they worked. 
This had the effect of making economic policy locally focused, leading to consolidation, 
in industries dependent upon large scale, of enterprises within republics into republic-
wide monopolies. This added an economic aspect to the ethnic competition between 
republics.49  
In 1953, 1963, 1965, 1968, 1971 and 1974, Tito implemented constitutional 
reforms that devolved additional powers and autonomy to the republics and autonomous 
provinces. The 1974 revisions gave Kosova and Vojvodina nearly the equivalent degree  
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of autonomy of the six republics,50 and instituted a nine-person collective Yugoslav 
Presidency composed of the heads of the six republics, plus the two autonomous 
provinces, plus President for life, Tito. 
Cooperation between the Secret Service (SDB) 51and criminals "had become 
standard practice by 1970s. According to one of the officials, over 150 criminals worked 
for the Federal Ministry of Interior during that time. Most of them were 'employed' as 
assassins and allegedly murdered more than sixty Yugoslav émigrés residing 
predominantly in Western Europe."52 The SDB also used criminals to perform smuggling 
and other criminal operations. Revenues derived by the SDB from smuggling of 
cigarettes, tobacco and arms had always been an important source of funds for the SDB 
secret budget. This institutional experience within the SDB came to be of increased 
importance to the Serbian government when international events blocked normal trade 
flows during the 1990s. 
D. RESTRUCTURING YUGOSLAVIA 
1. Resurgence of Serbian Nationalism 
The intention of Tito's series of constitutional revisions was to reduce the 
possibility of Serbian dominance over the other Yugoslavian republics; however, the 
reforms also reduced central control over the expression of nationalist sentiments, which 
had been a fundamental factor in Tito's ability to hold the Yugoslav Federation together. 
The reduction in central control was reflected in a weakening of the state security 
apparatus when in 1966 Rankovic was dismissed, allegedly because it was revealed he 
was keeping even Tito under surveillance. In 1968, Albanian Kosovars protested their 
suppression by Serbia and as a result gained increased autonomy for Kosova from Tito. 
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Following Tito's death in May 1980, central control over ethnic rivalries 
continued to slip, as the collective nine-person rotating head Yugoslav Presidency fell 
into paralysis without Tito's deadlock breaking influence. As central decision making and 
policy faltered, each republic took on greater defacto autonomy by necessity. Each 
republic and autonomous provincial administration sought to maintain and enhance their 
control on power by serving republic rather than federal interests, and de-emphasized 
federal multiculturalism in favor of local nationalism. Meanwhile, the federal government 
continued to attempt to avoid democratization by devolving additional powers.  
In summary, Tito's policies to reduce Serbian influence within the federal 
Yugoslavian government by devolving economic power through "workers' self-
management" and devolving political power through a series of constitutional reforms 
culminated in a paralyzed presidency and virtually assured prevention of Serbian 
dominance of the other Yugoslavian republics both during and after Tito's death. Similar 
to the early historical Serbian tradition of leadership transition, Tito had used the security 
services to prevent any of his assistants from gaining rival power, and had failed to 
designate a successor. Consequently, the trend of devolution of power, which Tito had 
managed for 35 years, simply continued after his death, perhaps as he had planned; 
eventually leading to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and national independence for each of 
the republics. 
2. Transition Toward Market Economies  
After further protests in 1981 by Albanian Kosovars, Yugoslav constitutional 
reform granted Kosovars additional autonomy. After Tito's break with the Soviet Union 
in 1948, Yugoslavia had enjoyed relatively easy access to World Bank loans as part of a 
western policy to reduce cohesion of the socialist bloc countries. Faced with rising debts, 
partly due to the oil shocks of the 1970s and the poor economic performance resulting 
from the failure of local worker self-management to rationalize industry on a Federation 
wide scale, the post-Tito economic managers of Yugoslavia turned to the west and 
especially the U.S. for further loans; and poured vast sums into the economically 
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inefficient but internationally prestigious project of hosting the 1984 Olympics in 
Sarajevo. Special appeals to the U.S. led to debt relief for Yugoslavia in 1983 and 1984.  
During the early and mid-1980s, Slovenia increased its economic integration with 
neighboring Austria and Italy. Catholic Slovenian youth built ties with the human rights 
and green movements in Germany and Western Europe, and criticized the anti-human 
rights and anti-democratic tendencies of the Yugoslav People's Army.53 Slovenia 
complained about federal redistributive budgetary policies, which had wealthier Slovenia 
paying to subsidize development of poorer Kosova, Montenegro and Macedonia.54 
Slovenia also portrayed to European human rights and civil society groups that the 
Serbian treatment of Kosovars in Kosova was a threat to Kosovars human rights and 
represented the potential of Serbia to be a threat to Slovenian democracy.55 
Partly in response to the institutional biases Tito had incorporated into the federal 
Yugoslavian framework, the Serbian populace began to give more credence to Serbian 
nationalists’ claims. In 1985, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) 
undertook an examination of the causes of the economic and leadership stagnation, which 
had overcome the federal government during the 1980s. In 1986, a draft paper, including 
chapters that had not been reviewed by the Academy, was released to the press. Included 
in the unreviewed draft chapters was a strongly Serbian nationalist argument that the 
Yugoslav Federation had disadvantaged Serbia and caused Serbia to lose dominance over 
the other republics, while advantaging the other republics.56 Whether the intention of the 
leak was to discredit the report, or whether it was to test Serbian public opinion, the result 
was a public expression of a revival of Serbian nationalism.  
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3. The Greater Serbia Project and the Rise of Milosevic 
Before 1982, Slobodan Milosevic had been director of one of Yugoslavia's largest 
banks, Beobanka. In 1984, Milosevic became a Belgrade Communist party official and 
proposed liberalizing economic reforms. In 1986, he was elected head of the League of 
Yugoslavian Communists and headed an economic commission that recommended 
economic reforms similar to those recommended by the IMF.  
As an alumnus of the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law, and a mid-level 
party official, Milosevic almost certainly was aware of the SANU report and the reaction 
its disclosure had received. In April 1987, Milosevic, as leader of the Yugoslavian 
League of Communists, made a speech in a mostly Serbian populated industrial suburb of 
the capital of Kosova. In the speech, he defended Kosova Serbs interests against alleged 
Kosovar repression. The speech was subsequently repeatedly broadcast on Serbian 
national media and aroused Serbian nationalist sentiments and feelings of victimization 
by other Yugoslav ethnic groups.57 
Capitalizing on and escalating the resurgence in Serbian nationalism, Milosevic 
won the Serbian presidential elections in December 1987. Continuing with the same 
campaign, Milosevic managed to have his supporters gain control of the provincial 
government of Vojvodina in September 1988, the republic government of Montenegro in 
January 1989 and to remove the Kosovar leader from the Kosova League of Communists. 
The latter allowed the Serbian National Assembly to pass laws in February 1989, giving 
Serbia greater control over Vojvodina and Kosova, specifically including greater control 
over Kosova's police and judiciary. Albanian Kosovar protests and strikes then were used 
by the Milosevic Serbian government as political justification to declare martial law in 
Kosova.58 
In 1989, the Yugoslav economy suffered hyperinflation and Yugoslav Prime 
Minister, Ante Markovic, accepted the conditions of the IMF for further loan support and 
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introduced economic policies referred to as "economic shock therapy" in December 1989. 
The shock-therapy policy included a wage and salary freeze, fixing of the exchange rate, 
and liberalization of trade tariffs and restrictions.59 As had occurred in other countries, 
the economic shock therapy resulted in a large rise in unemployment and large reductions 
in real GDP, real incomes,60 and federal government revenues. The reduction in revenues 
left the federal government without the financial means to implement policy programs 
and forced the individual republics to step into the vacuum to provide the missing 
services to their populations. Thus, Markovic's economic policy added to the federal 
decision making paralysis that Tito's institutional framework had caused, and further 
decreased federal power and enhanced the defacto autonomy of the individual republics 
and autonomous provinces.  
4. The Role of the Serbian Orthodox Church 
As Tito's a-religious multicultural Yugoslavia disintegrated, former Yugoslavians 
returned to their religious traditions as part of finding a replacement identity. The 
Orthodox clergy, perhaps sensitive to their metaphorical banishment to the wilderness in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and again under Tito, were quick to play to 
public sentiment, and "spoke the nationalist language, clearly trying to play a more 
prominent role in Serbia."61 The Orthodox clergy had no particular liking for the 
communist atheist Milosevic, but found common interest with his calls to unite all Serbs 
in one country. The clergy saw this would help boost the Church congregation. The 
clergy were also sympathetic to Milosevic's apparent rejection of liberal western norms, 
which the Church leaders perceived to be "alien and anti-Orthodox."62  
By 1991, the Church's official news publication, Pravoslavlje, was publishing 
numerous stories emphasizing the Serbian heritage of areas in Croatia under siege. In 
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1992 Serbian Orthodox Church leaders issued statements denying that Serbs had 
organized rapes of Muslim women and claiming Muslims and Croats had raped 
numerous Serb women.63 Through 1997, Patriarch Pavle's public statements supported 
the Karadzic campaign in Bosnia and urged annulment of the ICTY indictments against 
Karadzic and Mladic. A 2003 survey of Serbian public opinion indicated 68 percent of 
Serbs trusted the Church, more than trusted any other institution; and, for the first time in 
a century and half, significant numbers of young Serbian men began taking monastic 
vows.64  
5.  The 1990s and Milosevic’s Political Reform 
In January 1990, the Slovenian and Croatian delegates to the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia walked out. In May 1990, Milosevic proposed a new Serbian 
constitution, allowing the breakup of Yugoslavia and the redrawing of Serbian borders to 
include "all ethnic Serbs in a new Serbian state."65 In July, Milosevic formed the 
Socialist Party of Serbia by capturing most of the remains of the infrastructure and 
personnel of the League of Serbian Communists.66 At the same time, a number of other 
political parties formed around anti-communist dissidents and nationalists. The 
nationalists gave primacy to the national rights of Serbs over concepts of civil rights and 
rule of law. This group included Vuk Draskovik, Vojislav Seselj and Vojislav Kostunica. 
Vuk Draskovik became leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) formed in 1990. 
He controlled television broadcaster Studio-B, and distinguished himself by holding 
rallies at the war time headquarters of the Cetniki leader Draza Mihailovic. Vojislav 
Seselj assumed leadership of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), which was formed in 
1991, to politically represent the paramilitary Serbian Cetniki movement whose 
leadership included Seselj. Constitutional lawyer, Vojislav Kostunica, who became leader 
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of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) formed in the summer of 1992. Other parties 
formed to represent more specific policies. Vesna Pesic, a founder of the Helsinki 
Committee in Yugoslavia, became leader of the Civic Alliance (GSS), which favored 
greater integration with Europe. The Democratic Party (DS) was formed in 1989 by a 
group of intellectuals and combined polices of liberal economic reforms and reuniting of 
all Serb lands, but suffered periodic attrition as prominent members left to set up alternate 
parties. In 1992 Zoran Djindjic, with a pro-EU orientation, assumed the leadership of the 
DS. The regional party, the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina was also formed in 
1990, under the leadership of Nenad Canak, to advocate independent federal republic 
status for Vojvodina within Serbia. 
The feature common to all of these other political leaders during the 1990s was 
their wariness of each other, resulting in an inability to find their common ground in 
opposition to the Milosevic government, and inability to create an effective message to 
the Serbian public to build support for their attempted coalitions to win electoral victory 
over Milosevic. The first attempted coalition in 1992 brought the SPO, DS, DSS and GSS 
under the Democratic Movement of Serbia (DEPOS) banner, but it was popularly 
perceived as merely seeking power and not significantly different from Milosevic. The 
following coalition attempts by the same partners, in 1995 under the Democratic Alliance 
banner, and in 1996 under the Zajedno67 label were similarly perceived by the Serbian 
electorate.68 Perhaps this perception is not surprising given party leaders statements. For 
example, in 1995 in response to the fall of the Serbian Krajina enclave in Croatia, the 
Vice President of the Kostunica headed DSS publicly claimed that "After six centuries 
Vuk Brankovic, for the first time, can sleep peacefully in his grave [because a] bigger 
traitor has now appeared and his name is Slobodan Milosevic."69 Further, according to a  
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wealthy Belgrade businessman "and according to American government officials, 
opposition parties in Serbia often demand kickbacks and bribes from businessmen, just 
like the ruling Socialist Party."70 
By late 1990, Milosevic had gained control of the Service for State Security 
(SDB) and also of the state controlled Radio-Television Serbia (RTS). Radio-Television 
Serbia is reported by Croatian academic, Vjeran Pavlakovic, to have begun to 
propagandize against Croats, Kosovar Albanians and Bosnian Muslims by using symbols 
of Serbian nationalism, using Ustasa symbolism to portray Croats as Facists and using 
symbols of previous Muslim conquests of Serbia.71 Milosevic also sought to reduce his 
ideological competition by restricting the non-state controlled independent media through 
restrictive conditions on licensing and institutional censorship.  
While the RTS promoted the ideological assaults of Milosevic's Serbian 
nationalist project by helping discredit opponents and build public support for Milosevic, 
the SDB organized the material assaults. The SDB, led by Jovica Stanisic and Mihalj 
Kertes, had ongoing connections with paramilitaries and with organized crime figures, 
both of which assisted Serbian efforts in the Croatian and Bosnian wars.72 These groups 
were supplied weapons by the MUP, which was involved in organizing drug and 
weapons smuggling both to acquire arms and to finance their purchase.73 One such group 
was formed in October 1990 by convicted criminal and veteran of the Yugoslavian state 
security service SDB, Arkan Zeljko Raznatovic, who built the group into a militia dubbed 
Arkan’s Tigers.74 Raznatovic's conflicted high-level connections were highlighted when  
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in November 1990 he was apprehended and jailed by Croatian border police for weapons 
smuggling, and was held until after the Serb-Croat fighting had started, but then released 
in June 1991.75  
In December 1990, Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia held multiparty elections. After 
the Croatian elections were won by Croatian Nationalists in 1991, and as the likelihood 
of Croatia declaring independence increased, the Serbian SDB organized an elite 
paramilitary group, the Red Berets, to arm, train and lead various less formal paramilitary 
groups to fight in opposition to Croatian independence. One of the paramilitary groups 
supported was Arkan’s Tigers. In addition to organizing paramilitaries during the 1990s, 
the SDB’s role included mainly surveillance and repression of any opposition to the 
government, including independent journalists, and organizing and managing smuggling 
and money laundering networks for the government; and "as such, the SDB remained in 
its essence a typical authoritarian secret service."76  
The new Slovenian government escalated its campaign toward independence in 
1991. The Slovenian Minster of Science, in a 1991 e-mail broadcast to scientists around 
the world, portrayed the Slovenian-Serbian differences in Huntington's "Clash of 
Civilizations" terms as an "incompatibility of two main frames of reference 
civilization."77 In June 1991, the Slovenian government unilaterally declared 
independence without attempting to negotiate with the federal government, and 
immediately had its "National Guard" police attack and take control of all 35 
Yugoslavian border crossing posts on the borders between Slovenia and its neighbors, 
Italy and Austria. These posts were manned by soldiers of the Yugoslavian National 
Army (JNA), under the command of a Slovenian general, but the JNA was outnumbered 
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10:1 to 20:1 by the attacking Slovenians.78 The Slovenian objective was to gain control 
of all of the tariff revenues on goods moving between Yugoslavia and Europe, revenues 
estimated to be approximately 75 percent of the federal Yugoslav budget.79 The new 
Croatian government, in June 1991, dismissed Serbs from civil service positions and 
began restoring the Ustasa symbols including the flag. Gangs began to attack Serbs and 
bomb Serb homes.80 
6. Embargoes 
The conflict in Croatia in August to December 1991 brought about significant 
international interventions. In September 1991, the UN Security Council agreed to a 
weapons embargo on all of occupants of Yugoslavia.81 While it was not uniformly 
adhered to by all international actors, and while it did have the effect of helping to reduce 
the initial Serbian advantage in the balance of arms against its neighbors, the embargo 
also had a variety of longer lasting collateral effects. On May 30, 1992, the UN 
announced an embargo on all non-food or medicine trade with Serbia and Montenegro. 
Formal trade relations between Serbia and its usual trading partners were halted.  
However, borders are not easy for police, even for national governments; and the 
UN initially had little border policing capacity in place to police the trade embargo on 
Serbia and Montenegro, which shared borders with Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Adriatic Sea. Assessing this 
reality, Serbians organized alternate sources of supply. Serbian state controlled 
enterprises offered to pay premiums for needed petroleum products and other raw 
materials. As Serbian industry had been completely worker managed under the 
Yugoslavian Communist government and privatization enabling legislation had only been 
enacted in August 1991, the economy was early in the process of transition to 
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privatization, and state controlled enterprises made up the majority of industry. New 
"informal" trade relations prospered in response to the UN embargo. Serbian economists 
estimate that the illegal economy constituted about 23.7 percent of the Yugoslav 
economy in 1991, but experienced tremendous growth during the sanctions period.82 The 
UN weapons and trade embargoes were crucial to both the rapid growth of the illegal 
economy and the state directed restructuring of the economy to focus on smuggling, 
money laundering and non-reported financial flows.  
In the summer of 1992, the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO began to 
run anti-smuggling patrols in the Adriatic Sea. In an unprecedented effort to enforce the 
trade sanctions, the UN established regional Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMS) in 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and Ukraine. These SAMS 
included U.S., Canadian and European customs officers stationed at border posts and 
coordinated through a UN Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications Center 
(SAMCOMM) with headquarters in Brussels. 
Despite these unprecedented UN efforts to enforce the trade sanctions, reports of 
UN efforts to monitor Serbia's borders suggested that for each truck or train car checked 
by UN monitors at the border, perhaps as many as 200 other vehicles passed the border 
unchecked.83 Apparently, in some cases, European and NATO border guards were as 
willing as Serbian border guards to facilitate trade despite the sanctions. German troops 
and other UN peacekeepers stationed along Serbia’s borders reportedly "were notorious 
for turning a blind eye to smuggling, and even for profiting from it.” Nis, located nearby 
Kosova and the main smuggling route between Asia and Western Europe, was a location 
where NATO officials were reported, by unloyal staff assistants, to regularly trade 
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information on Serbian forces activities in Kosova in exchange for allowing safe passage 
of petroleum products and other sanctioned goods across borders into Serbia.84 
Sanctions busting was organized in a relatively free market fashion under the 
Milosevic government, which, for the first few months, relied on small entrepreneurial 
traders. During the early months of the embargo, a severe oil shortage was created in 
Serbia and road traffic ceased for lack of fuel over the summer of 1992. By the fall, 
entrepreneurial smugglers had developed supply channels for importing Russian oil via 
the Danube, across the Bulgarian border at Kalotina, and via the Adriatic border port of 
Bar. Later, the government began to rely on official's ability to cooperate and form 
alliances with quasi-private criminal traders. Milosevic’s son, Marko, was granted control 
over the cross-border trade through the town of Bela Crkva on the Romanian border. 
Mirko Marjanovic, Serbia’s prime minister and head of a major gas and oil import 
company reportedly used his connections to gain a $50 million personal fortune from 
smuggling profits. Service for State Security associate paramilitary commander Arkan 
turned his arms smuggling skills to oil trading and received reimbursement from the 
government in the form of ownership of several gas stations. UN experts estimate that 
Arkan profited by $30,000 for each tanker truck of petroleum he brought across the 
borders.85  
By 1994, the process was working so well that the government appointed Mihlaj 
Kertes, who had been a senior SDB operative smuggling arms to Croatian and Bosnian 
Serbs during the UN weapons blockade, to head the Serbian Customs Office. A system of 
import and export permits began to be more strictly enforced allowing the government to 
administer an effective informal tax system on the informal trading industry. This was 
essentially ‘state-directed smuggling'.86  
                                                 
84  David Samuels, “The Pink Panthers.” The New Yorker, April 12, 2010. 
85  Peter Andreas, “Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy,” 
International Studies Quarterly (2005), 342. 
86  Ibid., 355–356. 
  37
To increase the efficiency of the Customs "tax" system, Kertes restructured the 
customs and border guard services. He replaced the existing staff of professional customs 
officers and border guards with people he trusted, many from his home town. They were 
assigned to the border crossings with the greatest value of sanction busting traffic. Since 
under the UN sanctions all formal cross-border financial transactions were frozen, 
remittances were often carried as cash across the borders and became the target of 
informal taxation through skimming by Kertes agents. Stealing abroad and returning with 
the booty was also common, and incentivized by the government to boost Customs 
skimming revenues. From 1996 to 1998, the government provided a thirty-day period of 
amnesty to register any car, even stolen vehicles, in order to raise money from licensing 
fees. Many of the registered vehicles were reportedly stolen from neighboring former 
Yugoslavian republics or from European countries, thus, yielding the government not 
only licensing but also import "tax" fees.87 Certain smugglers were granted preferential 
treatment by Kertes and were thus protected from the skim tax. A former customs officer 
who worked under Kertes said corruption was 'normal practice' in the 1990s, stating," 
Often we would receive a call from someone close to Kertes, saying the next five trucks 
should be let through the frontier without inspection. After we let through their five 
trucks, the next five would be for us. It was the norm."88 A forty-year-old retired wealthy 
Belgradian told the New York Times in 1998,"Sanctions are paradise … Normally, you 
import and you pay duties and then taxes. But under sanctions, if you know the right 
people, you pay no duties and no taxes, and you have the excuse of charging more. 
Sanctions are what cemented Milosevic's power."89 
Forensic financial experts assigned by the ICTY to investigate state fraud under 
the Milosevic government report that the customs service was the government's money 
export channel. On Milosevic's mostly verbal orders, Kertes sent customs service 
                                                 
87  Harden, ”The Milosevic Generation,” 2. 
88  Simpson, John “Serbia Losing Customs Corruption Battle. Institute for Peace and War Reporting,” 
BCR Issue 541, 2 Aug 2005, accessed March 29, 2001, http://www.iwpr.net/report-news/investigation-
serbia-losing-customs-corruption-battle.  
89  Harden, “The Milosevic Generation,” 4. 
  38
revenues to Cyprus via several Belgrade banks. The financial experts report Kertes 
transferred approximately a billion German marks, $80 million US, 63 million French 
francs and 390 million Austrian schillings to Cyprus.90 
The collateral effects of sanctions resulted in giving privileged access to 
government policy makers, and government policy, to the illegal, but hardly clandestine, 
sanctions-busting industry. The best connected covert commerce/black market groups 
thereby gained access not only to greatly increased profit opportunities but also to greatly 
increased social legitimacy. The enhanced profits allowed these groups to strengthen their 
cross-border black market networks building their ties and connections with border 
guards and border security administrators, especially those appointed by Kertes who were 
especially receptive to economic incentives. This resulted in a realignment of the pecking 
order of the political economy of Serbia, which went on for a lengthy eight-year period 
resulting in a significant degree of institutionalization of the sanctions-busting industry. 
Consequently, "most of the country’s new economic (and political) elites were 
leading beneficiaries of sanctions busting.”91 For example, allegedly Radovan Karadzic's 
profits from black market trading into Republika Srpska allowed him to maintain control 
over the Bosnian Serb police by "supplementing the salaries paid to Bosnian Serb police" 
for nearly two years after the official ending of hostilities.92 Arkan Željko Ražnatović's 
profits from arms and oil smuggling allowed him to buy a senior division football club 
and a number of businesses including casinos, discos, gas stations, pastry shops, stores, 
bakeries, restaurants, and gyms, as well as a large villa and an apartment for his divorced 
first wife and family in Greece. Meanwhile, the top officials in the government were 
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reportedly controlled two-thirds of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's financial markets 
under the Milosevic government, and arranged regular transfers of funds to Cyprus bank 
accounts controlled by Milosevic.93 
This concentration of the nation’s wealth in the hands of nouveau riche 
smugglers, arms dealers, and drug-traders meant that these were the people that 
democratic political parties could turn to for electoral financing. Western liberals’ 
academics usually portray democracies as based on the principle of ‘one person-one 
vote’. However, free market representative democracy functions on a basis closer to one 
dollar gets one minute of voters attention, and getting elected requires getting enough of 
the voters attention that they remember the candidate’s name in the polling booth. Thus, 
the new political parties in Serbia were unlikely to succeed by appealing for donations to 
the average rural voter living on $40 per month or the average urban white collar worker 
earning $100 per month. Meaningful campaign funds were available from the nouveau-
rich upper-middle-class and upper-class smugglers, arms traders, drug dealers and 
thieves. Yet, people making campaign contributions expect to have some influence on 
policy, or they channel their contributions elsewhere next election.  
A collateral effect of the UN sanctions was therefore to criminalize much of 
Serbia's economy and governmental institutional structure. This had the consequence of 
promoting what Andreas calls "‘uncivil society,’ ... a higher level of public tolerance for 
lawbreaking and an undermined respect for the rule of law. Smuggling may not only 
become perceived as ‘normal’ rather than deviant, but it may even be celebrated as 
patriotic."94 Sanctions-busting came to be seen as patriotic; official disapproval of 
smuggling disappeared and much of the society became accustomed to, or by the end of 
the eight years of sanctions, habituated to economic and political behaviors that do not 
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comply with western legal standards. Removal of sanctions and external exhortations to 
reform laws and once again comply with western legal standards were unlikely to have 
short term success in re-establishing societal acceptance and compliance with legal norms 
when contrary habits were ingrained.95 
7. Milosevic Government Police Reforms 
As the Yugoslav Army had developed a greater degree of independence from 
government control than Milosevic preferred, he built up the Serbian police force. Police 
salaries rose above those in the military, the police were funded to buy better equipment 
than the military and the oversight process closed its eyes to police corrupt practices.96 
The Milosevic government organized a number of specialized police forces. The Serbian 
Security Services (RDB)97 was reorganized in 1992 to report to the Minister of Internal 
Affairs. The RDB had grown to include about 4,000 staff by the end of the 1980s, due the 
centralization of all police forces in Serbia. As part of this process, all police helicopters, 
including autonomous provinces units, republic and city police helicopter units were 
placed under the central control of the RDB. Also, under the command of the RDB were 
several paramilitary units. Another unit, the Special Police Anti-Terrorism Unit (SAJ) 
was centralized in 1992. The unit's origins were in local units of the MUP set up in 1978 
to counter airline hijackings, hostage takings and other organized crime. In 1992, the 
various units were reorganized under central SAJ command. Initially the SAJ was 
composed of about two hundred officers.98 The Special Anti-terrorist Unit was organized 
into two assault teams, a logistics team including snipers, dog handlers, a security and 
support team including a medical group, a construction group and a weapons and 
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ammunition search group. Officially, the SAJ was tasked with combating terrorism, 
insurgency, organized crime, and dealing with hostage situations and high risk warrant 
executions. In addition, the SAJ was used to provide VIP protection.  
By 1993, the police force was composed of 80,000 personnel and was heavily 
armed and essentially turned into a paramilitary unit. In 1996 the RDB paramilitary units 
the Tigers, under the command of Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, and the Red Berets, under 
the command of Franko Simatovic, and the RDB helicopter squadron were reorganized 
as the Unit for Special Forces (JSO).99 The OPG was formed in late 1997 of elite Kosova 
based police staff to counter the KLA guerilla's success at raids on MUP regular 
uniformed police in Kosova in the late 1990s. The Operational Group (OPG) was 
organized under the official command of the SAJ.  
The para-militarized police was initially used to suppress urban opposition in 
Belgrade. During the wars with Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, regular police 
officers were required to accept assignment to rotating three month shifts in the war zone 
or face the alternative of losing their job.100 Later the OPG, JSO and other units were 
used to suppress the Kosovo Liberation Army.101  
The requirement for the police to carry out political suppression without regard 
for the finer points of respect for civil rights and the rule of law likely reduced police 
respect for the law and willingness to cooperate with prosecutors in enforcing the rule of 
law. Further, it surely reduced the public's' respect for and trust in the police. By the late 
1990s, the public perception of the brutality of police was such that when police 
confronted protesting university students in Belgrade mass demonstrations of 1996–97 
with clubs, the students chanted to the police "GO TO KOSOVO."102  
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Reportedly by the late 1990s, the smuggling skills developed bypassing the UN 
Arms Embargo and the UN Trade Sanctions were being used by the elite security and 
criminal groups in Serbia to gain market share in the lucrative drug trade. The Zemun 
criminal group and the JSO were purchasing and smuggling a total of about one hundred 
million dollars value of heroin and other drugs from Bulgarian, Albanian and Bolivian 
suppliers. Safekeeping for inventories was provided, knowingly or not, by Belgrade 
banks; in one of which 660 kilos of 99 percent pure heroin was found in March 2001 in a 
vault rented by state security officials.103 
8.  Loser Not Leader: The Demise of the Milosevic Government 
Continuing to play on Serbian nationalist sentiments, in 1999 Milosevic portrayed 
the NATO bombing as analogous to the Nazi bombing of Belgrade in WWII.104 
However, by 2000 the opposition was able to organize 18 of the separate opposition 
parties, not including the SRS or the SPO, into a coalition under the banner, the 
Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). The coalition chose constitutional lawyer 
Kostunica as its presidential candidate.105 Kostunica represented the public frustration 
with Milosevic in his choice of the campaign charge that Milosevic had failed to achieve 
the nationalist goal of uniting all Serbs under one state.106 With U.S. support for 
"democratization" reported at $25 million to $100 million through Otpor and other civil 
society groups, Milosevic failed to win a victory in the September twenty-first round 
balloting for the presidency, and Otpor led demonstrators took to the streets in support of 
Kostunica. The heads of the army and SDB refused Milosevic's order to use the army to 
suppress the demonstrators, and instead allowed protesters to burn the federal parliament 
building.107 There was speculation and reports that the DOS, specifically Djindjic, had 
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negotiated with the JSO leadership, and that the JSO understood that in exchange for 
their refusing to support Milosevic, the DOS government would take a mild approach to 
police (and military) reform.108 Milosevic conceded on October 6, 2000. 
Within a week, the UN, EU and the U.S. removed sanctions against Serbia. In late 
October Serbia joined the Stability Pact for Southern Europe. On October 27, Kostunica 
visited Russia and secured loans of approximately $600 million to meet Serbia's energy 
needs for the coming winter. On November 1, 2000, Serbia was readmitted to the UN and 
to the OSCE on November 27, 2000. The new DOS government won 64 percent of the 
seats in the December 2000 National Assembly elections. Thus, by the end of 2000, the 
Serbian government was reaccepted as a member of the international community of states 
and held a democratic mandate to improve Serbian administration. 
E.  LEGISLATING DEMOCRACY:  THE DOS INITIATES REFORMS  
In a liberal democratically governed country, the role of the police is to prevent, 
detect and investigate misdemeanors, felonies and other crimes, including the violations 
of law by organized crime perpetrators; and to find and apprehend criminals. In Serbia 
during the 1990s, the police played a different role. The Serbian Police Force had been 
organized as a section of the Ministry of Interior (MUP)109, reporting to the Minister.110 
As noted, during the conflicts in Bosnia, the Serbian police were assigned to rotating 
three month patrols in the war zone acting as combatants. The government formed by 
Djindjic took over a police force composed of approximately 83,000 to 85,000 armored 
troops, many of whom had developed expertise in smuggling arms, oil, drugs or 
cigarettes. Many if not most of the police had grown accustomed to working with 
organized crime members involved in smuggling or as members of war paramilitary 
forces such as Arkan's Tigers.  
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The initial reform effort of the government acknowledged the need for 
decriminalization, demilitarization, de-politicization and decentralization; and the initial 
police reform focus of the DOS government was to control the quasi-army it had 
inherited and to rehabituate the battlefield and border crossing veterans to traffic patrols, 
routine border document checking and crime investigations.  
The Djindjic government approached reforms selectively. Giving credibility to the 
speculations of a negotiated agreement with the security sector leaders, the new DOS 
government chose not to attempt to reorganize the army or the secret police, although that 
would have helped to preserve records of Milosevic government activities111 and to 
consolidate the new governments control. The apparent timidity may have been because 
the Army had, on October 11, advised the “DOS government that any attempt to discredit 
the military leadership would result in 'NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES'."112 The Army 
resisted reforms. In March and April 2001, the VJ guards of Milosevic’s residence 
obstructed police officers sent by the Djindjic government to arrest Milosevic.113  
The new government had the support of the police to a degree, yet, the police 
were not successful in arresting Milosevic until April 1, 2001; and the sitting president of 
Serbia from the removal of Milosevic until early 2004, had been indicted by the ICTY, 
but remained president. In other words during this period, the Djindjic government, 
which based its platform on reintegration of Serbia into the international community and 
accession to EU membership, was unable to command sufficient political support and 
obedience from the police for two years to arrest the president and provide him to the 
ICTY, despite cooperation with the ICTY being an explicit requirement by the EU for 
Serbian accession to membership.  
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A major focus of police reforms in this period was the government's pragmatic 
need to raise additional government revenues, which prompted an emphasis on border 
security reform and curtailing the influence of organized crime. This included reduction 
of smuggling of cigarettes and petroleum products in order to raise revenue, hoping to 
transfer much of the former customs’ services off-budget revenues back into regular 
tariffs and fees. In 2001, the MUP Minister created an Organized Crime Directorate 
reporting directly to the Minister. The government was successful to the point of being 
able to reduce the tax on wages by about 10 percent. The estimated black market share in 
the Serbian economy fell from about 50 percent in 2000 to 17 percent in 2001.114  
At the political level, the Djindjic government was eager to drive reform more 
quickly and to attempt to motivate the police to act more aggressively against organized 
crime. In July 2002, the National Assembly adopted a new Criminal Procedure Law and a 
new Organized Crime Law establishing a special prosecutor’s office, a new court section 
and a new jail for the investigation and bringing to justice of organized crime suspects. At 
the operational level, the response of the police did not result in any significant increase 
in charges against major organized crime operations. Commentators noted that despite 
the positive intentions of international community experts in providing expert advice to 
the legislators in the drafting of the new Organized Crime Law, there remained several 
problems that made it "very demanding and not appropriate to current needs and 
situations" due to the current incapacity of the prosecutors to fulfill their role under the 
law of leading and coordinating the police in gathering of evidence sufficient to bring 
charges, and due to lack of existing laws dealing with many aspects of "trafficking, drugs, 
money laundering, asset confiscation, the use of surveillance and covert evidence 
gathering, and witness protection."115 Further, the areas of responsibility of the Criminal 
Investigation Directorate and of the Organized Crime Unit overlapped, and they had not 
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developed the capacity to coordinate their work as of 2005.116 In what some 
commentators called a response by organized crime, in June 2002 the Assistant Chief of 
Police, Bosca Buha, was assassinated.117  
The Djindjic government made some operational reforms to the MUP during this 
period. The most high profile was the January 2001 dismissal of Radomir Markovic from 
his position as head of the MUP's RDB State Security Sector. On 24 February 2001, 
Markovic was arrested regarding the attempted murder of Vuk Draskovic. Markovic had 
allegedly been systematically destroying documents between October 2000 and January 
2001 when he was removed from his post.118 However, he was subsequently convicted 
only of removing police records about the Draskovic case, and the attempted murder was 
pinned on two subordinate Red Beret members.119 In addition to Markovic, the Djindjic 
government also replaced nine of 13 police generals,120  along with hundreds of senior 
police officers including the head of the criminal investigation unit of the Police 
Directorate, and 396 other key management officers and about 2,500 regular officers.121 
The government also made tentative organizational reforms to the police, perhaps 
attempting to balance the Djindjic loyalist's desire for rapid liberalization and 
democratization with the reality of the residual authoritarianism in the society represented 
by the opposition.  
Reforms were made in the MUP's "regular police" group, the Public Security 
Sector. The Gendarmerie, a unit that had been dissolved at the end of World War II, was 
reestablished by the Minister in June 2001. The Gendarmerie consists of four battalion 
                                                 
116 Dragan Paunovic, “Police Reform in Serbia,” Friedenskonsolidierung auf dem Balkan: Probleme 
und Perspektiven, Nov. 2005, p. 77-89. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), Hamburg, 
Germany, 79-80, accessed April 9, 2010, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=22753.  
117  Bakic and Gajic, “Police Reform in Serbia: Five Years Later.” 20. 
118  Milkovic and Hoare, “Crime and the Economy under Milosevic,” 214. 
119  Ibid.  
120  Bakic and Gajic, “Police Reform in Serbia: Five Years Late.” 4. 
121  Richard Monk, “Study on Policing In The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” OSCE, (July 2001), 
5, accessed April 10, 2010, http://www.osce.org/item/16131.html, also see Bakic and Gajic, 5. 
  47
sized units, each with 500 to 800 police equipped to NATO standards, with bases located 
in Belgrade, Nis, Novi Sad and Kraljevo.122 The Gendarmerie was tasked with anti-
terrorist patrols, riot control at mass crowd events such as demonstrations and large 
sporting events, and backing up the Criminal Investigation Directorate and Uniformed 
Police Directorate staff in arresting dangerous suspects.  
To cope with the volatile situation in several southern Serbian municipalities in 
2001, the new government made short-term reforms. One was to create a Multi-Ethnic 
Police Force (MEPE). The MEPE recruited 375 cadets and put them through a twelve-
week basic training run by the OSCE with a succeeding 15 week on-the-job-training with 
monitoring by OSCE organized international police mentors. The Gendarmerie was 
assigned to back up the MEPE in the south.  
Frustrated in its desire to bring about significant depoliticization and 
demilitarization of the police, the Djindjic government initiated police efforts to develop 
a strategic plan for reform. In 2001 with the assistance of the Danish Center for Human 
Rights (DCHR), the League of Experts (LEX) and the OSCE, reports were prepared 
profiling the state of policing in Serbia and detailing recommendations for reform.123 In 
response, the MUP Minister appointed working groups from each Directorate in the 
Ministry to follow up on the DHCR-LEX-OSCE reports to prepare a vision for police 
reform. Delay followed, and it was not until March of 2003 that the Ministry of the 
Interior formally finished its proposal to the government entitled a "Vision for Reform of 
the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia," which defined fourteen reform 
priorities. 
In June 2001, facing pressure from the international community that was 
threatening to cut off Serbian access to foreign aid payments unless greater cooperation 
with ICTY requirements was evidenced, the Djindjic government had the police turn 
Milosevic over to the ICTY despite strong opposition from opposition parties in 
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parliament and the need to defy a Serbian Supreme Court judgment restraining 
extradition until the court had ruled on the constitutionality of the government's 
extradition decree.124 
In an incident, which is perhaps symptomatic of the rising internal conflicts 
within the police sector, in August 2001, the former deputy head of the RDB State 
Security met with Kostunica aides, either with an offer of documents that linked the 
Djindjic's government to organized crime or to discuss reform of the RDB; and was 
murdered shortly after the meeting. Kostunica claimed the killing evidenced Djindjic's 
links to organized crime. The deputy head of the MUP Organized Crime Directorate 
claimed to have evidence discrediting the dead RDB deputy head as having been a debt 
collector, assassin and paramilitary in the Croatian and Bosnian wars.125 
Shortly thereafter, the government had the police JSO unit arrest two former 
prison camp guards charged by the ICTY with murdering detainees. Despite the recent 
November 6 Serbian Supreme Court ruling that the government's extradition decree was 
unconstitutional, on November 9 the Djindjic government had the police extradite the 
two prison camp guards to the ICTY in the Hague. In response, the JSO claimed they had 
been misled about the reason for the arrest of the two guards and called for the 
resignation of the Minister of the Interior. The JSO head resigned and the 300 JSO 
members held a two day strike in protest over the Djindjic government's cooperation with 
the ICTY. As a result, government ministers, including Djindjic, were left without police 
security protection, although many employed private security bodyguards. In response 
the Djindjic government agreed to replace the reformist RDB head they had appointed 
and also agreed to not shift the RDB to the control of the Public Security Sector126, to 
detach the JSO from the RDB State Security Service and put the JSO directly under the 
MUP Minister. Further, the MUP Minister agreed to the JSO demand to make a public 
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statement that there would be no more police extraditions to the ICT.127 The government 
also threatened to disband the JSO unit if it did not submit to civilian control128  and 
reorganized the JSO helicopter unit, combining it with the police squadron to form the 
existing Helicopter Unit, which is now part of the police directorate. Later, in July 2002 
the RDB was removed from the MUP by the Parliament's August 2002 Law on Security 
Services and transformed into the Security and Information Agency (BIA) under 
Parliamentary control.129  
F. LEADERSHIP TRANSITION:  THE DJINDJIC ASSASSINATION  
In January 2003, the head of the RDB was replaced by a loyal Djindjic ally, and 
the first civilian Minister of Defense was scheduled to be appointed on March 13, 2003. 
On March 12 Prime Minister Djindjic was assassinated near the main government 
building in downtown Belgrade near midday. The process of police reform spurted 
forward. The same day the government declared a state of emergency until April 22. The 
police and military were given powers to arrest anyone without warrants and to hold 
suspects without charges for thirty days.  
G. CONCLUSION 
The history of events relevant to the current status of police and border security 
reform in Serbia indicates that there are a number of past events whose residual effects 
continue to overhang the current reform process. One of these is the aspect of traditional 
Serbian nationalism given expression through the Kosova Epic, the Serbian National 
Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Serbian Orthodox Church. This manifests as an 
acceptance by a large proportion of the population of vendetta politics and leadership 
transition by violent removal, as occurred to Djindjic. Another is the wariness of Croat 
and Bosniak nationalistic passions as given expression through the Ustasa regime and the 
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war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocides committed against Serbs in the 1939–45 
conflict and as echoed in the 1990s wars treatment of Serb residents of Croatia and 
Bosnia. A third is the lingering influence and power in Serbian society, especially in 
political parties and in the police, of individuals who hold a shallowly disguised contempt 
for the egalitarian application of the rule of law as a result of their gaining of their wealth 
and power through subverting the rule of law to provide the Serbian state and people with 




III. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INTERVENTIONS BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
A.  THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) 
1. Operation Deny Flight 
 NATO first intervened militarily in the Balkans in 1993. The United Nations 
(UN) in October 1992 adopted Security Council Resolution 781, which declared a ban on 
military flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina to protect those areas from Serbian and 
Croatian air attacks. Initially, the UN assigned the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) to monitor the ban.  
NATO began Operation Sky Monitor to monitor compliance with the ban. 
Between October 1992 and April 1993, NATO observed over 500 violations of the 
ban.130 In response, the UN adopted Security Council Resolution 816 in March 1993 that 
extended the ban to include all plane and helicopter aircraft not authorized by the UN as 
humanitarian flights or UNPROFOR required flights. Resolution 816 also authorized UN 
members to use of all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban.  
 On April 12, 1993, NATO began Operation Deny Flight, which continued until 
December 20, 1995, to enforce the UN Security Council Resolution 816 ban on flights 
over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Twelve NATO nations (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom 
and the United States) contributed some 4,500 personnel and approximately 239 aircraft 
to Operation Deny Flight. Operation Deny flight involved 23,021 fighter sorties over 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 27,077 close air support and air strike sorties over Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 29,158 flight sorties by Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), 
NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW), tanker, reconnaissance and support aircraft, 
and 21,164 training flights, for a total of 100,420 sorties.131 The mission reduced the 
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average number of unauthorized over flights of Bosnia and Herzegovina from an average 
of twenty per month to an average of approximately three per month. In February 1994, 
six Serbian Air Force J-21 Jastreb jets entered Bosnian airspace and bombed a Bosnian 
factory. NATO F-16s intercepted the Serbian jets near Banja Luca and entered into 
NATO’s first combat engagement, shooting down four of the intruders near Banja 
Luca.132 Operation Deny Flight was less effective against helicopter flights over Bosnia, 
as all three combatant military forces painted their helicopters with international 
organization insignia including UN colors or Red Cross insignia that prevented Operation 
Deny Flight forces from identifying unauthorized helicopter flights easily. The 
helicopters slow air speeds made it difficult for the Operation Deny sorties to see the 
helicopters involved in aggressive acts, which was the engagement rules requirement for 
use of force by NATO pilots.  
 In June 1993, the UN adopted Security Council Resolution 836 authorizing 
UNPROFOR to use force to protect the UN declared “Safe Areas” in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. NATO expanded Operation Deny Flight to provide close air support to 
UNPROFOR ground operations when requested by the UN special representative in 
Bosnia. In March 1994 NATO aircraft first flew in support of UNPROFOR troops but 
did not attack ground targets. In April 1994, NATO F-16Cs for the first time bombed 
ground targets in support of UNPROFOR troop operations. Security analysts noted that 
this evidenced NATO’s ability to engage in military operations in environments outside 
its traditional territory in the central plains of Europe and to carry out coordinated 
operations with UN forces.  
 Also in April, F/A-18As performed bombing and strafing missions against ground 
targets at the request of UNPROFOR, and a NATO Sea Harrier was shot down by a 
surface to air missile while on an UNPROFOR close support mission. In August 1994, 
NATO A-10s strafed Bosnian-Serb heavy weapons seized in violation of UNPROFOR 
commands and forced Bosnian-Serb compliance. Also in August, NATO A-10s and 
Jaguars attacked a Bosnian Serb tank that had attacked UNPROFOR troops. In 
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November 1994, NATO jets attacked the Udbina, Croatia airfield and also attacked the 
Otoka and Dvor surface-to-air missile sites. In May 1995, NATO aircraft struck a Pale 
ammunition dump at UNPROFOR request. In June 1995, a NATO F-16C on a patrol was 
shot down by a surface-to-air missile over western Bosnia. In July 1995, NATO aircraft 
attacked ground targets near Srebbrenica identified by UNPROFOR ground forces. In 
August 1995, EA-6Bs and F-18Cs attacked surface-to-air-missile stations near Knin and 
Udbina.133  
2.  Operation Deliberate Force 
 On August 30, 1995, Operation Deny Flight was escalated to Operation 
Deliberate Force, a bombing campaign against Bosnian-Serb forces in response to the 
Bosnian-Serb mortar shelling of Sarajevo. Operation Deliberate Force lasted until 
September 20, 1995, and included 3,515 sorties flown and attacks on 48 target complexes 
made up of 338 individual targets on which 1,026 bombs were dropped. Of this total, 708 
were precision munitions and 318 were non-precision.134 
 In December 1995, Operation Deny Force was terminated and the staff and 
equipment were transferred to Operation Decisive Endeavor to provide close air support 
to the NATO led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), which was mandated with 
Dayton Accords implementation monitoring. IFOR included up to 54,000 troops in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina from the 32 countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and 
the United Kingdom. Non-NATO nations that contributed forces included Austria,  
 
 
Bangladesh, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Slovak Republic, Sweden, the Russian 
Federation and the Ukraine.  
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 In December 1996, the role of IFOR was taken over by the NATO led 
multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR). SFOR began with about 50,000 troops from 
the NATO members Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, United States, Luxembourg and from the non-NATO countries 
Australia, Austria, Argentina, Finland, Egypt, Ireland, Malaysia, Morocco, New Zealand, 
Russia, and Sweden. By December 2002, the SFOR complement had been reduced to 
about 12,000 troops and by December 2004 to about 7,000 troops. 
 In December 2004, the role of SFOR was taken over by EUFOR-Althea under EU 
command. By early 2008, the EUFOR troop level had been reduced to about 2,500 and 
by mid-2008 to about 2,000. These troops were mostly from EU member countries.  
3. Operation Allied Force 
 Meanwhile, as the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina came under increasing 
stability, the situation in Kosova grew problematic as Serbs and Albanian ethnic groups 
engaged in mutual hostilities. NATO, on March 24, 1999, began Operation Allied Force 
to stop alleged Serbian ethnic cleansing of Albanians. Subsequent investigations by the 
ITCY found no evidence of ethnic cleansing before the commencement of Operation 
Allied Force, but much evidence that crimes against humanity and human rights abuses 
were committed by the Serbian security forces exits, including the special police units 
and the JSO after the commencement of Operation Allied Force and during its 
continuance until June 11, 1999. Operation Allied Force involved about 1,000 aircraft 
based from the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt sailing in the Adriatic and from land bases in 
Italy, which flew more than 38,000 combat missions. The Operation marked an important 
rite of passage for the Luftwaffe as the German Air Force’s missions were its first combat 
operations since 1945.  
 Operation Allied Force initially targeted Yugoslavian air defenses and military 
targets, but later was transitioned to “dual use” targets, that is, anything that could be of 
use to the military, including Danube bridges, factories, power stations, 
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telecommunications facilities, the headquarters of the Yugoslavian Leftists political party 
led by Serbian President Milošević's wife, the Avala TV tower and the Chinese Embassy. 
The latter’s military use was indicated by intelligence reports that Serbian President 
Milosevic was in the Embassy.  
 After the Serbian government accepted Finnish-Russian mediated NATO 
conditions that Yugoslavian forces be removed from Kosova and that a UN and NATO 
military force be posted in Kosova, Operation Allied Force was ended June 11, 1999. The 
NATO led Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeeping force entered Kosova to administer the 
peace conditions. KFOR was composed of British troops, a German Army brigade and 
Italian, Spanish and United States Army brigades. The KFOR initially included about 
50,000 personnel, and by January 2002 had been reduced to about 39,000 staff, further 
reduced to about 26,000 staff by June 2003 and to 17,500 staff by the end of 2003.135 By 
May 1999 NATO had transported about 4,700 tons of food and water, 4,300 tons of other 
goods, 2,600 tons of tents and 1,600 tons of medical supplies to refugee areas in and 
around Kosova. 136 The KFOR mission has been extended to 2010. 
 Several of the former Yugoslavian republics are NATO members. Slovenia, 
Croatia and Albania are currently members of NATO, while Macedonia’s membership as 
of 2010 was being blocked by Greece's objections. Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
Montenegro, indicated they intend to become members. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia are NATO Partner countries. In 2003, the Serbian government 
applied for membership in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. NATO approved 
Serbia's application in November 2006 after Serbia had agreed in mid-2005 to allow 
transit through Serbia of NATO KFOR forces to Kosova. Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Montenegro were approved for PfP membership at the same time. In December 2006 
Serbia formally joined the PfP, and NATO established a liaison office in the Serbian 
capital to administer the KFOR transit agreement.137 According to NATO, in joining PfP 
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Serbia "Serbia expresses its readiness to accept its part of responsibility for maintaining 
permanent peace and stability in the region, to participate in UN mandated peace 
missions in order to reach the level of interoperability of NATO member states’ 
armies."138 Serbia defined its priorities for cooperation through the PfP to include 
building capacity in "Democratic oversight of the defense system, defense policy and 
strategy, planning and financing of the defense system and resource management, 
military education, training and doctrine, and operational aspects of participation in peace 
and humanitarian operations, and nuclear/biological/chemical weapons defense."139 In 
2007, Serbia escalated its participation by entering the PfP Planning and Review Process 
(PARP). 
 In 2007, Serbia also applied for membership in the Southeast Europe Defense 
Ministerial (SEDM), a NATO initiative “designed to enhance regional cooperation to 
prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, build cooperation for military 
industries, military research, and establish "satellite links between military hospitals."140 
In October 2009 Serbia was admitted to membership in the SEDM.141  
 As of 2009, the Serbian government stated on the Web site of the Minister of 
Defense, Dragan Sutanovac, that it had no desire to join NATO, but had chosen to 
participate in a NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) to facilitate Serbian reforms through 
interchange of expertise with other NATO participants.142 Due in part to the public's 
memories of NATO’s 1999 bombing of Serbia, public opinion polls indicate that only 
about one-quarter of Serbians favor NATO membership. 
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B.  THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) 
 The Serbian Stabilization and Association Process (SAp) officially started in 2001 
with the establishment of the Joint Consultative Task Force (JCTF), as a mechanism to 
enable the European Commission and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to 
examine the situation. The JCTF adopted recommendations that were binding guidelines 
for Serbian reform to comply with EU standards in the areas of political and economic 
reforms, regional cooperation and compliance with obligations. 
 After the fourth JCTF meeting, the organization and coordination of Serbia’s 
activities was assigned first to the European Integration Department of the Ministry of 
International Economic Relations and then in March 2004 to the European Integration 
Office of the government of the Republic of Serbia. The European Integration Office of 
the FRY continued to coordinate reports of the Serbian and Montenegrin governments. 
After the fifth meeting, the constitutional transformation of the FRY into the state union 
of Serbia-Montenegro (SaM) occurred. After three informal meetings between the EU 
Commission, the EU Member-States and SaM, the Enhanced Permanent Dialogue (EPD) 
was introduced to ensure a positive feasibility study assessment. The first EPD between 
SaM and the EU was held in July 2003. The EPD assessed the current situation of SaM 
relative to the EU standards for the accession and defined recommendations for the SAp. 
Particular EU concerns were the SaM constitution, efficient institutions and the 
implementation of the practice of the rule of law.143  
 During the negotiation process between 2000 and 2004, the FRY, and later SaM, 
were provided with EU CARDS assistance that totaled 1.139 billion Euros, which was 
primarily allocated to infrastructure projects in the energy and transportation sectors.  
 The Negotiation Team of the Republic of Serbia was set up in January 2005, and 
the Feasibility Study on Serbia's readiness to negotiate the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA) was approved in April 2005. In September 2005 the framework for the 
negotiation of the SAA was accepted. Negotiations began in November 2005, but were 
suspended by the EU from May 2006 to June 2007 due to EU members’ dissatisfaction 
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regarding Serbia’s level of cooperation with the ICTY. The SAA, including the Interim 
Agreement, was initialed by Serbia in November 2007. In April 2008, the President of 
Serbia signed the SAA after Prime Minister Kostunica refused to do so, and sought an 
election on the issue. In the subsequent election Kostunica’s government failed to win re-
election, and the new government of Prime Minister Cvetkovic won ratification of the 
SAA in the National Assembly in September 2008.  
 The SAA and Interim Agreement ratification by the EU members was delayed 
due to the Netherlands and Belgium awaiting a report from the ICTY certifying the 
ICTY’s satisfaction with Serbia’s efforts to comply with the processes and requests of the 
ICTY to deliver indictees, Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic, to the ICTY.144 Serbia 
unilaterally began implementing the Interim Agreement in January 2009. In November 
2009, the EU initialed the SAA, and in December 2009, the EU began implementing the 
trade aspects of the SAA and granted Serbia access to the Schengen visa regime. The 
Interim Agreement went into effect 1 February 2010. After Serbia submitted a package of 
wartime journals of Ratko Mladic to the ICTY in May 2010, on June 14, 2010, the 
Council of the Ministers of the EU announced that the ratification process of the SAA 
with Serbia would be resumed and the SAA would be submitted to the member country 
parliaments and to the European Parliament for ratification.145 
 In December 2009, Serbia entered its formal application for membership in the 
EU. The first meeting of the Interim Committee for monitoring the EU-Serbia Interim 
Agreement was held in March 2009 regarding issues of trade, competition, state aid, 
intellectual property law and transit traffic and to set up technical coordinating groups to 
coordinate Serbian reforms in these areas. Meanwhile, the EU—Serbian Enhanced 
Permanent Dialogue continued to coordinate Serbian reforms in other areas relating to 
requirements for EU membership until the SAA is ratified by the EU members. In May 
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2010, the EU made the first grant of 174 million Euro to Serbia under the IPA program 
for local infrastructure, higher education and regional economic development.146  
 A crucial component of the EU requirements for the granting of access to the 
Schengen visa regime and for accession to membership relate to border security and the 
implementation of Integrated Border Management (IBM). The EU IBM policy requires 
that borders be closed to criminal and other activities that reduce stability and security in 
the region including organized crime, terrorism, illegal migrations and human trafficking. 
For maintenance of security, EU policy requires that border management control the 
passing of persons, transportation vehicles, and goods through border crossings, and also 
prevent uncontrolled entrance across borders and manage persons seeking asylum and 
persons arrested without legitimate travel documents. The purpose of this level of IBM is 
to prevent smuggling of goods, illegal drugs, weapons, and persons across borders and to 
block the transmission of human, animal and plant diseases and to reduce threats of 
international terrorism. Because execution of the border control functions involves 
overlap of authority of the customs service and border police, EU policy requires the 
definition of competences for each of these agencies and development of procedures for 
institutional cooperation, including joint training, and ensuring compatibility of 
telecommunications, information-technological systems, and of BCP infrastructure and 
equipment.147 The EU border security standards have been reformed over the past decade 
in response to the increased number of terrorist attacks in western European cities and the 
consequent increasing political support for more restrictive immigration policies and 
nationalist/xenophobic political parties in the UK, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
France, Italy, Denmark and Austria.  
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C.  ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 
(OSCE) 
 The OSCE Permanent Council established the OSCE Mission to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in January 2001, at the invitation of the federal government. The 
OSCE Mission was later renamed to the OSCE Mission to SaM and then to the OSCE 
Mission to Serbia. The role of the Mission has been to provide expert assistance in the 
areas of rule of law, law enforcement, democratization, human rights and minorities’ 
rights, and media development. The OSCE Mission played a key role in reform of 
Serbia’s police security sector by coordinating international assistance in the form of 
consultative experts, police staff training and police infrastructure development. The 
Monk report assessing Serbia’s policing and needed reforms was prepared for the OSCE 
Mission.148 The OSCE Mission advised the MUP strategic planning processes, provided 
advice to the MUP on developing and implementing oversight systems and procedures 
and advised the MUP Police Directorate on development of the witness protection unit. 
The OSCE Mission also facilitates police-citizen forums to develop greater trust and co-
operation between the public, municipal governments and police.149  
 The OSCE ran a series of training seminars for senior police officials emphasizing 
European best practices. For example, the OSCE assisted the Police Directorate with 
aspects of implementation of the National Strategy for the Fight Against Organized 
Crime by providing training to police senior officers in the use of special investigative 
methods against organized crime, including drug production and trafficking and cyber 
crime.  The OSCE provided expert advice on drafting of legislation for various security 
sector legislative bills including the 2002 Law On Organization And Jurisdiction Of 
Government Authorities In Suppression Of Organized Crime and the 2005 Law on 
Police. 
 The OSCE Mission also assisted with reform of the police education system by 
providing expertise in new curriculum design, development of field training programs 
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and in coordinating fund raising to refurbish the Police Basic Training Centre in Sremska 
Kamenica. In addition the OSCE provided courses to the faculty of the former Police 
High School to upgrade their teaching methods and skills to use modern adult learning 
and student centered teaching methods.150 The OSCE Mission also provides ongoing 
assistance to the Police Directorate to design and implement advanced training for police 
officers at the Zemun Advanced Police Training Center and at the Sremska Kamenica 
Basic Police Training Center.151 The OCSE Mission has also assisted the MUP and the 
Border Police Directorate to assess and identify appropriate border control point 
infrastructure and equipment satisfactory to the EU IBM standards. 
D.  GENEVA CENTRE FOR DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED 
FORCES (DCAF) 
 The DCAF is focused on providing expert assistance in drafting of legislation and 
regulation for security sector reform, including police system reform legislation. In 
addition, the DCAF provides expert consultations on establishing civilian, parliamentary 
and government oversight mechanisms for the police and other parts of the security 
sector. The DCAF guided the development of the MUP and Border Police Directorate’s 
strategy and plan for demilitarization of the border police.  
 The DCAF also provides training seminars for senior managers in the security 
sector on issues including legal reform, organizational culture and leadership, logistic 
support, border surveillance, training curricula and methods, risk assessment techniques, 
criminal investigation, integrating border control systems, and developing national and 
international cooperation. The DCAF is also promoting the establishment of a virtual 
Border Police Academy with dual focuses, one on a training program for mid-level 
managers including multi-week working visits for participants to countries in Europe 
with the more advanced border management systems and a second focus on basic training 
in integrated border management practices for junior level staff.  
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E.  EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL 
COOPERATION AT THE EXTERNAL BORDERS OF THE MEMBER 
STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (FRONTEX) 
 The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union was set up in 2004 in 
response to increasing security threats to European urban centers. FRONTEX’s mandate 
is to facilitate implementation of the acquis concerning border management in Articles 
62(2) (a) & 66 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.152 Of the total 
FRONTEX staff of approximately 225 persons, about 70 are seconded experts.153 
FRONTEX brings together the heads of border security of all the EU member countries. 
FRONTEX has organized nine border police training academies in various member 
countries, developed a common core curriculum for border guard education, and 
allocated 6.5 million Euros to training border police.154  
Of the total FRONTEX staff of approximately 225 persons, about 70 are 
seconded experts. FRONTEX brings together the heads of border security of all the EU 
member countries. FRONTEX has organized nine border police training academies in 
various member countries, developed a common core curriculum for border guard 
education, and allocated 6.5 million Euros to training border police.  
 FRONTEX also facilitates “operational cooperation and coordination,” which 
consists of exchange of information and experiences as well as training cooperation. The 
European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) is a pilot project for this type of 
institutional development.  
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F.  RUSSIA’S ROLE 
 Russia has historically played a role as a supporter of Serbian and Yugoslavian 
interests in the Balkans and recently in Serbian reforms, both economically and 
politically. As of 2007 "large parts of the public and political activists, for example in the 
SRS, look to Putin’s Russia as a potential alternative. Putin asks for no commitment to 
democracy, transparency and genuinely free markets in return for association; and Russia 
can supply Serbia’s energy and military equipment needs without requiring painful 
adjustments in personnel and civil-military relations."155 
 In 2008, Serbia privatized its state oil importer and retailer Naftna Industrija 
Srbije (NIS), selling 51 percent of the company to the Russian firm Gazpromneft, which 
is a subsidiary of Russian oil and gas conglomerate OAO Gazprom. In exchange for the 
majority stake in NIS, Gazpromneft paid 400 million Euros and agreed to invest an 
additional 500 million Euros to upgrade NIS’s two refineries and retail gas station 
network.156  
 In 2009, Russia agreed to provide Serbia with a loan reported to be $1 billion with 
$200 million going to the government budget to enable the government of Prime Minister 
Mirko Cvetkovic to meet the IMF condition of maintaining Serbia’s budget deficit below 
3.5 per cent of GDP.157 Reportedly the remaining $800 million is designated for 
infrastructure construction. In addition, Russia and Serbia in October 2009 signed an 
agreement to set up a joint venture company, South Stream Serbia, to plan, build, and 
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set up a second joint venture company, Banatski Dvor UGS Joint Venture, to plan, build 
and manage an underground gas storage facility with a capacity of 450 million cubic 
meters of gas in northern Serbia at Banatski Dvor.158 
 During a visit to Serbia in 2009, the President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry 
Medvedev, stated Russia "would continue to defend Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.” Medvedev's one day visit included an entourage of approximately 100 
"associates, ministers, and business people" and was timed to symbolically mark the 65th 
anniversary of the day that Soviet and Yugoslav forces liberated Serbia's capital in 
1944.159 During the same visit, Serbia and Russia signed an agreement to establish a 
Serbian-Russian Emergency Center in Nis. The Serbian MUP indicated the Nis Center's 
function would be "putting out massive fires and participation in dealing with the 
consequences of other emergencies, such as floods, earthquakes, technological-chemical 
incidents, terrorist activities, de-mining, pandemics.” The Center, to be jointly run by the 
Russian Emergency Control Ministry (EMERCOM), which has 23,000 civil defense 
staff, and the Emergency Sector of the MUP, is planned to operate continuously to 
provide "constant repair and servicing, overhauling and maintenance of the emergency 
protective and rescuing equipment," and will include "warehouses and storage rooms for 
keeping immediate material reserves, which are necessary for the protective and rescuing 
activities.” Western military strategists have questioned the possibility that the Center 
could be or be transformed from a rescue logistics base into a Russian military logistics 
base.160 
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IV. RECENT POLICE AND BORDER SECURITY REFORMS AND 
CURRENT STATUS 
A.  OPERATION SABRE  
In retrospect, the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic provided a political 
opportunity for the reformers giving them public support, in a culture emotionally attuned 
to the justice of revenge, to purge at least some of their opponents. Unlike in October 
2000, when the democracy supporters were largely unorganized, by March 2003, the 
reformers were accustomed to running a government and had consolidated some degree 
of control over the police and army. Thus, they were better positioned to target and 
remove the most critical blockages to the furtherance of their reform program. In addition 
the public had experienced some of the benefits of EU transitional support and were 
somewhat less supportive of "greater-Serbia" advocates and elitist kleptocrats.  
On March 12, 2003, the government declared a state of emergency to last until 
April 22nd and initiated a large police crackdown, codenamed Operation Sabre. The 
police and military were given powers to arrest anyone without warrants and to hold 
suspects without charges for thirty days. On March 14, MUP troops bulldozed a housing 
complex and shopping mall in Zemun owned by the leader of the Zemun clan, the most 
notorious organized crime group in Serbia. On March 18, the head of the Supreme Court 
and the Chief Prosecutor were dismissed, and on March 19, the Deputy Chief Prosecutor 
was arrested for allegedly having received 150,000 Euros payment from the Zemun clan 
with a promise of 850,000 Euros more.161 On March 20, seven Supreme Court judges 
and 28 other judges appointed by the Milosevic government were dismissed, and the 
government censored two major newspapers that had published reports critical of the 
government's responses to the Djindjic killing. On March 24, the deputy head of the 
police special operations unit JSO was arrested as a suspect in the Djindjic assassination. 
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Signaling an acceleration of police and border security reform, on March 26 the 
JSO was disbanded and most of the JSO members were transferred to the Gendarmerie 
unit of the police Public Security Division, while some were assigned to two other units 
of the Public Security Division of the MUP, the SAJ Special Anti-terrorist Police Unit 
and to the VIP Security Directorate. A few former JSO members left the police service. 
The next day a further three JOS member suspects were arrested. The government alleged 
the Deputy Commander of the JSO, Zvezdan Jovanovic, had shot Djindjic and that 
Zemun clan boss and former JSO head, Milorad Lukovic, had financed and organized the 
assassination. The prosecutors charged a total of 36 people in the case.162 During the 
state of emergency, police had arrested about 11,665 people163 and charged about 
2,697.164 165 Responding to human rights advocates, the Justice Minister did not deny 
that human rights were not the top priority of police and that some of the arrested may 
have been beaten while in custody, although he did confirm that none had been 
tortured.166 
The disbanding of the JSO has been identified by western commentators as a 
crucial step in the demilitarization of Serbian society since it "eliminated some of the 
most powerful and influential criminal gangs in the country" and that Operation Sabre 
"represented a watershed in the country's civil-security sector relations and confirmed the 
reality of civil supremacy in the chain of command" in that the "police and army both 
demonstrated that they could and would do as the government commanded, even if this 
involved potentially bloody operations against their erstwhile fellows."167 According to  
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Serbian commentators, the transformation of the JSO and its members, determined by the 
MUP to be necessary after the Djindjic assassination in March 2003, had not been 
completed as of 2005.168 
The disbanding of the JSO reduced admiration within the police ranks for the 
extra-legal mercenary ideal and boosted support for reforms that would rebuild the public 
respect for the policing profession. Elimination of the Zemun clan leaders diminished 
influence, in the form of dominance, and in the form of monetary incentives that extra-
legal operators had to use to motivate police cooperation or acquiescence to their 
"business" activities. For a growing proportion of the police professionals, reform began 
to look like the better prospect. 
Institutional reform is a complex process requiring the coordination of reform of 
several aspects of institutions. To enhance the clarity of the analysis and description of 
the recent reforms to Serbian police and border security institutions, this thesis 
categorizes the discussion of these aspects into legislative reforms, institutional 
organizational reforms and institutional operational reforms. The remainder of this 
chapter discusses the legislative reforms, organizational reforms  and operational reforms 
that have occurred with regard to the Serbian police, border police and customs 
administration since the end of Operation Sabre in 2003. As noted above, the police are 
organized as a Directorate of the MUP. The border police are organized as a sub-
Directorate of the Police Directorate. The customs service, which coordinates duties with 
the border police at border-crossing points, is organized as a Directorate of the Ministry 
of Finance.  
According to EU principles, borders should allow the cost-efficient and quick 
passage of legitimate trade in goods and legitimate travel for persons, while blocking 
non-authorized personnel travel and unauthorized trade in goods. Serbian Customs 
Service officers state the role of customs is "to facilitate the rapid flow of goods and 
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people while minimizing costs and guaranteeing efficient and effective control - such as 
uncovering and clamping down on customs offenses, particularly terrorism, organized 
crime, corruption, and other crimes ... customs services have become an important factor 
in the general protection of society."169 In contrast, as of 2002, Serbia's borders formed 
an effective economic barrier to development of its industries and an effective deterrent 
to international investors. The "pervasive corruption and crippling delays" as well as the 
"high customs tariffs" that existed for traded goods crossing the borders meant that 
company's legitimate markets were essentially confined to the national population.170 
B. LEGISLATIVE REFORMS 
 Legislative reform is a key enabling factor for police and border security reform. 
Legislative reform had occurred with the 2002 Law On Organization And Jurisdiction Of 
Government Authorities In Suppression Of Organized Crime, but it had not proven 
effective and much other enabling legislation was badly needed. To transition to a 
governmental administration of police and border security compatible with membership 
in the EU, Serbia needed new policing legislation, revised criminal code legislation, 
modern anti-organized crime and anti-trafficking legislation, revised border security and 
customs tariff legislation. The legislative reforms relating to policing, border policing and 
customs administration by the National Assembly since 2003 are summarized in the 
following sections.  
1. Reforms to Laws Relating to Policing 
 In March 2001, the Police Code of Procedure for the Inspector General’s service 
of the DPS was adopted; however, it did not begin to be implemented until mid-2003.171 
The major legislative reform was the new Law on Police, which was adopted in 
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November 2005. The Law on Police was developed with the assistance of the Council of 
Europe and the OSCE to ensure that it embodied the principles of the European Code of 
Police Ethics.172  
 A new Criminal Procedure Code was enacted in 2002, and a provisional Criminal 
Procedure Code of Kosova adopted in 2003. A revised Criminal Procedure Code was 
adopted in 2006, with the Law on the Amendments of and Supplements to the Criminal 
Procedure Code adopted in August 2009.  
 A new Law on Witness Protection was enacted in 2006. A set of laws designed to 
enhance the police capacity to fight drug trafficking and other organized crime was 
enacted in 2008, including the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and 
Financing of Terrorism. 
 Several pieces of legislation relating to civil rights impact on police conduct. 
These included the Serbian Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Liberties, as 
well as the 2003 Regulation on Protection Against Domestic Violence and the Law to 
Regulate Immigration and Movement of People. During the summer of 2003, the 
government debated and passed the Law on Co-operation with the ICTY, and in 
September 2003 the ICTY indicted the sitting head of the Serbian police, the head of the 
MUP's Public Security Sector. A potentially important new law is the 2009 Law on 
Communal Policing, which represents an approach to de-centralization of the police. The 
Law on Communal Police came into effect in January of 2010 and gives city officials the 
authority to increase enforcement of city policies. The law grants cities the power to 
establish a limited size173 communal police force to assist with preserving community 
order, enforcing city regulations, public policing, suburban and local traffic, 
environmental protection on a local level. The communal police have similar powers to  
 
                                                 
172  Council of Europe, “Serbia and Montenegro: compliance with commitments and obligations and 
implementation of post-accession co-operation program -- addendum ii to the fourth report February-April 
2004” (May 18, 2004), 25, accessed March 28, 2010, 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.instraservlet?mmand=com.instranet.cmdblobget&instranetimage=336400
&secmode=1&docid=737270&usage=2.  
173  Up to one officer per 5,000 city residents 
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those of the regular police including assessing statutory fines, reporting on criminal 
offenses, initiating charges, and enlisting other authorities with appropriate jurisdictional 
authority. 
 In October 2008, the Law on Criminal Proceedings Confiscation was adopted, 
and in March 2009, the government adopted the National Strategy to Fight Organized 
Crime. Half a year later, the government adopted an Action Plan For The Implementation 
Of The Strategy, as well as the Law on the Amendments of and Supplements to the Law 
on the Organization and Competences of the State Authorities in Organized Crime 
Suppression. The complimentary Law on the Anti-Corruption Agency went into effect in 
November 2008. These laws gave police significant new powers to combat organized 
crime.  
2. Reforms to Laws Relating to Border Policing 
 The Law on the Protection of the State Border, which was adopted by the 
National Assembly on October 23, 2008, and came into force on November 5, 2008, 
providing the legal framework for Border Police control of the state borders and 
authorizes the border police to secure the borders. This provides for the removal of the 
military from that role, thereby de-militarizing the borders as required to meet the 
conditions of the government’s plan for implementing the EU’s partnership priorities.174.  
 The Law to Regulate Immigration and Movement of People was also adopted in 
2003. The new Asylum Law of 2007 replaced the previous federal Asylum Law of 2002, 
which had been based on the 1951 UN convention related to the status of refugees, but 
which had become nonoperational due to the dissolution of the federation. The Asylum 
Law was adopted in November 2007 and came into force on December 6, 2007, and 
reinstates the possibility for foreigners to claim asylum in Serbia. 
 The Law on Trafficking of Illegal Drugs was adopted in 2003 and made 
possession of any quantity of an illegal drug an offense and made sentences harsher.  
                                                 
174  Republic of Serbia Government Plan for Implementation of the European Partnership Priorities 
(adopted on 7 April 2006), Section 8.1.3, accessed January 7, 2010, 
http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/EP/final_pep2006%20eng.pdf.  
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 The Serbian National Assembly also adopted the Law on Aliens. This law defines 
the legal framework for the treatment of issues of entry, movement and residence of 
aliens in Serbian territory including visa requirements. The Law went into effect in April 
2009, and in July and August 2009 fifteen regulations arising from the Law were 
published and became law. These are:175 
    1)  Regulation on detailed conditions and method of issuance of visa at border 
crossing points; 
    2)  Regulation on detailed conditions and method of extension of the visa 
expiration date and on the form of application; 
    3)  Regulation on fulfillment of conditions for granting temporary residence 
to a foreign citizen for the purpose of family reunion; 
    4)  Regulation on fulfillment of conditions for granting of temporary 
residence to a foreign citizen for studying and education purposes; 
    5)  Regulation on fulfillment of conditions for granting of temporary 
residence to a foreign citizen in respect of health insurance; 
    6)  Regulation on form, content and method of issuing the ID card to a foreign 
citizen; 
    7)  Regulation on form and content of emergency travel document for a 
foreign citizen; 
    8)  Regulation on detailed conditions for the approval of permanent residence 
and form, content and method of entering of the approval of permanent 
residence into a foreign travel document and ID card for a foreign citizen 
and form of the permanent residence waiver; 
    9)  Regulation on form, content and method of entering the approval of 
temporary residence into a foreign travel document; 
    10)  Regulation on method of registration of residence abode and address 
change and cancellation of abode of a foreign citizen; 
    11)  Regulation on method of entering mandatory residence into a travel 
document and on form of the application of temporary ID card; 
    12)  Regulation on method of entering residence cancellation and ban on entry, 
into a foreign travel document; 
    13)  Regulation on method of keeping and content of data registers on foreign 
citizens, by the Ministry of Interior. 
                                                 
175  “Updated Report on Serbia’s progress in the visa liberalization process,” (September 20, 2009), 
accessed March 28, 2010, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/Schengen_white_list_project_SERBIA Updated 
Report 25 Sept 2009.pdf.  
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    14)  Regulation on method of entering mandatory residence into a travel 
document and on form of the temporary ID card application; 
    15)  Regulation on form, content and method of production of ID card for a 
foreign citizen. 
3. Reforms to Laws Relating to Customs Administration 
 To meet the requirements for the phasing in of integration with the EU trade zone, 
the customs law reforms have been numerous. The Law on Customs Tariffs and the Law 
on Amendments to The Customs Tariff Law were enacted in July 2005. These laws 
expanded Customs Officers policing role, authorizing the Customs Administration to use 
telephone surveillance and undercover agents to infiltrate criminal groups. The customs 
laws were updated by the law, amending the Law on Customs Tariff that was adopted in 
June 2007 and by the current Customs Law that was adopted in March of 2010.  
 The Law on Foreign Trade Transactions was adopted in November 2005 and 
instituted "national treatment,” giving all registered businesses in Serbia the right to do 
international as well as domestic trading. The law also specifies requirements for 
obtaining licenses or permits for import or export of goods, and authorizes the Ministry 
of International Economic Relations to set quantitative limits on imports or exports of 
specified goods. The law also grants authority to the customs service to sell goods for 
which import duties are not paid or for which appropriate import documentation is not 
completed.  
 Through these revisions, the Serbian system of import and export controls has 
been transformed. Import quotas have been eliminated, import and export licensing have 
been reduced, tariffs and non-tariff barriers have been reduced, and customs processing 
has been simplified and made more efficient.  
 The Excise Tax Law specifies the charging of excise tax on producers and 
importers of oil derivatives, tobacco products, alcoholic beverages, alcohol-ethanol, 
coffee, soft drinks, food salt, and luxury products. The excise tax rates are adjusted 
quarterly to reflect changes in the inflation rate represented by the Retail Price Index. The 
excise taxes were an important contribution to the state budget, but have declined in 
importance as the collection rates for other taxes have improved.  
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C. ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS 
 As noted previously in 2001, when the Djindjic government assumed power, the 
Serbian police force was composed of approximately 83,000 to 85,000 staff, suggesting 
the police force was overstaffed at a ratio of one police for every 120 persons in the 
population. The police force was also politicized and centralized in that the head of the 
police served at the will of the Minister and reported to the Minister. There was no police 
code providing a legal framework for police operations. There was no external oversight 
of police activities. Further, many of the senior police commanders had close connections 
with smugglers and arms dealers.  
 In mid-2003, the MUP produced its vision document for police reform that listed 
fourteen reform proposals. Reform began to focus on five issues that were legislation 
reform, improved accountability and internal control, renewed police education and 
training, development of competencies in crime policing and policing organized crime, 
and the unification of all policing groups including the border police under uniform 
standards and control.176  
 Reform proceeded slowly, but by September 2006 the total staff of the ministry of 
the interior had been considerably reduced to approximately 42,740 and the number of 
uniformed police was reduced to 26,527.177 The police had been reorganized into a semi-
autonomous directorate within the MUP headed by a director general and composed of 
15 units at headquarters and 27 regional commands. The regional command centers 
included 48 police stations and oversaw an additional 161 police stations in other 
municipalities. 
 Several of the special units of the MUP were reorganized under the post 2003 
reforms as part of the de-politicization and de-militarization process. The Gendarmerie 
had been dissolved at the end of World War II, and was re-established in June 2001. The 
division was reorganized under the Police Directorate and the command of the Director 
                                                 
176  Dragan Paunovic, “Police Reform in Serbia,” Friedenskonsolidierung auf dem Balkan: Probleme 
und Perspektiven, Nov. 2005, p. 77-89. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), Hamburg, 
Germany, 78, accessed April 9, 2010, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=22753. 
177  OSCE, accessed March 31, 2010, http://polis.osce.org/countries/details?item_id=46.  
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of Police in 2004-5. The Gendarmerie consists of four battalions of 500 to 800 police 
each with bases in Belgrade, Nis, Novi Sad and Kraljevo. When the decision was made to 
dissolve the JSO in March 2003, the majority of its members were transferred to the 
Gendarmerie; and the others who remained with the MUP were transferred to the Special 
Anti-Terrorism Unit and to the VIP Protection Unit of the Police Directorate.  
 The following series of organizational charts of the MUP provide a visual guide 
to the process of organization reforms that were made during the 2001 to 2010 period.  
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Figure 4.   Organization Chart of the MUP and Police Directorate 2010 
The senior management staffing of the MUP is listed in TABLE 1. The Minister 
of the MUP in 2010 was Ivica Dacic. After the most recent Parliamentary elections in 
2008, current Prime Minister Mirko Cvetković was able to form a coalition government 
only by offering the Deputy Prime Ministerial post and four cabinet posts to Milosevic's 
former party, the Serbian Socialist Party (SPS). The leader of the SPS, Ivaca Dacic, was 
appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the MUP. He is known for his 
nationalist and socialist policy statements. Dacic is reported to have demanded in 
Parliament, in February 2008, that all political parties and NGOs backing independence 
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of Kosova be banned in Serbia.181 However, Dacic’s nationalist policy preference may 
have been modified by his plan to have his SPS party join the Socialist International. In 
2008 Dacic met with Socialist International President George Papandreou in Athens and 
Papandreou stated that Socialist International would process the SPS application for 
membership if SPS supports Serbia's EU accession process and renounces SPS's ultra-
nationalistic policies.182 In 2008 Dacic met with U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and in 
2009 was invited to visit Washington to meet with senior administration officials.  
While Dacic has recently emphasized the new orientation and more pro-EU 
orientation of the SPS party, there remain questions regarding the conflict between 
Dacic’s allegiance to pro-EU reforms and his allegiance to nationalist Serbian policies.  
 
MUP SENIOR STAFFING 
 
INTERIOR MINISTER, Ivica Dacic 
MINISTER’S SECRETARIAT  
• State Secretary Dragan Markovic 
• Head of Office Branko Lazarevic 
• Deputy Cabinet Chief, Vanja Vukic 
• Office for Cooperation with the Media Head, Suzana Vasiljevic 
• Bureau of International Cooperation and European Integration Head, Drazen 
Maravich 
• Bureau for Complaints Head , Svetlana Tratar 
• Office of Strategic Planning Head, Vesna Jovanovic 
 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 
• Police Director Milorad Veljovic 
 
                                                 
181  Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, “Revival of hate speech,” accessed April 1, 
2010, http://www.helsinki.org.rs/index_archiva_t11.html.  
182  SETimes, “Serbian Socialist Party leader meets head of Socialist International,” (25 May 2008), 
accessed April 2, 2010, 
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/newsbriefs/setimes/newsbriefs/2008/05/25/nb-06.  
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MUP SENIOR STAFFING 
 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, HUMAN RESOURCES AND JOINT 
ACTIVITIES 
• Assistant Minister, Head of the Department Dejan Matic 
 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, HUMAN RESOURCES AND COMMON TASKS 
• Department of General Affairs, Chief Vladimir Blagojevic 
• Department of Human Resources, Chief Gordana Jeković 
• Department for Food and Accommodation, Chief Dragan Dimitrieska 
• Office for Professional Education, Training, and Research, Mayor John Kopas 
 
INTERNAL CONTROL POLICE DEPARTMENT 
• V. D. Assistant Minister - Dragan Radovic. 
• Head Office Police Department's internal control, Sinisa Spanovic. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF PROTECTION AND RESCUE 
• Assistant Minister & Head of the Department Predrag Maric 
Table 1.   MUP Senior Staffing 
1. Police Directorate  
a. Organization 
The arrest of the Deputy Commander of the JSO on suspicion of having 
assassinated the Prime Minister and the arrest of the former head of the JSO on suspicion 
of having organized the assassination, resulted in the disbanding of the JSO in March 
2003 and the reassignment of many of its staff to the Gendarmerie unit of the Public 
Security Division, while some were assigned to two other units of the Police Directorate 
of the MUP, the SAJ Special Anti-terrorist Police Unit and to the VIP Security 
Directorate. All three of these units were under the command of the Assistant Minister of 
the Public Security Division, a civilian reporting to the Minister. At about the same time, 
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the Special Police Units PJP183 were also dissolved and most of the 6,500 members 
transferred to the Gendarmerie. While the JSO and the PJP theoretically were under the 
direct command of the Minister, previously both the JSO and the PJP had operated under 
the command of the RDB State Security Division; and were believed to have loyalties to 
the former head of the RDB that were stronger than their feeling of legal duty to the 
Minister.  
As part of the government’s efforts to gain greater control over the police 
and border security apparatus, a new police unit, the Counterterrorist Unit (PTJ), was 
formed by the government in May 2003 after the Djindjic assassination, as part of the 
Public Security Division. Officially, the PTJ is tasked with anti-terror operations and 
securing and maintaining internal state security. Unofficially, the government may have 
been attempting to establish a loyal security unit they could count on to ensure 
government members security. The PTJ reportedly has 400 troops184 organized into two 
teams specialized for urban situations and two teams specialized in rural situations. Each 
team has various attack groups including guide dog groups, sniper groups, divers, 
explosives experts and paratroopers.  
In 2004, the OSCE called for the MUP to reorganize the Public Security 
Sector units stating:  
the Public Security Sector, as currently defined within the Ministry, should 
be reorganized. At present, all of the services fall under one operational 
chain of command, a situation that further centralizes decision-making. 
The Police Service, the Border Police Service, the Fire and Rescue 
Service, and the General Administrative Services should be separated and 
given clear and distinct terms of reference and areas of operational 
responsibility. The Gendarmerie, who are members of the Public Security 
Sector and who should be accountable to the Police Directorate, should 
review its equipment and terms of engagement to ensure that they are 
consistent with the civil nature of its tasks.185 
                                                 
183  Posebne jedinice policije. 
184  Jovanović, “Serbia: Ministry of the Interior, Anti-Terrorist Unit.” 
185  Mark Downes, “Police Reform In Serbia Towards The Creation Of A Modern And Accountable 
Police Service,” Law Enforcement Department, OSCE Mission To Serbia And Montenegro, (January 
2004), 9-10, accessed April 20, 2010, http://www.osce.org/serbia/item_11_18262.html. 
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In late 2004, several of the General Administrative Services units were 
reorganized. The Catering and Lodging Directorate and the Common Affairs Directorate 
were moved to a newly created Division for Finance, Human Resources and Common 
Affairs that reports directly to the Minister. In addition the Police College and Police 
Training Centers were reorganized as a Directorate reporting to the Division for Finance, 
Human Resources and Common Affairs. This was an important reform in consolidating 
the human resources and training functions of the police within one group allowing for 
development of a coordinated approach to developing police organizational culture.186 A 
coordinated approach to evolving police culture is considered necessary "to 
accommodate to the changing social values of a society in transition, striving towards the 
EU."187 
In comparing the above MUP Organizational Charts for 2005 and 2010, a 
number of organizational changes are noteworthy. In 2005, the Organized Crime 
Directorate (OBPOK)188 was reorganized from being directly responsible to the Minister, 
with the politicization that represented, to being the Organized Crime Suppression 
Service (SOK),189 within the Criminal Investigations Directorate. At the same time, the 
Organized Crime Suppression department was given a SWAT team to enhance its 
capabilities,190 and authority to increase its anti-drug agents from about twelve to about 
fifty and established regional offices around the country to increase its effectiveness.191 
In addition to meet the requirements of the 2005 Law on Police, a new Witness 
Protection Unit was created within the Police Directorate.  
                                                 
186  See Figure. 1. MUP, MUP_ORGANIGRAM_2005. 
187  Bakic and Gajic, “Police Reform in Serbia: Five Years Later.” 3. 
188  OBPOK or Odeljenje za borbu protiv organizovanog kriminala.  
189  SOK or Sluzba za organizovanog kriminala.  
190  Bakic and Gajic, “Police Reform in Serbia: Five Years Later.” 22. 
191  Dejan Anastasijevic, “Organized Crime in the Western Balkans,” (paper presented at the First 
Annual Conference on Human Security, Terrorism and Organized Crime in the Western Balkan Region. 
Humsec, Ljubljana, November 23-25, 2006), accessed April 7, 2010, http://www.etc-
graz.at/cms/fileadmin/user_upload/humsec/Workin_Paper_Series/Working_Paper_Anastasijevic.pdf, 6. 
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Later the Public Security Sector was reorganized as the Police Directorate 
under the command of a Director General, an appointed professional police officer, rather 
than being under a political appointee Assistant Minister. At the same time, to avoid 
confusion the formerly named Police Directorate sub-unit of the Public Security Sector 
was renamed the Uniformed Police Directorate. In addition the Fire And Security Service 
was reorganized out of the Police Directorate to report directly to the Minister as a 
separate Division For Protection And Rescue.  
As of 2010, MUP had addressed many of the OSCE concerns expressed in 
2004; however, the Border Police Directorate still remained as a sub-unit under the 
command of the police directorate. Additionally, the MUP as a whole and, therefore, the 
police directorate also operate on year to year budgeting without long term strategic 
budgetary planning.192  
Organized crime has continued to be a priority problem, especially drug 
trafficking and trafficking in human beings, which are perceived by the EU members as a 
threat to their security. To intensify efforts to counter organized crime the Criminal 
Police Directorate (CPD) was reorganized in 2009. The new unit for Financial 
Investigations was created in the Organized Crime Suppression department (OBROK) of 
the CPD. The Financial Investigations unit has a staff of approximately 105 split into two 
departments, the Organized Crime Financial Investigations department and the 
department for Planning and Coordinating Financial Investigations. The new departments 
are expected to coordinate with the department for Combating High Technology Crime 
regarding money laundering and on-line fraud. In 2009 the CPD was also strengthened 
with the formation of the Service for Criminal Intelligence and Undercover 





                                                 
192  Bakic and Gajic, “Police Reform in Serbia: Five Years Later.” 3. 
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the department for Undercover Investigations. The formation of the latter will, for the 
first time, give the CPD the formal capability to conduct undercover police 
investigations.193 
At present, the Police Directorate has twenty-seven Regional Police 
Directorates. At the headquarters municipalities of the regional police directorates there 
are forty-eight police substations, and there are an additional 161 police stations in other 
municipalities, for a total of 209 regular police stations. The Traffic Police Directorate, a 
sub-unit of the Police Directorate, has an additional forty-nine stations along the nation’s 
roadways.194 
Importantly for the police oversight process, the Inspector General of the 
Public Security Sector has been removed from the reporting control of the Minister and 
the MUP.195 
b. Staff 
As noted above, after the government adopted the Law on Cooperation 
With The ICTY in the summer of 2003, the ICTY indicted the sitting head of the MUP 
Public Security Sector, the head of police, in September 2003. In 2004, the change to the 
Kostunica government resulted in the change of many senior managers. In many cases 
this resulted in a loss in human capital investment as these were some of the managers 
who had received capacity building training from international partners, such as the 
OSCE, in the previous years. This removal of management capacity is cited by some 
commentators as a cause of the failure to develop strategic plans in the various sections  
 
 
                                                 
193  ESI European Security Initiative, “Updated Report on Serbia’s progress in the visa liberalization 
process,” (September 20, 2009), accessed March 28, 2010, 
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/Schengen_white_list_project_SERBIA Updated Report Sept 25, 2009.pdf.  
194  OSCE, “Policing Profiles of Participating and Partner States – Serbia,” accessed April 2, 2010, 
http://polis.osce.org/countries/details?item_id=46.  
195  See Figure 4. 
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of the police directorate.196 At least in some cases, the dismissed managers were removed 
because of their background and experiences in the economic corruption and hostilities of 
the 1990s.  
One of the EU conditions was to depoliticize the police, and the 
depoliticization was pursued in 2005. One of the most significant depoliticizing 
organizational changes was the creation of the Police Directorate under the control of a 
civilian Director General and the transfer of the former Public Service Sector from the 
direct control of the Minister to the control of the new Director General. The Director 
General of the Police Directorate is appointed for a five year term, which is longer than 
that of any elected Serbian government, to give the Police head some independence from 
political influence by the Minister. However, in 2005 a new Law on Police defined the 
procedures for hiring of senior police officers, and it states that "the minister, in 
consultation with the director general of police, appoints and dismisses regional police 
chiefs.” 197 Therefore, the 2005 Law essentially continues a significant degree of 
politicization of the police at the regional level.  
The senior management staffing of the Police Directorate is listed in 
TABLE 2. The current Director General of the Police Directorate is Milorad Veljovic. He 
was forty-eight years of age in June 2006 when appointed to the position. Despite the EU 
encouragement to demilitarize, Veljovic was made a Major-General just before his 
appointment in 2006. Prior to being appointed, he was head of the Criminal Police 
Directorate for one year, prior to that position he was Assistant head of the Inspector 
General’s Office, and before that, the head of the Department for Legal Control of the 
Criminal Police Directorate since October 2000. A career policeman, Veljovic had 
graduated from university with a law degree in 1983 and joined the police in 1986 in the 
Kragujevac regional office of the MUP as Inspector of Economic Crimes. He rose to 
become chief of the Section for Suppression of Economic Crimes. He held these 
                                                 
196  Bakic and Gajic, “Police Reform in Serbia: Five Years Later.” 26. 
197 Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Interior, Law on Police, Article 24, accessed May 20, 2010, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,LEGISLATION,,MNE,4b5d7ab32,0.html. 
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positions during the period when the Milosevic government came to power, so he likely 
had exceptional opportunities during the period of the Milosevic government under UN 
sanctions in which to investigate and suppress economic crimes. Later he became head of 
the Criminal Police Department and then Assistant Head of Criminal Affairs until 2000. 
The specifics of these background experiences and connections would assist to estimate 
the effects they have on the approach he takes to his current position and 
responsibilities.198 In 2000 with the change of government, Veljovic was made head of 
the Department for Legal Control of the Criminal Police Directorate. Afterward, he held 
the position of assistant head of the inspector general office. In May 2005 he became 
head of the Criminal Police Directorate.199  
As part of the 2005 depoliticization, the Minister dismissed officers who 
had been active in political parties. To fill vacancies, the Minister appointed 443 new 
senior officers including the Inspector General, the chiefs of twenty-nine regional 
headquarters units, ninety-one new chiefs of departments, and 105 new police 
commanders. However, many of the new members who were appointed had also been 
members of other political parties.200 By 2006, the number of uniformed police officers 
had been reduced to 26,527, of which 1,833 were female. The total MUP staff had 
declined to 42,740, of whom 8,533 were females.201 
                                                 
198  Branik Bakic and Novak Gajic. Police Reform in Serbia: Five Years Later. (London: Conflict 
Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2006), 86, accessed April 4, 2010, 
http://www.ssrnetwork.net/document_library/detail/4187/police-reform-in-serbia-five-years-later. 
199  Republic of Serbia, “General Police Director,” accessed April 3, 2010, 
http://www.mup.gov.rs/cms_eng/home.nsf/gpd-ddirector.h.  
200  Paunovic, “Police Reform in Serbia,” 81. 
201  OSCE, “Policing Profiles of Participating and Partner States – Serbia,” accessed April 2, 2010, 
http://polis.osce.org/countries/details?item_id=46.  
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Table 2.   Police Directorate Senior Staffing  
Another EU condition was demilitarization of the police. The 
demilitarizing started with dismissing some of the Special Police (PJP) forces who served 
in paramilitary actions in the 1990s wars, and the setting up the new Multi-Ethnic Police 
(MEPE) forces in southern Serbia beginning in January 2002.202  
                                                 
202  Paunovic, Dragan, “Police Reform in Serbia,” Friedenskonsolidierung auf dem Balkan: Probleme 
und Perspektiven, Nov. 2005, 77–89. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), Hamburg, 
Germany, 81, accessed April 9, 2010, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=22753. 
DIRECTORATE OF POLICE SENIOR STAFFING 
Director General Milorad Veljovic 
Directorate Of Criminal Police – Chief Of Rodoljub Milovic 
Police Department –  Chief Of Police General Mladen Kuribak 
Management Of Security –  Chief Zoran Tomasevic 
VIP Protection Unit – Chief Milos Perovic 
Traffic Police Department – Chief - Police General Stojadin Jovanovic 
Department Of Border Police – Chief Of Nenad Banovic 
Department Of Administrative Affairs – Chief Zorica Loncar-kasalica 
Operations Centre – Mayor Goran Čabrilo 
Department Of Immigration – Chief Tanja Vasic 
Management Of Information Technology (IT) – Chief Of Slobodan Nedeljkovic 
Government Liaison And Cryptography – Chief Mladen Vratonjić 
Gendarmerie 
Special Anti-terrorist Unit (SAJ) – Commander Spasoje Vulević 
Helicopter Unit – Commander Free Glavčić 
Special Counter-terrorism Unit – Commander Goran Dragovic 
Coordination Office For Kosova And Metohija – Dragan Terzic 
Police Administration Branch 
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c. Training 
The police training reform has been one of the politically least disputed 
aspects of police reform, yet was much delayed in implementation due to institutional 
difficulties. It was also considered to be perhaps the most fundamental aspect of reform 
by western facilitators, since it is the means by which police culture can be reformed. 
Modern democratic society police culture requires police to adjust not only by 
modernizing to acquire the new skills necessary to meet contemporary security 
challenges but also to adjust by adopting the belief that the role of police is to serve the 
citizenry, and to develop an open relationship with the public providing the public with 
input to the functioning and training of the police. The OCSE encouraged the MUP to 
reform the police training to give young recruits greater exposure to the concepts of 
human rights and respect for multicultural diversity, and to adopt a uniform faculty and 
curriculum following the standards of the Bologna Declaration. The Ministry responded 
by developing in 2006, a curriculum for an amalgamated police faculty composed of the 
four divisions: criminal police, criminal technique, uniformed police and national 
security.  
The former four-year Police High School program was phased out 
beginning in 2006 as part of the demilitarization of police training, and the historic 
building at Sremska Kamenica was reformed as the Basic Police Training Center. Basic 
and specialized training is organized through the Basic Training Center as well as at 
regional training facilities in Makis, Belgrade, Kula, Klisa, Petrovo Selo, Jasenovo, 
Mitrovo Polje, and Kursumlijska Banja. Previously, a six month basic policing training 
had been offered for men, and a four month basic policing training had been offered at 
the Kula and Kursumlijska facilities. 
In June 2006, the ambiguously named "Criminal and Police Academy" 
was formed through the integration of the previously isolated former Police College in 
Zemun, which had offered a three-year training program, and the former Police Academy 
in Belgrade, which had offered a four-year university-level course. The new Criminal and  
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Police Academy developed a single, theoretically modernized, demilitarized, 
depoliticized curriculum, offering both four-year vocational and academic policing 
degrees, as well as master’s programs in policing.  
During the reform process, the OSCE assisted by offering training in EU 
standard practices. In 2003, the OSCE conducted three week-long training courses for 60 
police faculty trainers that covered training pedagogy, curriculum development, human 
rights and policing. Part of the courses involved fifteen-day–long study visits by 
participants to police training institutes in other Council of Europe member countries. In 
addition the OSCE organized advanced training seminars to upgrade particular aspects of 
the skills of the police, for example, in enforcing anti-trafficking laws.203 
The Criminal Investigation Directorate has implemented an ongoing 
program of crime scene investigators and evidence quality management for all criminal 
investigators. 204 In 2009, anti-corruption training of police officers responsible for the 
process of issuance of travel documents began using a new curriculum based on the 
ethics and anti-corruption code.205  
d. Oversight 
Reforms in police oversight began very slowly. As noted above, the 
oversight function was formally reintroduced to the Serbian police force in March 2001 
with the establishment of the Inspector General’s Service of the Department of Public 
Safety of the MUP. However, the Minister did not staff the Service. A step toward 
practical introduction of oversight occurred in July of 2003 when the government 
implemented the March 2001 Police Code of Procedure For The Inspector General’s 
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Service by appointing the first Inspector General. In its first years of operations, the 
Inspector General's Service did not provide effective oversight. As of 2005, it was 
described as not "promis[ing] too much. It is still occupied with minor problems."206 In 
2004 and 2005, the Inspector General’s Office (IGO) was provided with its own offices. 
By late 2005 the IGO had received over 6,000 complaints against police officers and had 
processed 89 percent of the complaints and filed 107 criminal charges against 152 police 
officers for 200 criminal offenses.207 In 2006 the IGO was removed from the MUP. 
Some of its functions were reorganized as an agency of the National Assembly, the 
Ombudsman’s Office.208  
Another police oversight mechanism was established in 2005. In 
November 2005, the Law on Police was adopted, which included Articles 171 through 
181. Article 178 of the Law on Police defines the Minister’s responsibility to supervise 
and give obligatory direction regarding the activities of police employees. Article 180 of 
the Law on Police specifies the procedures to be followed by police when a public 
complaint of police illegal activity is received. Articles 171 through 181 provide for the 
institutionalization of an Internal Affairs Sector in the MUP with powers to monitor "the 
legality of work performed by MUP law-enforcement officers, especially regarding 
safeguarding and protection of human rights."209 This authorized the setting up of the 
Internal Affairs Division of the MUP and its staffing at headquarters and in regional 
offices. As a separate Division from the Police Directorate, the Internal Affairs Division 
is headed by an Assistant Minister to give it some autonomy from the Director of the 
Police Directorate. The Internal Affairs Division is composed of an Office of Internal 
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Affairs of the Assistant Minister and an Internal Affairs Directorate, which has three 
units. The Criminal and Operational Affairs unit has sub-units for Covert Audio and 
Optic Surveillance and for Criminal-Operational Activities. The second unit, the 
Preventive Procedure, Complaints Procedure and Analytic-Informatic Affairs unit has 
two sub-units. One is the Preventive Procedure and Complaints Procedure sub-unit, and 
the second is the Analytic-Informatic Affairs sub-unit. The Regional Coordination unit 
has four regional offices located in Belgrade, Nis, Novisad, and Krajujevac. Article 179 
requires the Minister to prepare and file reports to the National Assembly on the activities 






Figure 5.   Internal Affairs Sector Organization Chart210 
A further step toward a strengthened police oversight mechanism was 
taken when the Complaints Procedure Regulation was published in June 2006. It gives 
the full procedures to be followed by police for registering, investigating, processing and  
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assessing complaints from individuals.211 With the publication of the Complaint 
Procedure Regulation the Internal Affairs Division began to receive and investigate 
complaints in 2007.  
The Bureau for Complaints and Grievances, a unit in the Minister's 
Secretariat, is a third group with responsibility for oversight of the police. According to 
the MUP, the Bureau processes requests and recommendations of the Ombudsman, 
processes freedom of information requests to the MUP, processes complaints submitted 
to the Minister’s Office, provides the Minister with reports regarding submitted 
complaints, and “enforces the rules regulating the procedure of resolving complaints filed 
against police officers.”212  
e. Coordination Structures 
Organized criminals have developed skills in flexibly forming and 
dissolving international multi-ethnic working teams to facilitate the successful 
completion of their illicit business projects whether that be smuggling cocaine from 
South America through Albania into Serbia and on to Hungary, or whether it is 
smuggling Romanian females through Serbia to entertainment establishments in Kosova. 
In order to be able to identify, characterize and interrupt organized crime groups business 
projects, police officials have to develop effective international multi-ethnic information 
sharing and cooperation. This is particularly difficult when the people the police officer 
needs to cooperate with were recently attempting to terrorize or kill him or her, and vice-
versa. Therefore, is not surprising that the Serbian police’s development of international 
information sharing and cooperation has not been exceptionally fast. Serbia is a member 
of several multilateral anti-crime organizations. Serbia joined Interpol in 2001 as the 
FRY, which in February 2003 became SaM. In June 2006, when Montenegro left the 
union, Serbia remained as the member of Interpol. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
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Montenegro and Croatia are also members of Interpol, so Interpol could provide a 
communication channel for Serbia for the sharing of information about border crossing 
crime projects/international criminal activities.  
Serbia is also member of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative 
(SECI) Regional Center for Combating Trans-border Crime. The SECI Center is located 
in Bucharest. Its function is to assist member states to increase their mutual cooperation 
on law enforcement. SECI defines law enforcement as preventing, detecting, 
investigating, prosecuting, and repressing trans-border crime. The assistance SECI 
provides includes “assisting member states with harmonizing their legislation with EU 
standards, supporting law enforcement officers ‘field activities’ and facilitating task 
forces on human trafficking and migrant smuggling, anti drugs trafficking, anti fraud and 
anti smuggling, financial and computer crime, stolen vehicles, anti terrorism, container 
security, and environmental crimes.” Neighbors of Serbia, which are also SECI members, 
include Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey. Serbia has coordinated many law 
enforcement joint actions through the SECI Center.213  
In 2009, Serbia became a member of the European Association of 
Undercover Officers to transfer knowledge and techniques related to undercover police 
work. The 2006 amendment to the Code on Criminal Procedure authorized the Police 
Directorate to utilize this type of investigation. Therefore, the Police Directorate set up 
the Department for Undercover Investigations in the Service for Organized Crime (SOK) 
of the CPD of the Police Directorate.214  
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Serbia has also negotiated a number of bilateral agreements with 
neighbors and other nations to cooperate in police matters and fighting crime. Serbian 
signed an agreement with Slovenia to cooperate to fight organized crime, drug trafficking 
and terrorism.  
Serbia has signed an agreement with Spain on judicial assistance in 
criminal cases and extradition, on carriage of goods and passengers by road, and on 
combating crime. In March of 2009, Serbia agreed to cooperate more closely with 
Hungary to fight crime.215 Since 2007 the Austrian Ministry of Interior and the MUP are 
cooperating in fighting illegal drug trafficking, including sharing advanced investigation 
techniques, and cooperating to fight other aspects of organized crime and terrorism.216  
In May 2009, Serbia signed an agreement with Croatia regarding police 
cooperation, focused on fighting drug smuggling and human trafficking. In May 2010, 
the Ministers of Interior of Serbia and Croatia met in Croatia and agreed to set up a 
regional center to fight organized crime. The two ministers also agreed to assign joint 
investigative teams to the center.217 
2. Border Police Directorate 
 Serbia has borders with eight other countries, which total 2351.8 km according to 
present definitions. The lengths of border Serbia shares with each of the eight 
neighboring countries is as follows. The border with Hungary is 174.7 km in total with 
170 km of land border and 4.7 km of water border. The border with Romania is 547.9 km 
in total with 290.6 km on land and 257.3 km of water border primarily along the Danube 
River. The border with Bulgaria is 360.4 km in total with 343.5 km on land and 16.9 km 
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in water. The border with Croatia totals 259 km, of which 108.5 km are on land and 
150.5 km in water. The new border with Bosnia and Herzegovina is non-finalized but is 
currently 363 km, of which 102 km are on land and 261 km through water. The 
Montenegro border is also in the process of being finalized and is currently defined to be 
249.5 km in length with 245 km on land and 4.5 km in water. Serbia does not officially 
recognize Kosova as an independent country and, therefore, claims a border with 
Macedonia of 283 km with 281.3 km of land border and 1.7 km of water border. Of this 
283km total, approximately 158.7km is with Kosova and the remaining 124.3 km is 
contiguous with other Serbian regions. Serbia officially claims a 113.4 km border with 
Albania. This entire border is Kosova-Albanian border.218 
 The borders with Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria have been recently unchanged. 
The other borders are new since the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the settlement of the 
conflicts of the 1990s. Consequently, the recent border security reforms have involved 
the establishment of approximately thirty new border crossing points (BCPs) along 
various travel routes with Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and 
Kosova.219 
 In 2010, there are 89 BCPs for international and border traffic. Of this total 57 are 
road traffic BCPs, 14 are rail transport BCPs, twelve are river traffic BCPs, four are air 
traffic BCPs and two are for other traffic.220 
a. Organizational Reform   
Under the FRY administration, Serbian border security was a joint 
responsibility of the federal army, responsible for preventing border incursions, and the 
Serbian border police, responsible for allowing border crossings, or more accurately for 
managing border control at authorized border crossing points. Part of the conditions for 
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Schengen zone eligibility as part of the process of accession to EU membership is 
demilitarization of borders. This reform was complicated by the FRY administrative 
structure initially.  
In 2001 and 2002, the OSCE, the European Agency for Reconstruction 
(EAR) and the DCAF assisted the MUP's Directorate of Border Police’s Department of 
Aliens and Administrative Affairs to develop a strategic plan for assuming control of 
Serbia's borders from the military. This included specification of the human resources, 
infrastructure and equipment needed to meet the EU requirements.  
In February 2003, the FRY was reorganized into the state union Serbia 
and Montenegro (SaM). The SaM Ministry of Defense and Military Forces continued to 
be responsible for the security of the international borders of SaM, while the Serbian 
police was responsible at the state level for security of Serbia's borders.221 
In May 2003, at the Ohrid Conference, Serbia along with its neighboring 
west Balkan countries agreed to a set of requirements for border security as a condition of 
EU membership, which included Integrated Border Management (IBM) to meet the 
Schengen standards.222 IBM is intended to balance openness of borders for trade, tourism 
and other legitimate movement of people and goods against controlled security of borders 
to limit illegal migration, human trafficking, criminal activities and terrorism. 
Implementation of IBM posed particular challenges for Serbia due to the lack of formal 
agreement with neighbors regarding the border location with Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
with Croatia, as well as the complication of the Kosova ambiguity of status.  
As of 2003, the infrastructure of many of Serbia's border crossing points 
(BCPs) was inadequate to meet EU standards, and "on a number of them there [was] no 
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infrastructure at all, no electricity or a telephone line, no water or sewage."223 The 
strategic plan prepared by the Directorate of Border Police’s Department of Aliens and 
Administrative Procedure in 2001 and 2002 identified the reforms to the existing Serbian 
passport, driving license, and government ID standards in meeting the requirements of 
the EU Schengen standards. A MUP working group was set up, and by 2003 the technical 
documentation was prepared and the necessary equipment for making Schengen 
compliant ID documentation had been acquired. In line with Schengen standards, the 
border police were to be tasked with preventing terrorist attacks, preventing cross-border 
crime, and minimizing illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings. 
Contributions from international agencies were sought to support infrastructural and 
equipment acquisition. 
By 2004, the Border Police Service had developed a strategic plan to take 
over the border control from the military, which took into account stakeholder needs, EU 
standards, and included a time-line with benchmarks.224 In February 2004, the SaM 
Ministry of Defense signed an agreement titled Transferring the Duties of Securing the 
State Border with the MUP, which transferred responsibility for securing the state border 
of Serbia to the MUP police.225 In late 2004 the Directorate for Border Police’s 
Department of Aliens and Administrative Affairs was reorganized by transferring the 
Administrative Affairs section to a newly created Directorate for Administrative Affairs 
under the Police Directorate. 
b. Border Demilitarization  
The Border Police Directorate within MUP was reorganized, and staffing 
increased in accordance with the strategic plan's estimated need for 6,000 members, while 
new staff orientation and training was commenced. Coordination agreements with the 
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customs administration and the military regarding border surveillance were signed. In 
2004 the Border Police Directorate officers began to take over staffing of the border 
posts. A more complete border police training system was implemented with the opening 
of a border police training center. Also in 2004 the new Schengen compliant ID 
documents were phased in.226 The IOM provided some equipment as well as organizing 
training sessions regarding trafficking in persons for border police officers. 
Despite these contributions, equipment and infrastructure were lacking. In 
2005 Border Police Directorate Chief Zlokas stated the border police needed larger 
staffing and better equipment to control smugglers and terrorists. "It's very easy for them 
to cross the Danube. We need more boats, we need radar, we need thermal imaging, we 
need binoculars with night vision; we need everything. We don't have the technical 
capacity to provide border security. This is the crossroads of the trade in illegal 
immigrants, weapons and drugs and no one can say terrorists cannot pass. They are using 
all channels." In March 2005, a Moroccan alleged to have been a part of the 2004 attacks 
on the Madrid trains that killed nearly 200 people was arrested in Serbia, demonstrating 
international terrorists’ use of Serbia as a transit.227 
In October 2005, the Border Police Directorate assumed control from the 
army and demilitarized border posts along the border with Hungary. The border police 
proceeded to take control from the military of the border posts along the border with 
Romania in January 2006, those along the Bulgarian border in June 2006, and the BCPs 
along the Croatian border in November 2006. With the takeover by the Border Police 
Directorate of the border posts along the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 
2006, Serbia’s border demilitarization was completed; and in 2007 border police reform 
efforts switched to upgrading training of border guards.  
In January of 2006, the MUP adopted the IBM strategy, and in 2006 the 
EU reported "the reform of the border police is affected by the slow implementation of 
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the new Law on Police. There is no proper training system for border police personnel, 
with only basic courses available and occasional, donor driven specialized training. In 
addition, to the lack of adequately trained staff, there is neither proper infrastructure nor 
modern equipment at the borders."228 
As of 2006, there were 34 border police stations to facilitate managed 
crossings of the state border and 28 others to secure the state border.229 The EU, through 
the CARDS program and the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), supplied the 
funds to facilitate upgrading of several of Serbia's BCPS to EU "Class A" status. EAR 
provided a total of 23 million Euros for construction of new road BCPs with Hungary at 
Horgos, with Croatia at Batrovci, and with Macedonia at Presevo, and for a new rail BCP 
with Bulgaria at Dimitrograd. The road BCP upgrades involved road widening, 
resurfacing, and installation of road signals and video surveillance systems. In addition 
the EAR contributed 20 million dinars toward the 180 million dinar construction cost of a 
new road BCP into Bosnia-Herzegovina at Sremska Raca.230 The EU CARDS funding 
was also used to install an enhanced digital radio network meeting TETRA (Terrestrial 
Trunked Radio)231 standards. Other assistance was provided in the form of 40 all-wheel 
drive vehicles to enable the Border Police Directorate officers to more efficiently patrol 
and monitor remote areas of Serbia's borders; and to be able to move quickly enough to 
apprehend smugglers and traffickers who typically have sufficient profits to equip 
themselves with modern technology and vehicles.  
The Schengen requirements include two levels of common information 
systems. The Shared-Information-System-1 (SIS1) includes data on criminals evading 
police, previous asylum applications and stolen cars. The SIS2 includes biometric data, 
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information on extradition, third-country nationals refused entry to the EU and on 
individuals under surveillance for criminal activity or wanted on an EU arrest warrant. 
Serbia is implementing SIS1 and by early 2009 biometric passport readers had been 
installed at some BCPs.232 During 2009 approximately 660 stationary readers and 330 
mobile readers of biometric travel documents were installed, giving all BCPs the 
capability to read biometric travel documents.233 
In May 2009, the "Coordination Body for the Implementation of the 
Integrated Border Management Strategy in the Republic of Serbia" was established, and 
later in the year it began a "twinning" project with Austria and Hungary to facilitate 
implementing integrated border management. Austria and Hungary’s role is to transfer 
know-how and capability regarding implementation of IBM to EU standards.234 
As of 2010, the Border Police Directorate is organized as three line 
departments, the Department of Borders, the Department for Foreigners, and the 
Department for Support of Combating Trans-Border Crime. The Directorate also has two 
support departments, the Department for International Cooperation and the Operations 
Center Department. The Department of Borders has three divisions, the Border Crossing 
Control Division, the Border Surveillance Division, and the Border Security Division, 
which deals with incursions. The Department of Foreigners has three divisions, the 
Resident Foreigners Division, which registers and monitors the status of foreigners 
legally living in Serbia; the Visa Division; and the Asylum Division. The Department for 
Support of Combating Trans-Border Crime has three divisions, the Illegal Migrations 
Combating division, the Human Trafficking Combating division, and the Criminal 
Intelligence and Risk Assessment division. The operations of the 89 individual BCPs are 
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coordinated through the border police region stations and the 40 border police stations, 
while the border security division operates through 47 border police stations to secure the 
state border located, as shown in Figure 6. 235 
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Figure 7.   Border Police Directorate organization chart237 
c. Border Police Staff 
In 2010, the Head of the Border Police Directorate is Nenad Banovic. 
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BORDER POLICE DIRECTORATE STAFF 
 
Head of the Border Police Directorate – Nenad Banovic.  
• Border Police Department / Department For Borders  – Deputy Head  –  Colonel 
Nebojša Purić  
• Department for Education  –  Mile Novakovic  
• Section for International Cooperation –  Dragan Petrović  
         Bureau for International Cooperation  –  Nataša Petrusić 
Table 3.   Border Police Directorate Staff 
During the period of reforms from 2002 to 2007, the Directorate of Border 
Police was headed by Colonel Dušan Zlokas. During this period Colonel Zlokas was also 
the National Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Persons. Zlokas was formerly 
Chief of Police in the city of Zrenjanin, but was dismissed after his 2001 investigation of 
the fraudulent privatization of a state oil company in 1993. Zlokas admitted the results of 
the investigation showed fraud; however, his office did not initiate criminal charges, 
apparently due to consultation with the MUP Criminal Investigation Department. Shortly 
after Zlokas was dismissed, he was appointed to the Border Police Directorate; and the 
Criminal Investigation Department was reorganized.238 Zlokas background includes 
acting as the Head of the Serb Representative Office of the area of Gorski Kotar in 
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Croatia in 1995239 and reportedly as "one of the main Cetniki in the area of Gorski Kotar" 
in close contact with the commander of the 21st Kordunaškog Corps in 1994.240  
d. Training 
The staff of the Border Police Directorate is all members of the police 
directorate and; therefore, were initially trained in the general police training process. The 
reform of the training for the border police faced different issues than those for general 
police training. The two priority problems were the need to adopt new technologies and 
risk assessment based techniques to comply with Schengen procedures, coupled with the 
need to emphasize border police ethics to reduce the previously high levels of corruption 
of the border guard service. As reform of the border police began, the training curriculum 
and much of the training faculty was obsolete due to its militaristic orientation and the 
antiquated training facilities. 
The Border Police Directorate faced heavy capital requirements to reform 
the physical infrastructure and equipment of the border control apparatus, but had neither 
the expertise nor readily available funds to upgrade training curriculum and faculty and to 
invest in efficient modern training facilities. Therefore, the reform was slower than many 
observers of the 2000 revolution expected. 
In 2003, the Directorate for Border Police, Aliens and Administrative 
Affairs began training its officers with a basic course for border police officers, and in 
2004 adopted a modernized curriculum for border police training.241  
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The Border Police Directorate relied on external expertise to develop new 
training curricula and heavily utilized external courses to upgrade the skills of senior 
officers, and relied on EU funding to develop new training facilities. For example, in 
2009 the British embassies in Zagreb and Belgrade funded a project to have the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) utilize Croatian border police to offer 
their expertise to help train Serbian border police assigned to Serbia BCPs along the 
Croatian border regarding the procedures being used on the Croatian side of the border. 
Further, as part of an aid package the Slovenian Center for European Perspective (CEP) 
provided training at the Police Academy in Belgrade to Serbian border crossings chief 
commanding border police officers. The training focused on creating and maintaining 
border police officer ethics. The training emphasized creating a positive working 
environment by adopting a performance review system consisting of an annual interview 
and an annual work assessment.242 
In early 2009, anti-corruption code of ethics training for border police 
officers, managers and other MUP staff working with border control, border protection, 
or issuance of biometric documents was begun. The course curriculum included 
definition of corruption, causes and consequences of corruption, application of anti-
corruption regulations, corruption related legal regulation and criminal offenses, and the 
relation between organized criminal groups and corruption.  
e. Oversight Structures 
Formal oversight of the border police takes place through the same 
mechanisms as oversight of the police directorate, since the border police directorate is a 
sub-unit of the police directorate. There are multiple oversight mechanisms. Oversight of 
the border police is carried out by the MUP Internal Affairs division, which was 
established in 2005 and by the Bureau for Complaints and Grievances, a unit in the  
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Minister's Secretariat. In addition external oversight is also provided by the 
Ombudsman’s Office of the National Assembly. These oversight structures are more 
fully described in Chapter IV.C.1.d on pages 88 to 91. 
f. Coordination Structures 
As part of IBM, the border police coordinate their work with both other 
domestic agencies and with the border control agencies of neighboring countries and with 
more distant countries to counter international smugglers and traffickers. As part of the 
border security reform, at each of the BCPs the Border Police Directorate officers now 
work in teams with officials from the Customs Administration of the Ministry of Finance 
and the Veterinary and Phyto—Sanitary Inspection officers of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Water Management. In comparison with previous practices of 
requiring border crossing users to first move to the border control area to undergo border 
control, then move to the Veterinary and Phyto-Sanitary Inspection area to inspection, 
and then move to the customs area for customs control, the use of teams of one border 
police, one customs officer and two Veterinary and Phyto-Sanitary inspectors results in 
faster border clearance for border users and better working conditions for BCP staff.243 
In terms of external coordination, Serbia is a member of various regional 
organizations, such as the SECI Centre, the IOM, and the Migration, Asylum, Refugees 
Regional Initiative (MARRI). MARRI facilitates regional cooperation regarding 
migration management, including migration, asylum, border management, visa policies, 
consular cooperation, and refugee return and settlement. MARRI coordinates projects to 
upgrade member’s border police capabilities at international airport BCPs. The objective 
is to reduce irregular migration, crime and terrorism by improving cooperation and 
information exchange between different member's border police forces. MARRI also 
works to reduce trafficking by improving and harmonize anti-trafficking data collection, 
management, analysis, and evaluation.244  
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The Border Police Directorate has also built bilateral relationships with 
bordering countries. In March 2009, Serbia signed an agreement with Bosnia-
Herzegovina to do joint border patrols and hold regular meetings between border police 
officers of the two countries. Under the agreement they also exchange border police 
liaison officers and created a training manual on joint border patrols.245 A similar 
agreement was signed with Montenegro.  
The Border Police Directorate also effectively built and maintained 
cooperation with members of the international community, which provided monetary and 
in kind benefits. In 2004 and 2005, the U.S. government, through the FBI and SECI, 
donated desk top computers, camcorders, printers, fax machines and cellular phones and 
10 vehicles worth some $250,000 to the Border Police Directorate's Anti-Trafficking 
Group.246 In 2005 the EAR financed the modernization and rebuilding of selected BCPs 
and training of border police. In 2006 the EU provided funding for the acquisition of 
border police equipment including x-ray equipment for checking goods at BCPs and for 
control of new ID documents to meet EU Schengen standards.247 
From October 2009 to May 2010, an International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) project jointly trained 120 Serbian and Bosnia-Herzegovina border 
police officers to enhance cooperation between the two forces to enhance their ability to 
minimize illegal immigration across the Serbia-BiH border.248 
                                                 
245  Council of European Union Brussels, “Austrian Regional Chair for the Western Balkans (co-
chair: Hungary) Regional Report on the Western Balkans,”(June 18, 2009), 13, accessed May 3, 2010, 
http://www.secicenter.org/doc/ceu.regional%20report%20to%20the%20western%20balkans18.06.2009.pdf. 
246  United States Embassy Belgrade, “Ambassador Polt to Present Vehicles to the Ministry of Interior 
for Anti-Trafficking Team,” (February 23, 2005), accessed April 23, 2010, 
http://belgrade.usembassy.gov/archives/press/2005/a050223.html. Also see United States Embassy 
Belgrade, “Ambassador Michael C. Polt Presents Anti-Trafficking Equipment to Ministry of Interior,” 
(July 27, 2004), accessed April 23, 2010, http://belgrade.usembassy.gov/archives/press/2004/040728a.html.  
247  Davor Konjikušić, “Lack of funds and resources prevent the transfer of border control in Serbia,” 
Southeast European Times in Belgrade, June 16, 2005. 
248  EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina “Successful Cooperation Between Border Police 
of BiH and Serbia,” (June 1, 2010), accessed June 4, 2010, 
http://www.eupmbih.eu/detail.aspx?id=1414&tabid=5.  
  108
From December 2008, the Serbian and Croatian border police conducted 
joint exercises to simulate apprehension of illegal migrants.249 A 2009 training project in 
which Croatian border police shared their best practices procedures being used on the 
Croatian side of the border with their counterparts in the Serbian border guards resulted 
in a significant increase in cooperation and border control effectiveness as reported 
seizures from attempted smuggling across the Serbian-Croatian border increased by 35 
percent, and experts estimated that illegal migration and human trafficking across the 
border declined 65 percent.250  
In 2010, the Slovenian Center for European Perspective (CEP) provided 
training at the Police Academy in Belgrade to Serbian BCP chief commanding border 
police officers regarding building and maintaining border police officer ethics. The 
training emphasized creating a positive working environment by adopting a performance 
review system of an annual interview and annual working assessment. 
Serb Border Police in the Subotica BPC area reported that their good 
working relationship with Hungarian border police for information exchange and joint 
cross-border actions resulted in much greater success in jointly detaining illegal 
migrants.251 
3. Customs Administration  
a. Organization 
The EU conception of the role of customs in border security is that 
customs administration's function is to facilitate the correct application of customs duties 
and speed movement of people and goods across the border, while at the same time 
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resisting and working to preventing all illegal cross-border activities. The Serbian 
Customs Administration carries out customs control, customs clearance, prevention of 
illegal imports, customs management and customs offense proceedings, sale of goods and 
customs enforced payment of customs duties. Serbia's senior Customs Administrators 
appear to have adopted the EU concept. The Head of the Customs Administration 
Internal Control Service stated, "The principal task of Customs Services is to facilitate 
the rapid flow of goods and people while minimizing costs and guaranteeing efficient and 
effective control—such as uncovering and clamping down on customs offenses, 
particularly terrorism, organized crime, corruption, and other crimes."252 
When reforms began in 2003, the Customs Administration was relying on 
an outdated computer system from the early 1980s, which was not sufficient to 
implement an electronic customs clearance system. As a consequence, businesses 
importing goods had to hand deliver declaration forms to customs offices and every 
shipment was inspected at the border, which caused backlogs and delays in processing 
declarations and in inspections. There was also often a lack of coordination between 
customs, the border inspectors and the tax administrators. Priority reforms were to install 
an electronic clearance system, to implement risk-assessment based inspection controls, 
and to implement guidelines and anti-corruption enforcement mechanisms for staff.253  
In 2003, the Customs Administration began installation of an electronic 
customs clearance system, which was fully functional by the end of 2005. In 2006, the 
Customs Administration computer system was assessed to provide customs clearance and 
other customs procedures satisfactory to meet EU requirements.  
As of 2010, the Customs Administration is organized into eight 
departments, which are Operations & International Customs Cooperation, Tariffs, 
Customs Enforcement, Internal Control, Information Technology, Human Resources, 
Audit, and the Department of Finance, Investment & Legal Affairs. The Department of 
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Operations and International Customs Cooperation is responsible for the regular customs 
clearance and duty assessment and collection operations, as well as participating in 
bilateral and multilateral tariff discussions and negotiations including those relating to 
EU integration, and participating in international customs related organizations. The 
Tariff Department monitors tariff application and rules of origin and preferences and 
liaises with the World Trade Organization, World Customs Organization and the EU 
regarding tariffs. The Department of Customs Enforcement does investigations and 
intelligence operations to suppress smuggling and monitor the legality of other customs 
service department’s operations.  
In 2003, the average monthly wage of customs officials was about 7,000 
dinars, equivalent to about 100 euro. At that time, customs officers who attempted to 
report corruption and smuggling were often penalized for doing so. Bozo Djurovic, who 
was a customs officer in Bor, was dismissed after reporting to his supervisors that he had 
seen five trucks filled with televisions crossing the border into Serbia in mid-2003 at an 
unauthorized border crossing. Djurovic claimed there was no cause for his dismissal 
other than his report of the television smuggling.254 In the period August 2003 to August 
2005, there were official complaints filed against 63 customs officers; and of the 44 cases 
examined in that time frame, 38 of the accused were either dismissed or demoted. At that 
time senior customs officials estimated that 30 percent of the potential revenue from 
border tax was being lost due to smuggling, and a former head of the Customs 
Administration estimated the loss at 150 million Euros per year, and estimated that of the 
smuggled goods 20 percent were undeclared but the other 80 percent were declared and 
cleared under false invoices.255 While the oversight mechanism was apparently working 
to dismiss some corrupt officers, there was also clearly a problem with corruption. 
In 2004, the average wages for customs officers were raised to the 
equivalent of about 300 euro per month, which led to a visible improvement in 
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performance and a noticeable reduction in corrupt practices. Also in 2004, EU's Customs 
and Fiscal Assistance Office (CAFAO) set up an anti-corruption unit in Serbia with 14 
vehicles and a boat to fight corruption in the customs. 
In 2006, the Directorate for Environmental Protection of the Ministry of 
Science and Environmental Protection organized courses for customs officers to teach 
them the skills needed for border control of waste, poisons, and ozone-layer depleting 
chemicals so that the Directorate for Environmental Protection inspectors could transfer 
their responsibility to the customs officers at the BCPs to increase border control 
efficiency.256  
Despite the improvements brought by the reforms, it was not until 2009 
that the Customs Administration was authorized to acquire the sort of scanner technology 
that is commonly used by Customs Services in other countries. In 2009 the Ministry of 
Finance approved acquisition by the Customs Service of ten mobile and one stationary x-
ray scanner to help prevent smuggling of goods. According to Customs Administration 
Director Serbia's was the last Customs Service in the region to acquire scanners, despite 
the fact that the scanners would increase customs revenue by more than their cost of 
acquisition and maintenance.257 
As of 2009, the average wages for Customs Administration staff was 
about 51,200 dinar, or the equivalent of about 475 Euros per month. In 2010, the 
Customs Service received an additional 2.5 million Euros for upgrading of its computer 
transit system and 1.5 million Euros for the development of management capacity and for 
harmonization of customs legislation and procedures with EU legal codes.258  
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As of 2009, the Serbia's Customs Administration had approximately 2,700 
staff.259 As of May 2010, the Director of the Customs Administration was Predrag 
Petronijevic; other senior staff is listed in Table 4. 
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION SENIOR STAFFING 
 
Director,  Predrag Petronijevic 
Assistant Director, Slobodan Nikolic 
 
Department Of Operations And International Customs Cooperation,            
Assistant Director, Idrija Hadžibegović 
Tariff Department,  Assistant Director, Borislav Injac 
Department Of Customs Enforcement,   Assistant Director, Alexander Vulovic 
Department Of Internal Control, Head, Nebojsa Jovanovic 
Department Of Information Technology,  Assistant Director, Predrag Karavdić 
Financial, Investment And Legal Affairs, Assistant Director, Dubravka Gatica 
Department Of Human Resources And General Affairs, Assistant Director, Goran 
Grahovac  
Audit Department, Senior Customs Inspector, Mayor Milan Vukovic 
Table 4.   Customs Administration senior staffing 
c. Training  
During the 1990s, Serbian customs officer’s training did not keep up with 
developments in other World Customs Union countries training curricula. Therefore, 
when reforms began the Customs Administration was faced with a significant training 
challenge. In 2003 and 2004, all customs officers attended in-house training on the new 
electronic clearance system and the new risk assessment based inspection management 
system.  
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Acknowledging the Serbian Customs Administration’s major training 
deficit and the expected benefit to EU member country exporters and importers from 
greater Serbian customs clearance efficiency, in 2005 the EU CARDS program 
contributed 172,000 Euros for the upgrading of the Serbian Customs Service Professional 
Training Center to facilitate upgrading of customs officer’s skills. The upgrades to the 
Serbian Customs Service Professional Training Center included the addition of modern 
teaching aids to allow instructors to utilize contemporary teaching methods including e-
learning and a modernized curriculum focusing on application of risk-assessment based 
border management and information based crime prevention, detection and reduction.260  
In addition, the Customs Service has drawn on the assistance of the United 
Nations Office On Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to provide anti-crime training as one 
component of customs ongoing specialized training series. The UNODC curricula cover a 
range of customs topics including anti-smuggling, intelligence and investigations 
techniques, protection of intellectual property rights and criminal intelligence data 
analysis. The UNDOC also provided training in use of various modern technologies of 
efficient border management including PCs, digital projectors, software for intelligence 
analysis and drug identification. The EU CARDS program provided equipment funding, 
included sixteen drug and precursor test kits for use in BCPs.261 
d. Oversight 
  Customs reform under the Djindjic government had been oriented 
primarily to reducing the corruption of customs officers so as to increase the level of 
customs tariff and excise tax revenues to support the government budget. It had become 
so much a part of normal operating practice for customs officers to extort "gifts" from 
individuals passing through the borders that in 2003, with the beginning of the 
introduction of computerized customs clearance and selective inspection based on risk 
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assessment, the Director General of Customs made a series of speeches to staff at every 
customs office in Serbia announcing that customs officers were no longer allowed to 
accept "gifts" in excess of 30 Euros per transaction. In addition the new limit on "gifts" 
was publicized in print media and on television so as to make the public feel confident to 
refuse larger requests.262 
The Internal Control Department of the Customs Administration is 
responsible for investigating any complaints of misuse of authority or illegal actions by 
customs officers in the conduct of their duties. Due to the historical circumstances from 
which the reforms began, the Department of Internal Control was specifically mandated 
to fight corruption by testing customs officers and employment candidates regarding 
indicators of connection to organized crime groups, as well as for other corruption-
proneness indicators, and to develop risk profiles on tested officers and applicants. In 
addition the Department of Customs Enforcement contributes to internal oversight by 
conducting intelligence operations and investigations of officers work practices to control 
the legality of the customs units and to discourage any tendency toward violation of 
regulations.263 
In 2003, the Customs Administration adopted the Code of Conduct of 
Customs Officers to encourage ethical work practices by customs officers. The Code was 
revised in 2008 to be consistent with the Code of Conduct of Civil Servants adopted as 
part of the Law on Government.264  
Further informal external oversight is provided by nationally publicized 
phone numbers set up in 2005, and a website for individuals to supply information about 
evidence of corrupt practices by customs officers.265  
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e. Coordination  
The World Bank and the World Customs Union provided expert 
consultations to the Customs Administration during the development of the electronic 
documents customs clearance system. The CAFAO provided expert advice to the Serbian 
Customs Administration during the period of development of the new Customs Act. The 
World Bank provided expert advice during the development of the customs electronic 
clearance system. The Customs Administration draws on the expertise of the DCAF for 
training programs regarding enhancing border security.  
D.  OPERATIONAL REFORMS 
 Organizational reforms to the Police Directorate, the Border Police Directorate 
and the Customs Administration are important for Serbia's IBM strategy and border 
security since they are necessary to enabling modern border security performance. 
However, organizational reforms are not sufficient to result in IBM and secure borders, 
since it is the performance of the institutions that creates these results. This section will 
consider the operational reforms that the Police Directorate, the Border Police 
Directorate, and the Customs Administration have managed to produce with the reformed 
organizational structures described above.  
1. Police Directorate Operational Reforms 
 The Police Directorate has suffered under a public distrust that has been damaging 
to moral, and to an unquantifiable extent, to their effectiveness. Members of the public 
are much less likely to report suspicious information to the police if it is perceived that 
the police are corrupt and that the reporting of the information could sour a corrupt deal 
and result in retribution. A similar effect exists for public reporting of information about 
known crimes. The resulting reduction in flow of information to the police makes their 
work much more difficult to perform well. 
 The public image of the police was further degraded in April 2005 when a video 
was shown at the Milosevic trial at the ICTY, and rebroadcast on Serbian national 
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television, showing the Special Police Unit, the Scorpions, under the official command of 
the Police Directorate of the MUP, participating in the July 1995 Srebrenica killings.266 
 After the success of Operation Sabre when the Police were able to remove a few 
of the most notorious organized crime figures, the conservative elements in society 
reconsolidated; and under the Kostunica government many senior managers who had 
been the object of reform capacity building investments in the purportedly depoliticized 
Police Directorate and Customs Administration were replaced. “After the 2004 elections, 
about 700 Police Directorate senior staff were dismissed. More than a half (18) of 
Superintendents of Police in the regional directorates were let go,” and according to one 
expert, "At the same time people without a day of police experience were given the 
position of Generals and police Inspector Generals.”267 Police effectiveness in law 
enforcement, in law breaking prevention, and in investigation declined. 
 Reflecting the society itself, the police appear to have been divided on the 
desirability of fundamental reforms and the adoption of EU standards and social 
institutions. For example, former police bodyguards of ICTY indictee Mladic reported 
playing table tennis at military barracks near Belgrade where Mladic was being provided 
safe haven, rather than being arrested.  
 And despite the reforms, the ethics training, the anti-corruption units, and the 
successes against organized crime publicized in the media, the Police Directorate remains 
riddled with corruption. According to expert commentators, "The symbiosis of the police 
and criminal top structures for sure does not exist anymore, but the existence of the 
corruption and coupling of individual police officers with the criminal organizations 
cannot be denied.”268 
 Decentralization, along with demilitarization, depoliticization, and de-
criminalization had been one of the early EU conditions for progress toward accession. 
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Yet, as of 2008, there had been no significant decentralizing, nor development of a plan 
to decentralize the police service.269 Demilitarization did not progress quickly either. In 
police education surface changes belied underlying constancy. While reform of police 
training did not move quickly, and only occurred organizationally in 2006 and 2007, the 
operational reality was that the curriculum remained the same. "Courses like Military 
Psychology or Military Topography were abolished, but only by replacing the word 
‘military’ by the word ‘police’. Despite the organizational reform combining the 
separated old Police College and Police Academy into the new Academy of Criminal and 
Police Studies, the textbooks were only slightly changed, and the courses were still taught 
by the same teachers who had taught them for the previous 20 or more years using 
military style teaching methods. The military ranks of the faculty and administrators were 
no longer referred to but the absolute authority of the Dean, who had held the rank of 
general, continued to be formally and in practice observed by the faculty and the teacher 
council."270 
 As of 2006, the Service for Organized Crime was not as effective as public 
expectations for it, despite the salaries its members received being twice those of 
comparable officers in other services of the Criminal Investigation Directorate. Service 
for Organized Crime staff suggests they faced constraining resource shortages. The unit 
was allocated 22 detectives and had limited office space. The unit claimed few of the 
cases it submitted charges for were actually successfully executed by the prosecutors. 
"According to police estimates, only 16 percent of criminal charges submitted by the 
police service end up with a court verdict and half of those are suspended sentences."271 
However, in the following two years the Service for Organized Crime began to have 
greater success.272 
                                                 
269  Zelimir Kesetovic, “Attempt to Reform Ministry of Interior - Essence and Form,” In Security 
Sector Reform in Serbia -- Achievements and Prospects, ed. Wiroslav Hadzic, (Belgrade: Center For Civil-
Military Relations, 2008), 82.  
270  Zelimir Kesetovic, “Attempt to Reform Ministry of Interior - Essence and Form,” In Security 
Sector Reform in Serbia -- Achievements and Prospects, ed. Wiroslav Hadzic, (Belgrade: Center For Civil-
Military Relations, 2008), 81. 
271  Bakic and Gajic, “Police Reform in Serbia: Five Years Later.” 22. 
272  Kešetović, “Attempt to Reform the Ministry of Interior,” 83. 
  118
 In 2004, Dusan Mihajlovic, leader of the Serbian Liberal Party, stated that 
political parties and politicians were largely financed by "mafia networks in business and 
the underworld."273 As the former MUP Minister from 2001 to 2004 in charge of the 
police and with access to the information gathered by the Criminal Investigation 
Directorate and the Organized Crimes unit, Mihajlovic must be considered well informed 
on this issue. This suggests that Kostunica's claims in August 2001, that Djindjic was 
connected to organized crime, were probably true but less than comprehensive. It also 
suggests the enormity and ubiquity of the obstacles the police directorate was facing, and 
goes some way to explain the apparent lack of police effectiveness.  
 Nevertheless, some successes were noted. A major operational reform occurred in 
crime scene investigation and evidence acquisition when the CID developed a quality 
management system for processing evidence and a crime scene investigation policy by 
2007, and implemented an ongoing program of crime scene investigators and evidence 
quality management for all criminal investigators.274 The CID also created a centralized 
forensic lab in Belgrade with regional labs in Nis and Novi Sad. The CID staff is in the 
process of implementing an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and a 
Face Identification System (FIS). They plan to set up a national DNA lab.  
 The Drug Smuggling Suppression Department (DSSD) of the CID developed 
sophisticated communications and cooperation with other neighboring countries 
organized crime police forces that, during 2008, allowed the Department to make eight 
drug seizures and four controlled deliveries.275 The DSSD and other anti-drug units of 
the CID work in close cooperation with Interpol, the SECI Center, the DEA, and 
UNODC on combating drug production, transport and distribution.  
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 In 2009, the government announced another campaign against organized crime. A 
list of 30 to 40 target groups was selected. In September 2009, the cooperation resulted in 
a joint BIA plus DEA and Serbian police operation arresting of 22 members of one 
organized crime group, including three police officers, and the seizing of a 2800 kg 
cocaine shipment in international waters estimated to be worth 120 million Euros. In 
November 2009, based on Serbian police information, Argentinean police arrested five 
Serbians in Buenos Aires and seized 492 kg of cocaine.276 In a related action, in January 
2010 nine members of the Zemun Clan were arrested and some of their real estate was 
seized. 
 A number of smaller probably unrelated cocaine and heroin seizures were 
reported in 2009, and were cited by the government as evidence of the increasing 
effectiveness of the Police Directorate in combating organized crime. In February 2009 a 
1.7 kg cocaine seizure was made and two people arrested at Zagreb airport bound for 
Serbia. Also in November 2009, Serbian police arrested four people in Belgrade and 
seized 5 kg cocaine. On December 21, kg of heroine were seized in Belgrade. 
 In November 2009, the police launched Operation Morava, billed as the largest 
crackdown on organized crime since Operation Sabre. More than 2000 police officers 
arrived at approximately 600 buildings across the country at exactly 6am on a Saturday 
morning to search the buildings for drugs and arrest the allegedly drug trafficking 
occupants. Police arrested 500 people and seized $1.5 million in counterfeit U.S. money, 
"dozens of kilograms of various drugs, a large cache of weapons and ammunition, and a 
number of stolen cars.” Of the 500 people arrested, 400 were quickly released.277  
 Despite the evidence that the Police Directorate was having more success 
apprehending drug smugglers, the street price of drugs in Serbia was declining. By 
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November 2009, the market price of heroine in Serbia had fallen to one euro per gram 
from a typical level of 8 to 12 Euros per gram, and while the price of cocaine had  
remained steady at its typical price of 30 to 35 Euros per gram.278,279 At the same time 
police were reporting that a seizure of 2.1 kg of heroine was valued at U.S. $1.5 
million.280 
 In November 2009, at an EU meeting, President Tadic had stated that "Serbia’s 
future depends on breaking the ties between crime, the economy and the judicial and 
political spheres."281 Also in November in what is perhaps a revealing signal, President 
Tadic had the government purchase a 620,000 euro armored car for his security.282 In 
March 2010, he vowed a war on drug trafficking and organized crime, claiming that 
organized crime had attempted to destabilize his government. In April 2010, a State 
Secretary of the Ministry of Justice reported that “Articles containing encrypted 
threatening messages were noted in several local newspapers in the region. According to 
the information obtained by our services, there were already developed plans for 
liquidation of several people involved in the investigation (against Šarić's clan) and 
highest state officials Tadić, other targets included Special Prosecutor Miljko 
Radisavljević, Justice Minister Snežana Malović, and the State Secretary himself.”283 
While security for the head of state and for visiting heads of state was usually executed 
by the police, President Tadic had chosen the Army special unit, the Kobre, to provide his 
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security, suggesting he does not have confidence in the police in this regard. A former 
head of the Gendarmerie offered his opinion that “Something is seriously wrong in the 
president’s security,” and that “Things are repeating themselves, like in the time of 
Djindjic. The same thing can happen here.”284 This highlights the strength of the 
organized crime gangs and their influence over elements within the police, suggesting 
that police reforms to combat corruption have not been successful in providing adequate 
security for a stable democratic system of policing.  
 New anti-organized crime asset seizure laws and a government announcement 
that the proceeds from sales of confiscated properties of criminals would be used to 
support social spending, such as kindergartens, provided the police a target to aim at to 
improve their public image. Police used the asset seizure laws aggressively for the first 
time to continue the government’s assault on organized crime members in April 2010 by 
arresting several associates of alleged drug smuggler Darko Saric and confiscating 
"several million Euros" of his property.285 The Police Unit, Special Prosecution for 
Organized Crime, entered charges against Saric and 19 associates alleging they had 
attempted to smuggle 2.5 tons of cocaine to Europe from South America. The police are 
reported to have confiscated over 100 million Euros worth of real estate and autos from 
suspects charged with organized crime and corruption offenses in the first half of 
2010.286  
 In more prosaic aspects of policing, other operational reforms are needed. While it 
has not received much mention in security sector reform discussions nor in public policy 
discussions, Paunovic notes that there is a pervasive and persistent problem with the 
Serbian traffic laws and legislation. The traffic laws and regulations allow police officers 
to assess "on-the-spot" fines for excessive speeding, unauthorized parking, passing 
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moving automobiles, and for traffic accidents. This arrangement is an invitation to abuse 
and corruption of the attending police officer. With modern technology, laws and 
regulations could be changed to require digital images evidencing traffic infractions be 
presented to substantiate any fine. This would remove the most abusable opportunities for 
corruption. However, in order for police to accept and implement such revised and low-
corruption susceptible regulations, it may be necessary to remove a large number of 
officers who have grown as used to the pocket money from traffic fines as the customs 
officers have grown used to the pocket money from "gifts”.287 As of 2010, new traffic 
legislation that is consistent with EU standards had been adopted but was not being 
enforced.288 
 In addition to the lack of fulfillment of positive expectations for police reform as 
discussed above, certain aspects of unreformed police culture are more troublesome. 
Despite the oversight by the MUP Internal Affairs Division and the new Ombudsman’s 
Office reporting directly to the Prime Minister, there remains a deficit in police 
performance with regard to respect for civil rights and minority rights. Police officers are 
often cited for abuse of authority and brutality. A few selected examples of police actions 
during 2008, which have been cited by external observers as probable violations of civil 
liberties and human rights, demonstrate the extent of this issue. In September 2009, three 
youths in Brus were beaten by plainclothes police officers, after the police detained the 
youths on suspicion that they had robbed a gas station. An eighteen-year-old received a 
broken eardrum and numerous bruises. In response to a formal complaint by the youths, 
the MUP failed to identify the officers despite the detailed physical descriptions of the 
officers provided by the youths.289 In December 2008, three police officers reportedly 
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beat a college student because he did not obey an order to stop his auto at a checkpoint. 
The student admitted to drinking and claimed the police had offered to dismiss drunk-
driving charges if he remained silent about the beating. A witness confirmed seeing a 
group of people beating someone at the location where the police stopped the student. 
The MUP Minister sent a commission from Belgrade to investigate. After the 
investigation, the police filed charges against the student’s doctor, claiming the doctor 
had grossly exaggerated the injuries to the student.290 
2. Police Oversight Implementation 
 As discussed above, the operational reforms to the police oversight mechanisms 
did not have much early success. The first appointed Inspector General displayed his lack 
of independence and his loyalty to the police directorate by becoming an organizer of a 
rally in support of General Sreten Lukic, the former Deputy Head of the Police Service 
and former Head of the Border Police Directorate, when Lukić was indicted by ICTY in 
October 2003. The second Inspector General was less focused on investigating police 
wrong-doing than on socializing with celebrities.291  
 By 2005, a new more professional Inspector General had taken over the oversight 
role, and "had filed 107 criminal charges against 152 police officers for 200 criminal 
offenses. The Inspector General’s Service had received more than 6,000 complaints and 
processed approximately 89 percent."292 In a time period when the former Minister in 
charge of the police was publicly stating that political parties and politicians were being 
largely financed by organized crime, and publicly implying the politicians were largely 
corrupt, the Inspector General chose, after receiving about 6,000 complaints against 
police officers, to lay charges in only 1.8 percent of the cases. That works out to laying 
charges against approximately one-half of one percent of the police force staff. So in 
what the former Minister of Police was characterizing as an “apple orchard of windfalls 
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going to rot,” the Inspector General was only able to identify barely more than a handful 
of bad apples. This is apparently in part due to the lack of authority granted to the 
Inspector General by the MOI when creating the institution.  In 2005, the Inspector 
General reported difficulties in functioning due to lack of cooperation within the police, 
including restrictions on access to information concerning complaints filed against police 
officials, and regarding war crimes and organized crime.293  
 The initial success of police oversight reform by the Inspector General's Service 
can be characterized as better than nothing, which was the previous level of oversight it 
replaced; but very disappointing to an advocate of liberal democratic values and 
processes expecting Serbian police reforms to relatively quickly approach EU standards.
 Improvements in police oversight operations occurred with the establishment of 
the Internal Affairs Sector of the MUP. By 2007, the last year for which data is posted, 
the Internal Affairs Sector reportedly dealt with 2,384 complaints against police officers. 
Of these complaints, nearly all, 2,347, were processed. Of the processed files a total 11.3 
percent, or 266 cases, were deemed founded or partially founded. Almost a third (31.4 
percent) of the investigated complaints (739) were dismissed as unfounded, while a 
further 21 percent (493) of the complaints were judged not to contain enough facts to 
investigate the allegations. The remaining 36 percent (849) of the complaints were dealt 
with by Internal Affairs by passing the case to other police units for further work.294 
 During 2007, the Internal Affairs Sector reportedly filed 122 criminal charges and 
12 amendments of criminal charges against 239 persons, of which 159 were police 
employees and 80 were non-police Serbian citizens. These charges related to 282 
criminal acts of which 27 percent involved abuse of official authority, 14 percent 
involved falsifying official documents, 11 percent falsifying non-official documents, 12.8 
percent involved accepting bribes, and a further 6.7 percent were related to fraud. The 
regional police directorates outside of the Internal Affairs Sector also filed charges 
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related to illegal acts by police officers, bringing the total numbers of disciplinary 
prosecutions in 2007 to 483 criminal charges and 18 amendments against 551 MUP 
employees regarding 680 criminal acts. The most common crime among police in 2007 
was criminal acts of endangering traffic with 115 cases prosecuted, and severe crimes 
against traffic safety resulting in 45 cases prosecuted. The next most popular was abuse 
of official authority with 106 cases. The once popular practice of accepting bribes netted 
63 cases with prosecution. Falsifying official documents resulted in 48 cases, and only a 
paltry 33 fraud causes were prosecuted. In addition 2,299 MUP police were subject to 
misdemeanor proceedings for "severe abuse of official position," and a further 1,622 
police officers underwent misdemeanor proceedings for "minor abuse of official 
position.”295 
 In summary, these reported numbers are not obviously consistent and don't 
obviously add up. This leaves open the question of whether the cause is the Internal 
Affairs Sector's difficulties with record keeping or with accurately reporting its work. 
Questions might also be raised about the high proportion of complaints received, which 
were assessed to be unfounded. It is not clear whether the fact that only approximately 
11.3 percent of complaints resulted in charges is due to the Internal Affairs Sector being 
somewhat lenient toward their colleagues or whether Serbians are overly enthusiastic to 
lay formal complaints against their police. Despite these unanswered issues, the adoption 
of the Law on Police legislation and the establishment of the Internal Affairs Sector is a 
significant operational reform improvement compared to the earlier performance of the 
Inspector General's Service. 
3. Border Police Operational Reform 
 The Border Police Directorate, under its then head Colonel Dusan Zlokas, was 
highly successful in developing a border policing strategy, building domestic political 
support for it, arranging international cooperation to provide necessary expertise and 
funding for infrastructure and equipment, and implementing the strategy. The successful 
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demilitarization of the borders in 2006 stands as a significant achievement and a 
significant milestone toward meeting EU Schengen conditions. The Border Police 
Directorate has continued to build its capability to secure and control the traditional 
borders.  
 Over time, as police officers human capital skills cumulated, the years of training 
in new EU techniques, and as infrastructure and equipment accumulated due to 
continuous EU CARDS and other donor funding, the border police began to show 
improved results. By 2010 the border police were becoming adept at detecting and 
interdicting human traffickers. Serb Border Police in the Subotica BPC area claimed their 
good working relationship with Hungarian border police for information exchange and 
joint cross-border actions resulted in much greater success in jointly detaining illegal 
migrants. The Serbian Border Police were able to obtain EU funding to acquire six 
vehicles with thermal-imaging cameras, global positioning and laser range finders; and 
have detected and apprehended more than 400 illegal migrants using the new gear and 
joint operations with their Hungarian counterparts.296 Border police, in May 2010, 
reported the arrest of a nine-member human trafficking organization that had trafficked 
approximately 100 people from Kosova through Serbia to Subotica and then into 
Hungary during a two month surveillance period. They credited good information sharing 
relationships with Hungarian and Austrian border police for alerting them to the 
traffickers operations.297 
 The Police Directorate and the Border Police Directorate, under its then head 
Colonel Dusan Zlokas, was quite successful in countering trafficking in humans. It has 
been observed that this may be partly because there was no political controversy about 
the desirability of eradicating human slavery, since the corruption in the security sector 
has focused around the more profitable drug and weapons trades. In September 2003, 
SECI coordinated an area wide campaign against human traffickers code named 
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“Operation Mirage,” which apprehended 526 of 600 identified human traffickers and 
charged 207 of them.298 However, only 50 of the 207 were tried and only 5 were 
convicted.299 This highlights that the difficulties faced by Serbian police with having 
accused dealt with and convicted by the courts is shared by other countries in the region. 
 Serbian police continued to have success combating human traffickers in 2005. 
The police collaborated with the IOM Mission at the operational level to investigate and 
free several trafficked persons. Most of the trafficked women freed were discovered and 
released from their situation due to police raids.300 In 2005, Serbian police arrested 24 
people for sex-trafficking in Serbia, and approximately 180 victims were freed. Police 
also uncovered 11 human smuggling operations and arrested 23 of the smugglers in 
2005.301 
 In 2006, border police and customs officers seized about 360 kilograms of heroine 
in the first half of the year, which was over two times as much as they had seized in the 
previous two years, 2004 and 2005.302 As Table 5 details, in 2007 heroine seizures 
climbed to a total of 484.3 kg, but declined thereafter.303  
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MUP STATISTICS ON POLICE NARCOTICS SEIZURES (2008, 2007)304  
  Amount Confiscated in Grams (except Ecstasy in pills) 
 Seized Drug 2010 Jan. to Nov. 2008 2007 
 HEROIN 135,000 207,649 484,337
 COCAINE 17,000 15,091 16,134
 MARIHUANA  1,477,786 1,625,053
 CANNABIS    0 583
 HASHISH        16,000 1,139 583
 ECSTASY               1,078 3,751
 TOTAL SEIZED    1,250,000 1,743,862 2,296,533
  
 NUMBER OF 
 SEIZURES             
  
6,189 6,141
 NUMBER OF 
 CRIMINAL 
 OFFENSES            
  
6,058 4,926
Table 5.   MUP Statistics on Police Narcotics Seizures (2008, 2007)305  
More recently, the border police and customs officers at several BCPs have made 
significant seizures from drug smugglers. In September 2008, border police seized 5kg 
heroin at the Horgas BCP to Hungary from a German national on a bus and arrested the 
man.306 In July 2008, border police at the Gradina BCP into Bulgaria seized 45 pounds of 
heroin from the Turkish driver of a Swiss registered car and arrested the driver.307 In 
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September 2009, border police at the Roszke BPC into Bosnia-Herzegovina seized 20 kg 
of marijuana from the Croatian driver of a car with Bosnian license and arrested the 
driver.308 In March 2010, border police at the Horgos BCP to Hungary seized 46 kg of 
cannabis from the Dutch driver of a Dutch licensed van and arrested the driver.309 
4. Customs Administration Operational Reforms 
 In the field, the results of the work of customs officers overlaps considerably with 
that of the result of the work of the border police officers. Without inside management 
information it is difficult to distinguish the contribution to border security of the two 
groups. Therefore, this thesis will attribute the increased rates of drug seizures discussed 
in relation to border police as jointly attributable to the border police and to the customs 
officers.  
 Customs Administration oversight implementation has also publicized some 
successes. In late 2006, police arrested more than 30 customs officers on suspicion of 
being members of a merchandise smuggling ring. In August 2007, Serbia's customs 
director announced that over 50 customs officers were suspended due to suspicion that 
they had abused their official powers and were part of a goods smuggling ring. Included 
in the arrests were the coordinators of the Customs Anti-Smuggling units at Vatin and at 
Igor Mishkin, and one of the heads of the customs office in Vatin. Reportedly some 
trucks were being allowed to pass the border uninspected in exchange for a bribe of 3000 
Euros per truck. The Director of the Customs Administration claimed their campaign 
against corruption was having a positive effect, noting that the 2007 revenue from 
Customs Duties and Excises at borders for the first eight months of the year was 22 
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percent greater than for the same period in 2006.310 In December 2009, customs officers 
arrested 13 border police and six customs officers in BPCs along the border with 
Montenegro on suspicion of corruption and abuse of authority, alleging they had accepted 
bribes during the period April to December 2009.311 
 Anecdotal reports indicate that corruption among customs officers has not 
disappeared; however, it appears to be contained and controlled by the policies of 
Customs Administration senior management and the Internal Affairs Division. As of 
2005, apparently typical "gift" amounts expected by BPC Customs Officers ranged from 
a couple of Euros or a chocolate bar for a suitcase smuggler, to 10 to 15 Euros for a 
busload of suitcase smugglers.312 This may indicate that customs corruption has lessened 
as customs salaries rose and more sophisticated equipment was provided to customs 
officers to do their job, perhaps making it a more prestigious job and more worth 
keeping.  
 The Customs Administration has also demonstrated increasing competence in 
more sophisticated investigations, and demonstrated the capacity to coordinate complex 
joint enforcement actions with neighboring country customs organizations. In 2008, the 
Customs Administration suspected that Serbian companies were fraudulently importing 
textiles from Hungary under documentation mis-specifying the origin, customs value and 
quantity. Customs used the secure communications facility of the SECI Center to contact 
the Hungarian Customs service to request copies of the Hungarian export documents for  
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the suspected textiles. The one-year long joint investigation with the Hungarian Customs 
service revealed a 1.2 million euro fraud and resulted in 52 charges against several 
Serbian companies.313 
5. Border Police and Customs Oversight Implementation  
 Like police oversight operational reform, Customs Administration oversight 
apparently failed to eliminate corruption. Despite the Criminal Code penalties of 6 
months to 10 years in prison for corruption and accepting bribes,314 customs officers 
apparently continued to enthusiastically and systematically extort small amounts from 
people crossing the border at BCPs. Perhaps by limiting themselves to the suggested 30 
euro maximum "gift" per shipment they switched the main cost of their corruption away 
from the wealthy and powerful Serbians smuggling industrial sized shipments, and 
transferred the cost to the hundreds of "sole proprietor" suitcase load smugglers; and 
thereby, avoided making it worth anyone's effort to formally complain.  
 However, recent events indicate an increasing level of success for border police 
oversight and customs oversight. In March 2009, police arrested 35 people from Novi 
Pascar, Kraljeva, and Raska, including 18 police officers for smuggling, corruption, and 
illegal possession of weapons.315 In December 2009, customs officers arrested 13 border 
police and six customs officers in BPCs along the border with Montenegro on suspicion 
of corruption and abuse of authority, alleging they had accepted bribes during the period 
April to December 2009.316 In March 2009, nine border police officers received 10 to 18 
month prison sentences for receiving bribes and allowing customs-free transport of goods  
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across the Serbian-Kosovo border in 2007. In June, 16 border police officers were 
sentenced to 18 to 20 month prison sentences for accepting bribes to facilitate smuggling 
of cattle across the Drina River to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
E. CONCLUSION 
 The review of the organizational reforms undertaken by the Police Directorate 
and the Border Police Directorate indicate that a large number of reforms were planned 
and executed to bring the legislative framework of policing into greater consistency with 
the EU standards. However, despite the expert advice of international experts from 
DCAF, the OCSE, the EU, etc., much of the legislation that was enacted lacked 
consistency with the prevailing conditions in society. For example, The Law on 
Organization and Jurisdiction of Government Authorities in Suppression of Organized 
Crime-Law on Organized Crime of 2003 was considered unworkable and police and 
prosecutors produced few results with it.317 The aspects of the Law on Police, the 
Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, and the Charter of Right intended to 
prevent police brutality and abuse of authority have not proved effective despite being 
created with the expert guidance of agencies such as OCSE, DCAF, etc.  
 In contrast, the legislative changes for more formulaic activities proved more, 
although not fully, successful. This is especially the case when the legislative changes 
were backed up by international support in the form of implementing technologies and 
financial support. For example, the Customs Law reforms and the Law on Protection of 
the State Border to enable IBM were more successful. These laws were written and 
adopted to implement agency strategic plans that had been developed under the guidance 
of EU experts and international agencies. The implementation of border control is being 
carried out by a relatively small group of about 6,000 border police, many of whom were 
hired and trained as part of the reforms, and by about 2,200 Customs Administration  
 
                                                 
317  Paunovic, “Police Reform in Serbia,” Friedenskonsolidierung auf dem Balkan: Probleme und 
Perspektiven, Nov. 2005, p. 77-89. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), Hamburg, 
Germany, 79-80, accessed April 9, 2010, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
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staff, all of whom are following a clearly defined EU model. A major portion of the total 
cost of the implementation has been supported by EU funds and other members of the 
international community.  
 In oversimplified terms, the summary that can be taken from this is that in 
security sector reform, as in new business start-ups, a “franchise,” in which all the details 
are specified and manuals provided as guides to all the “how-to-do-it” aspects and 
infrastructural equipment is supplied as part of the package, is much more likely to be 
successful than if the entrepreneur (reformer) has to think through and figure all the 
“how-tos” for himself. Of course, the other part of franchise success is that the franchisee 
must want to carefully and diligently follow the strategy and procedures specified by the 
franchisor. The carrot of EU pre-accession aid and of near term accession to EU markets 
have made “doing it the EU way,” regarding border security, seem worthwhile because 
EU border control success is measured statistically; and statistics on interdictions and 
seizures can be increased without preventing illicit flows.  
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V.  POLICE AND BORDER SECURITY REFORM CHALLENGES 
A. MUP REFORM CHALLENGES 
1. Resource Allocation 
 The MUP budget is 75 percent consumed by salaries of current staff and pensions 
of retirees. There is little fiscal flexibility to invest in modern crime detection and 
suppression equipment, labs or training. 
2. Legacy Staffing and Organizational Culture 
 The MUP’s ability to reform is also challenged by the legacy of senior staff and 
managers who participated in the 1990s economy and the 1990s ethnic conflicts, and 
whose human capital has been optimized to function in an environment of corruption and 
use of violence as the primary mode of interaction. Valuation of human rights and focus 
of effort toward creative innovations that generate win-win outcomes are not habitual 
practices for these managers; and consequently, they are poorly suited to being leaders 
promoting liberalization and democratization and entrepreneurial economic and social 
growth. 
 As a consequence of both the budgetary tightness and the culture of the MUP, the 
Ministry lacks a functional long term strategic planning and budgeting process. That 
makes coordinating efforts over long periods to achieve success with complex reform 
challenges difficult or perhaps not feasible. It is crucial that the MUP develop an integral 
long term strategic planning and budgeting process.  
 The tolerance, or perhaps preference, for redundancy in non-mission critical 
organizations appears to be a part of the MUP culture. One of the main aspects of the 
2006 police education reform was the consolidation of the Police College and Police 
Academy, which performed very similar functions but worked independently of each 
other. Similarly, part of the reform was the consolidation of the various independent anti-
terrorism and special police units into the Gendarmerie. Perhaps to insiders, there is an 
advantage to having multiple largely redundant units working at low utilization levels 
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because they represent stores of manpower available on short notice for quick response. 
However, to an outsider the multiple redundant units working at low capacity utilization 
levels looks like wasting resources and not completely having the capability to respond in 
more complex and sophisticated ways to situations. In terms of an example, borders can 
still be controlled by men with guns searching each car and truck that applies to pass 
through. But, highly integrated just-in-time industries cannot operate across such a 
border, and so the country cannot gain the benefits such industries could offer. With the 
help of the DCAF, OCSE and EU, the Border Police Directorate has managed to avoid 
this sort of roadblock. But, fully functioning IBM does not all happen at the borders. For 
example, part of keeping borders closed to undesirable people and products relies on high 
quality criminal intelligence and information sharing with other jurisdiction's CID police. 
High quality IBM cannot be achieved if the various criminal investigative and special 
organized crime units all have redundant investigative and intelligence units, so that the 
total of what they achieve is less than the sum of their individual efforts.  
 The MUP as a whole and the Police Directorate must meet the challenge of 
defining appropriately narrow unit missions and competences, eliminating organizational 
and operational redundancies, to increase efficiency and capabilities as a police force. 
Designing narrower job description competences can also help to raise individual 
productivity and allow headcount reduction to free up some of the limited budget for 
higher salaries or investment in training and equipment. In the short term, the MUP has 
the opportunity to take advantage of low to no cost training by EU sponsored groups such 
as OCSE, DFAC, etc., and strategically taking advantage of this subsidy is smart 
management.  
3. Oversight 
 The other reform challenge illustrated is that oversight cannot function if police 
are allowed to refuse to be accountable to oversight processes. Police accountability to 
the rule of law and to the citizens of the community is fundamental EU standards. 
Increasing police accountability is a crucial reform challenge facing the MUP.  
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 The Police Directorate faces an organizational challenge, which it has not been 
able to cope with so far. The description of Police Oversight mechanisms above noted the 
Inspector General’s Service was ineffective during the first years. The response by the 
government, presumably with at least the agreement, or perhaps the recommendation, of 
the Minister was to set up another oversight mechanism, the Internal Affairs Division 
with a considerably overlapping mandate. There does not seem to have been an effort to 
define a clear division of responsibilities between the two oversight units.  
 The response by the government, presumably with at least the agreement or 
perhaps the recommendation of the Minister, was to set up another oversight mechanism, 
the Internal Affairs Division, with a considerably overlapping mandate. There does not 
seem to have been an effort to define a clear division of responsibilities between the two 
oversight units.  
B. POLICE DIRECTORATE REFORM CHALLENGES 
1. Human Rights Issues 
 Restraining police officers from engaging in human rights violations and 
brutality, and disciplining those who do, continue to be a challenge for the Police 
Directorate. A recent State Department report relates the example of a Belgrade police 
officer, Miljan Raicevic, who was sentenced to a seven year prison term for killing 
Djordje Zaric, an individual citizen whom the police officer had stopped in traffic.318 
Given the Serbian court’s sentencing of the killers of Prime Minister Djindjic to 40 year 
sentences, a seven-year sentence for a brutal murder is extremely lenient punishment, 
suggesting that the justice system is either corrupt or values preferential treatment of 
police lawbreakers, neither of which is consistent with the EU culture of unbiased 
application of the rule of law. Whether the killing was premeditated, putting into question 
the officer’s fitness to exercise the authority to enforce the rule of law, or whether the  
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killing was impulsive, suggesting fundamental issues with police human resources 
screening and training processes, the killing is symptomatic of fundamental problems for 
the process of assimilation of Serbia into the EU society.  
 The report also notes that existing Serbian law allows authorities to detain a 
person for up to six months without charging the detainee, which is hardly consistent 
with respect for the detainee’s human rights. In addition the police often violate even this 
law by detaining people for longer than six months before charging them or releasing 
them.319  
 A second example from the same report highlights two other reform challenges. 
In July 2008, Ranko Panic died after being beaten by multiple police officers while he 
was participating in a political rally regarding ICTY indictee Radovan Karadzic, who at 
the time of the rally had not yet surrendered to the ICTY. An internal police investigation 
was begun into the actions of the six involved police, including a senior commander; but 
more than a year later there were no reports on the results of the investigation.320 
 One reform challenge this example illustrates is the continued tendency for Police 
Directorate officers to be used by the government to suppress opposition. As the Djindjic 
leadership transition demonstrated, there is still considerable acceptance in Serbian 
society of the settlement of political issues by violence when persuasion, intimidation or 
bribery is not successful. This challenge is more than can be solved by new legislation or 
setting up a new unit for civil rights crimes. Nor will appointing new police supervisors 
with clean backgrounds to admonish the troops not to pick on anti-government protesters 
solve the issue, because the regulars will wait till their off-hours to take carry of 
opposition “troublemakers.” To make refusal to engage in political suppression a new 
Serbian Police Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) requires an organizational culture 
change. Theoretically, that sort of cultural change could be brought about gradually 
through the Police Academy training process, except that as was noted above, in the  
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“new” curriculum the same long experienced instructors are teaching essentially the same 
texts and courses using the same militaristic styles of instruction as they have been for the 
last twenty years.  
2. Corruption Control 
 Mention was made above of the problem of corruption in the Traffic Police force 
and of the prevalence of corruption of customs officers and border police at BCPs. The 
several reports noted above, of large numbers of customs officers being suspended for 
running large scale smuggler organizations, suggests that customs and border police 
management oversight mechanisms are not able to prevent corruption nor to detect it 
consistently enough to make the cost of potentially being caught high enough to 
discourage officers from making large investments of time and effort to engage in 
corruption. If the oversight mechanisms are not able to reliably detect higher value 
corruption, then smaller amount corruption would result in even less risk of punishment; 
and therefore, would be perceived as essentially free money to the border control officers. 
This suggests that petty corruption by border police and customs officers is “standard 
operating procedure” and is tolerated, perhaps grudgingly, by senior Customs and Border 
Police managers.  
 The extent to which corruption affects the senior levels of the police, border 
police and customs is less clear. Six years ago the former Interior Minister stated publicly 
that the major political parties and politicians were being financed by mafia networks.321 
In December 2009 on the occasion of submitting Serbia’s application for EU 
membership, President Boris Tadic declared that “Serbia’s future depends on breaking 
the ties between crime, the economy and the judicial and political spheres.”322 Tadic is a 
skilled politician, so he may have been exaggerating with the intention of subtly 
threatening EU officials and members that if they do not support Serbia with financial aid 
and quick accession to membership, organized crime is likely to devour the vitality of his 
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country and then turn to the north for further spoils. However, to claim that the country’s 
future depends on breaking the existing hold of crime on the economy, the judiciary and 
the politicians suggests that corruption is extensive in the higher levels of decision-
making and leadership.  
 To minimize corruption, the Police Directorate and the Customs Administration 
need to reform organizational culture. This is a complex challenge; however, designing 
narrower job competences and raising salaries are complementary and relatively less 
demanding ways to reduce corruption. As alternate job requirements become more 
specialized, there is less overlap and less opportunity for an employee to easily obtain an 
alternate job in the event they are disciplined and lose their current position. As the salary 
benefits of a position become a greater portion of the total benefits and corruption 
skimming a lower proportion, the employee is less likely to risk being demoted to a lower 
salaried position. Therefore, narrowing job descriptions and raising salaries will cause 
employees to be more restrained in engaging in corrupt practices or abuse of authority. 
 A contributing reform challenge may be the private security sector. The Serbian 
Registers Agency reports there are approximately 600 registered protection, security and 
detective companies in Serbia with a total of approximately 40,000 employees authorized 
to carry weapons. This makes the “private sector army” larger than the Serbian military, 
which in 2010 had 36,000 personnel, many of whom are desk and supply workers who 
are not armed. However, the police with 47,000 armed officers still outgun the private 
sector.323 Nevertheless, having such a large number of armed ex-military or ex-
paramilitary-police operating with minimal regulations provides opportunities for these 
“private protection, security and detective” staff to hire out to organized crime as well as 
to legitimate employers; thereby, enhancing the power of organized crime businesses and 
enhancing the potential returns to corruption. 
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3. ICTY 
 The government has been subject to much pressure for its failure to have the 
police or the military find and arrest ICTY indictees, including Ratko Mladic and Goran 
Hatzic. The various coalition governments since 2003 have consistently avowed their 
intention to cooperate with the ICTY, at least whenever pressed by an EU or international 
aid funding deadline, and at all times during the years since 2008. Yet, the capturing of 
indictees has been a delayed process. Apparently this indicates the power balance in 
Serbian society. The government does not command the allegiance of all groups in 
society, notably some parts of the security sector. There is a power balance generated as 
the profits from smuggling and other organized crime businesses provide a significant 
proportion of the population with higher incomes than they estimate they could earn from 
the opportunities government policies could provide to them. People with no expectation 
of being able to gain by pleasing the government are unlikely to provide information that 
would aid the government, especially if they are benefiting by not doing so. For example, 
Radovan Karadzic is reported to have supplemented the salaries of a large portion of the 
Repubic Srpska police force for a number of years. This decentralization of power in 
society to organized crime business owners and employees remains a challenge to 
government reform efforts.  
 To some extent, this challenge is being overcome as the increasing amounts of EU 
funding of the EU integration adjustment process are providing the government with 
control over a growing proportion of the total economic activity in the country. In 
addition, the government is in the process of “fiscalizing various industries such as taxi 
drivers and lawyers by requiring them to install and use cash registers, so there will be a 
record of their transactions to form a basis for the collection of taxes.”324 The more 
breadth of control the government gains over various sectors of the economy, the more  
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success they will have in extracting compliance from the security sector and the citizenry 
for assistance with apprehending both the few remaining fugitive ICTY indictees and the 
many organized crime members.  
 As Bideleux and Jeffries observe, successful reform does not require reformers 
“to win over or gain the acquiescence of the thuggish ultra-nationalist and the criminal 
gangster wings of the Serbian polity, economy and society,” as with sufficient financial 
resources reformers can “marginalize and gradually neutralize” the obstructionist 
elements.325 This has essentially been the EU strategy to date, with EU support providing 
benefits to the sectors of the Serbian security system that were blocking the critical path 
of reform. However, the easier reforms, putting in place new legislative frameworks, 
down-sizing the military sector, and installing basic modern border control technology to 
ensure basic border security have been accomplished. 
C.  BORDER POLICE AND CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION REFORM 
CHALLENGES 
 The Border Police Directorate and the Customs Administration have successfully 
implemented border control, including providing relatively efficient movement of 
travelers and trade goods through the borders and basic border security to keep out some 
of the illegal migrants and some of the unauthorized goods. This is an important 
accomplishment. However, it is doubtful that border security operations, which 
sporadically, rather than routinely and systematically, apprehend illegal migrants and 
smugglers will be effective at keeping the border closed to typically much better financed 
and trained terrorists. Yet, keeping the Serbian border closed to terrorists is a major 
security concern for the EU members.  
 To achieve higher level IBM and the moderate or high level border security that 
effective IBM can provide requires reducing corruption to much lower levels, increasing 
interdiction capabilities, and increasing Customs Service, Border Police and Police 
Directorate intelligence gathering and analysis and coordination capabilities. The 
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intelligence effectiveness enhancement is highly dependent on public cooperation. Public 
cooperation depends on the public’s level of trust and belief that the police and border 
security officers’ activities are serving the public’s interests. Public confidence that the 
police and border security officers activities are serving the public’s interests will not 
develop if Police Directorate officers continue to violate citizens’ human and civil rights, 
nor if police and border guard officers continue to be involved in corruption. Reducing 
both these undesirable tendencies requires changes to organizational culture.  
D.  KOSOVA ADMINISTRATIVE LINE 
 While Serbian politicians officially refuse to acknowledge the line between Serbia 
and Kosova as an international border, the MUP signed a protocol with EULEX in 2009 
regarding control of what the MUP refers to as the “administrative line” between Serbia 
and Kosova. Eleven Administrative Line Control Points (ALCPs) have been set up with 
moderate speed digital data communication links to the MUP Single Information System 
(SIS) and with automatic readers for electronic travel documents installed and 
functioning. Maintaining border security of the “administrative line” involves several 
challenges that are amplifications of the regular IBM border security issues. 
 Securing the administrative line itself will be the task of the Gendarmerie. The 
MUP has stationed elite Gendarmerie officers along the administrative line border and 
nearby to each ALCP to maintain the security of the ALCPs and of the administrative 
line itself. Unlike the Border Security Police along other borders, the Gendarmerie troops 
are assigned to be constantly engaged in reconnaissance patrols using surveillance radars 
and opto-electronic devices, as well as in operations exercises including ambushes, 
blockades, raids, and search and inspection of terrain and facilities along the 
administrative line. These exercises are claimed to be preventative and intended to detect 
illegal crossings, as well to detect narcotics smuggling, smuggling of weapons, and 
human trafficking.  
 The border control task to be performed at the ALCPs is more complex than at the 
BCPs along Serbia’s other borders due to two factors. One is that the administrative 
situation in Kosova is complex and in flux. Administration of the internal and border 
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security of Kosova is a shared task of KFOR, EULEX, UNMIK, and the Kosovo 
government. The MUP has sought the institution of regular meetings at the local, 
operative and command level between the Gendarmerie, KFOR, and UNMIK. The 
Kosova government may lack sufficient resources to accurately collect and share the data 
needed for IBM. In addition, due to Serbia’s refusal to recognize the Kosovo 
government’s declaration of independence, and possibly due to corruption, the Kosovo 
government may not fully cooperate with Serbian border guards on information sharing 
and implementation of IBM. As a result, the Border Police Directorate officers staffing 
the ALCPs probably have access to less shared information than is available to BCP 
officers along other borders. Secondly, due to the status of the Kosova economy and its 
proximity to Albania, Kosova is a favored transit path for drugs being smuggled into 
western European EU countries, for irregular migrants to the EU, and for trafficking in 
human beings both into Serbia and into Kosova.326 Consequently, ALCP officers will 
have a relatively greater volume of attempted drug smuggling and attempted irregular 
migration northward to interdict. Reportedly, the greater profitability of smuggling, 
compared to other economic opportunities in Kosova and Albania, results in the 
attraction into the smuggling business of relatively more talented and capable individuals 
than occurs in other areas whose more prosperous economies provide more legitimate 
business opportunities. Therefore, the task of the Border Police Directorate and Customs 
Administration staffing the ACLPs is more difficult due to the relatively greater 
smuggling expertise and smuggling creativity of the people the ACLPs attempt to 
interdict, compared to those faced at the BCPs on other Serbian borders.   
 While ALCP security control presents a higher degree challenge for Border 
Directorate and Customs Administration border guard staff, the challenge provides a 
good testing environment for new interdiction equipment and advanced interdiction 
techniques. Further, the experience gained by border guards at the ALCPs is valuable in 
increasing the effectiveness of interdiction efforts at other BCPs.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
 The reforms to the Police Directorate and Border Police Directorate and Customs 
Administration organization and operations have had positive effects. The Customs 
Administration enjoyed somewhat better access to funds to support reforms, both from 
domestic revenues and from foreign support, through the EU CARDS scheme as well as 
bilateral assistance funding. The Customs Administration is a more transparent 
organization than a national policing agency, and this also allowed the Customs 
Administration to draw more fully on foreign expertise in developing its reform strategy 
and in implementing through emulation some of the best practices offered by the World 
Customs Union, the World Bank, and the EU. The Custom Administration began its 
reform with a detailed long term strategic plan developed in consultation with 
international experts in customs service systems and organization. The Customs 
Administration existing electronic data system at the beginning of the reform process was 
essentially obsolete, and many of the BCPs were in new locations or needed to be rebuilt. 
These considerations made the reform effort almost as much of a greenfield project as a 
renovation. The Customs Administration has adopted electronic document filing and 
customs clearing, as well as basic risk assessment based inspection management and has 
transformed itself into an EU standards compliant customs service. 
 The Border Police Directorate has also had the advantage of having begun its 
reform process with the development of a long run strategic plan developed in 
consultation with EU experts in border control infrastructure. A border control system is 
a relatively non-secret operation and, therefore, the Border Police Directorate has had the 
advantage of being able to readily draw on discussions with international experts. The 
Border Control Directorate also enjoyed a second advantage in its reform process in that 
the Schengen standards specify to a significant degree the objectives of the process, 
making the reform somewhat analogous to implementing a business franchise. Also 
somewhat similar to a franchise, the seller, in this case the EU, offered financing and 
ongoing guidance in completing the infrastructure installation and acquiring the 
equipment and getting the operation up-and-running. Serbia has its border control system 
functioning and is now working on developing more expertise in operating the system to 
  146
increase the resistance, or impermeability, of its borders to undesirable and illegal 
passage of goods (drugs, unauthorized goods) and people (illegal migrants). Furthermore, 
the Border Police Directorate requirements became national priorities because of the need 
the government felt to demonstrate its cooperation with the EU accession process in the 
political least contentious ways and because the EU prioritized border security conditions 
in the accession process.  
 Of the three organizations considered in this assessment of border security, the 
Police Directorate has faced the most difficult reform process. As a national police 
system responsible for internal security, as well as domestic and foreign intelligence, the 
processes of the Police Directorate must be kept more private for national security 
reasons. In addition, the Police Directorate commenced the reform process with excess 
manpower, which almost surely believed it embodied sufficient expertise without 
drawing extensively on international expertise or international best practice models. 
There was also less availability of external funding support for general police reform than 
for the other two aspects of border security reform considered in this thesis. Due partly to 
the institutional habits that had developed in the MUP during the 1990s, the Police 
Directorate started off the reform process without a strong planning procedure; and did 
not develop a long term strategic plan. Further, the Police Directorate was hampered in its 
reform by a relative lack of MUP financial capacity to invest in new infrastructure 
(educational curricula, long run strategic training programs for mid and senior managers), 
and non-weapons related modern policing equipment e.g. forensic crime scene and 
forensic laboratory equipment. 
 In addition, all three of these organizations faced the difficulties of starting reform 
from corporate cultures, which a western commentator would classify as ‘ethically 
challenged’. The Customs Service had been trained to be corrupt by its former director, 
Kertes, as part of the Milosevic government’s policies to survive UN embargoes. Officers 
of the Police Service had been required by their periodic battle front work "shifts" during 




Service staff had learned from the example of their colleagues from Customs to be 
corrupt, and from the example of their colleagues in the other units of the Police Service 
to be brutal and mercenary. 
 Many liberal democratic observers have been disappointed by the pace of reform 
toward EU standards demonstrated by the Serbian security sector. According to one 
commentator, "The most significant result of the reforms on the operational level were 
the return to Interpol and the establishment of international cooperation, higher 
representation of women, successful prevention of violence escalation in the south of 
Serbia and the creation of multi-ethnic police, and the formation of the Unit for the 
Suppression of Organized Crime and its success, improving the forensic capacities, and 
takeover of the border protection."327 Of these, the return to Interpol in 2001 and the 
establishment of much international cooperation as well as the creation of the multi-
ethnic police in 2001/2002, occurred toward the beginning of the Djindjic government. 
As discussed above, the Unit for Suppression of Organized Crime has won some battles; 
but has a long way to go before it could be said to have been a success in suppressing 
organized crime to levels typical of other EU countries. Recent successes have been the 
technical improvement in forensic capability and the demilitarization and implementation 
of integrated border management style border controls, also a largely technical 
installation. Thus the recent reform successes have been of a technical nature, and 
reforms dependent on organizational culture changes have largely been delayed. Reforms 
that are completely foreign to cultural habits are difficult to implement, even if formally 
adopted. Even within the pro-EU government Cabinet, there has been reluctance to 
effectively implement some EU liberal democratic institutions, such as the law on 
reporting of assets and incomes of National Assembly members and of political parties, 
and to exercise the admittedly weak powers of National Assembly committees to oversee 
the security sector. Given the influence of the Belgrade Law School based intellectual 
elite, the literary elite, and the Orthodox Serbian Church on the fundamental worldview 
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dominant in the culture, and the war experience of much of the population, it is not so 
surprising that the habits of perception and habits of responding consistently with liberal 
democratic values have not been adopted more than superficially by the vast majority of 
the Serbian populace. 
 The reform path ahead for border security in Serbia involves transformation of the 
organizational culture of the border guard organizations, and of the other security sector 
actors, primarily the police and the courts, that IBM depends on. The challenge of 
managing organizational cultural change has yet to be overcome by any of the Customs 
Administration, the Border Police, or the Police Directorate. This challenge is currently 
being approached through ethics training modules for customs and police officers. This is 
unlikely to have significant lasting effect. Unless more appropriate reform approaches are 
introduced and supported by the international community, Serbian border security reform 
in unlikely to proceed quickly. For Serbian border security reform to succeed in 
generating higher levels of IBM and borders closed to terrorists and organized crime 
before 2020, reforms based on the considerations in the following section must be 








VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Serbian implementation of EU-mandated reforms to the laws and administrative 
practices of the police and the border management security sectors have been slower than 
many EU and other western observers partly due to the lack of political support for 
submission of Serbian autonomy to broader EU community interests by conservative 
nationalist elements in Serbian society. Serbian politicians have suggested the 
responsibility for this lies with organized crime and corruption. Prime Minister Zoran 
Djindjic famously quipped that other countries have their mafias but in Serbia the mafia 
has its country. In 2004, according to former MUP Minister Dusan Mihajlovic, mafia 
networks in regular business and in illicit business were financing major political parties 
and politicians.328 In December 2009, President Boris Tadic in formally making 
application for EU membership stated that “Serbia’s future depends on breaking the ties 
between crime, the economy and the judicial and political spheres.”329 Serbian policy 
commentators suggest that in response to further reforms that effectively curtail 
organized crime and corruption of institutions "fierce resistance should be expected. 
Nationalist politicians will protest against foreign meddling in their country's internal 
affairs; corrupted officials and bureaucrats will resist reforms, and they will team up with 
those who are simply incompetent, but eager to keep their positions.”330 Future reforms 
that effectively enhance border security and policing will certainly curtail corruption and 
organized crime, making the prospects for Serbia’s success in meeting EU accession 
conditions for IBM and policing appear dim.  
 From a liberal point of view, this is too pessimistic. As Bideleux and Jeffries 
observe, successful reform does not require reformers “to win over or gain the 
acquiescence of the thuggish ultra-nationalist and the criminal gangster wings of the 
Serbian polity, economy and society.” Instead, with sufficient financial resources 
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reformers can “marginalize and gradually neutralize” the obstructionist elements.331 This 
has essentially been the EU strategy to date with EU support providing benefits to the 
sectors of the Serbian security system forming blocks along the critical path of reform. 
However, the easier reforms such as putting in place new legislative frameworks, down-
sizing the military sector, and installing modern border control technology to ensure basic 
border security have been accomplished. Yet, it is doubtful that border security 
operations that sporadically, rather than routinely and systematically, apprehend illegal 
migrants and smugglers will be effective at keeping the border closed to typically much 
better financed and trained terrorists. Keeping the Serbian border closed to terrorists is a 
major security concern for the EU members.  
 To achieve higher level IBM and the moderate or high level border security that 
effective IBM can provide requires reducing corruption to much lower levels, increasing 
interdiction capabilities, and increasing customs service, border police and Police 
Directorate intelligence gathering and analysis and coordination capabilities. The latter is 
highly dependent on public cooperation. Public cooperation depends on the public’s level 
of trust and belief that the police and border security officers’ activities are serving the 
public’s interests. Public confidence that the police and border security officers activities 
are serving the public’s interests will not develop if Police Directorate officers continue 
to violate citizen’s human and civil rights, or if police and border guard officers continue 
to be involved in corruption. Reducing both these undesirable tendencies requires 
changes to organizational culture.  
 The reform path ahead for border security in Serbia involves transformation of the 
organizational culture of the border guard organizations and of the other security sector 
actors, primarily the police and the courts, that IBM depends on. The challenge of 
managing organizational cultural change has yet to be overcome by any of the Customs 
Administration, the border police, or the Police Directorate. This challenge is currently 
being approached through ethics training modules for customs and police officers. This is 
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unlikely to have significant lasting effect. Unless more appropriate reform approaches are 
introduced and supported by the international community, Serbian border security reform 
in unlikely to proceed quickly. For Serbian border security reform to succeed in 
generating higher levels of IBM and borders closed to terrorists and organized crime 
before 2020, reforms based on the considerations in the following section must be 
developed and implemented.  
 The youth of Serbian society were originally won over to a pro-EU worldview by 
the civil-society funding channeled to Otpor and affiliated groups in the late 1980s and 
1990s. Many voting and powerful members of the older generation have remained within 
a more nationalistic worldview strongly influenced by the cultural mythologies of the 
Kosova Epic and personal or inter-generational memories of the plight of Serbians at the 
hands of other European nations during the 1939-45 conflict. 
 While it would be oversimplifying to say the educated urban older generation are 
guided by the Serbian literary elite, and the less educated rural older generation are 
guided by the Church, the strongholds and leadership of this more nationalistic 
worldview are located within the current senior membership of the Serbian Academy of 
Arts and Science, within the University of Belgrade Faculty of Law, and within the 
Serbian Orthodox Church clergy. 
 To increase the flexibility of Serbian political and electoral support for 
nationalistic policies and to promote increased Serbian flexibility in accommodating the 
needs of the expanding and integrating EU economy, a number of strategies should be 
pursued including: 
• Channeling of increased academic research grant and conference travel 
funding to younger more EU-oriented members of the Serbian Academy 
of Arts and Sciences (SANU) 
• A grant to the University of Belgrade tied to funding of a large number of 
new chairs in law to be filled by scholars under age 30 with international 
academic legal training, and coupled with generous research grant and 
conference travel funding to these new legal scholars to allow them to 
publish voluminously so as to dominate the legal literature with pro-EU 
theory and commentary 
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• Channeling of increased funding to priests and bishops of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church who hold pro-EU views and promulgate those views to 
their parishioners 
 Further, while the younger generation was won over to the pro-EU worldview in 
the 1990s, some aspects of EU politics, including the xenophobia being expressed in 
more restrictive intra-EU immigration regulations and the recent political reluctance to 
accommodate Greece's financial situation without escalating it to an economic crisis, is 
causing some Serbian youth to back away from their enthusiasm for EU integration. The 
EU and its agencies should resolve to address this issue by providing additional funding 
for more civil-society groups in Western Europe, which promote multiculturalism and 
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